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MANUSCRIPT*
YOU CAN'T PATENT SOFTWARE:
PATENTING SOFTWARE IS WRONG
Peter D. Jungert
INTRODUCTION
Until the invention of programmable' digital computers around the
time of World War II, no one had imagined-and probably no one
could have imagined-that methods of solving mathematical
. Editor's Note: This article is the final known manuscript of Professor Peter Junger. We
present this piece to you as a tribute to Professor Junger and for your own enjoyment. This
piece was not, at the time of Professor Junger 's passing, submitted to any Law Review or legal
journal. Accordingly, Case Western Reserve University Law Review is publishing this piece as it
was last edited by Professor Junger, with the following exceptions: we have formatted the
document for printing, and corrected obvious typographical errors. Footnotes have been
updated to the best of our ability, but without Professor Junger 's input, you may find some
errors. Internal references are likely to be inconsistent and could not be corrected without the
author's input; internet sources may be out of date or unavailable. The article was originally
published as a work-in-progress at Professor Junger's website, http://samsara.law.cwru.edul
patart/index.html (now unavailable).
t I want to thank Judith Kaul for all the assistance that she has given me over the years in
locating the materials that made writing this article possible. I also want to express my great
debt of gratitude to Gino J. Scarselli for all the uncompensated work that he did in establishing
that the First Amendment protects the publication of software in the case of Junger v. Daley.
And finally I must apologize to Flanders and Swan for appropriating-more or less-a small
portion of the lyrics of You Can't Eat People for the title of this article.
Among the early programmable digital computers were Konrad Zuse's Z3 developed in
Germany in 1941, the Colossus (which was not fully programmable, not being Turing complete)
developed by Tommy Flowers in England in 1943, and Mauchly and Eckert's ENIAC I
completed in 1946 in the United States. It is also worth noting that Charles Babbage designed,
but was unable to actually construct, a programmable-using punch cards--mechanical
computer, called the "analytical engine," back in the second-half of the nineteenth century. See
infra Part VI.A.3(a)(i). Augusta Ada King, Countess of Lovelace wrote a program for
Babagge's Analytical Engine and thus is usually credited with being the world's first computer
programmer. Id Both Babbage and Lady Lovelace were skilled mathematicians.
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problems could be patented. In 1972, however, the Supreme Court of
the United States2 was confronted in Gottschalk v. Benson3 with the
question of whether "an application for [a patent on] an invention...
related 'to the processing of data by program and more particularly to
the programmed conversion of numerical information' 4 in general-
purpose digital computers," 5 covered patentable subject matter; the
Court held that the claimed invention was not patentable,6 in effect
holding that most, and probably all, claims that relate to programs for
the processing of data-that is, most claims that relate to what is
commonly, but perhaps unfortunately, 7 called "software"-do not
cover patentable subject matter.8
Since then the holding in Benson has not been overruled-or even
questioned-by the Court, yet it appears today that most patent
lawyers, and most legal academics who think about such matters, are
now convinced that software is patentable and that Benson is no
longer good law having, in effect. been overruled by later decisions of
a lower court, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.9
It is, however, my contention in this article that Benson is still
good law-after all the Supreme Court is not likely to concede that its
opinions can be overruled by any of the lower courts-and, more
importantly from an academic point of view, that Benson was
correctly decided, for most of the arguments for overturning the
holding in Benson and permitting the granting of patents on software
rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the
information that is processed by-and that is all that can be processed
by-a computer.
Thus it is my contention here that inventions, no matter how novel
or useful they may be, in the field of computer programming-that is,
2 In this article I am only concerned with the law of the United States. If I know little
about U.S. patent law, I know infinitely less about that of other jurisdictions.
3 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
4 All that computer programs do can fairly be described as the conversion-i.e., the
processing--of information. See infra Part VI.C.
5 409 US at 64.
6 In this article I argue at length-and, frankly, I think quite persuasively-that the
holding in Benson that the application in that case did not cover a patentable invention applies to
all applications for patents on inventions that consist of computer programs for the processing of
data-and that all computer programs do nothing more, or less, than control the way in which a
computer processes data, i.e. numerical information." For a discussion of Benson in some detail,
see infra Part II.A.
7 See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
8 In Benson the Court was careful to say: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent
for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold", 409 U.S. at 71, but that cautious
statement does not, of course, amount to a holding, or even a dictum, that there are programs
that are patentable.
9 See infra Part 11.
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in the field of processing data or information-are not and should not
be patentable.
I. COMPUTERS AND SOFTWARE
We all know what computers are, or at least we think we do: they
are machines 10 that process information." Few of us, on the other
hand, have any idea of what information is, 12 even though we are
supposedly living in an "information age." Moreover, few of us have
any clear idea about what software is other than the generic name for
computer programs.' 3 And most of us, I fear, do not really understand
what computer programs are--or what, for that matter, they are not.
14
A quick, but perhaps not too informative, definition of software is:
Data that controls how a computer processes data.15
Computers, on the other hand, are tangible, kickable gadgets that
will in a pinch serve as doorstops16 and that are designed to be used in
the processing of information. 17 If someone were to invent a new type
of computer or a new way to manufacture computers, there is no
doubt that that invention would be patentable.'
8
Computer programs are, according to the foregoing definition,
software and they also have been defined as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result," 19 that is, in order to process information
10 And sometimes human beings.
I I.e., data. For further discussion of the nature of computers, see infra Part VI.A.
12 For a discussion of the nature of information and data-which is information that is
interesting enough for someone to process it in a computer-See infra Part VI.C.
13 The term "software" is misleading to the extent that it suggests that software is-that
computer programs are-the same sort of "ware" as the hardware, i.e., the computer, upon
which it runs. See infra Part VI.B.
14 In particular, they are not-and thus they are not patentable as-machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter. See infra note 20.
15 For a quick definition of data, see infra note 17.
16 At least in those cases where they are not human beings. See infra text accompanying
notes 23 and 24.
17 Or, slightly more precisely, data. "Data" is simply information that someone finds
interesting and perhaps worth processing. As to what information is, see infra Part VI.C.
18 As a machine. See infra note 20.
19 This definition comes from the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. One caution about this
definition: the term "instructions" does not imply that computers understand and obey
instructions the way human beings--or even dogs--do. Digital computers mechanically carry
out their instructions in the same manner that an automobile obeys the instructions transmitted
to it by the steering wheel or the brake, quite without any understanding. Human computers, on
the other hand, may, but are not required to, understand what it is that they are doing. The
Copyright Act also provides that: "In no case does copyright protection.., extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied . I... Id  at § 101b. That,
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is some specified way. Now, since the Patent Act says that processes
are patentable, 20 it might seem that the Court's holding in Benson was
clearly wrong. But the Court in Benson, of course, was perfectly well
aware that processes are patentable, and yet it still held that means of
processing data, even novel and useful ones, specified by an
algorithm, which is to say any computer program,21 cannot be
patented, because they are the equivalent of mental processes that can
be carried out not only by machines, but also by critters like us using
nothing but "head and hand ,,22 There once was, after all, a time
within the memory of some who are still alive23 when "computer" was
a job description and "computers" were people.24
There are lots of processes that involve the processing of
information that no one would dream 25 could be patented: hearing,
reading, thinking, speaking, writing, printing, and publishing, for
example, processes that26 are protected by the Freedoms of Speech
of course, raises the question of whether software can be copyrighted, a question that is not
further discussed in this article.
20 Part 101 of the Patent Act provides that:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 35 U.S.C. §
101 and Part 100(b) defines "process" as "process, art or method, and includes a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
21 Every computer program is an algorithm, ultimately composed of simple steps that can
be executed with stupendous reliability by one simple mechanism or another. Electronic circuits
are the usual choice, but the power of computers owes nothing (save speed) to the causal
peculiarities of electrons darting about on silicon chips. The very same algorithms can be
performed (even faster) by devices shunting photons in glass fibers, or (much, much slower) by
teams of people using paper and pencils. DANIEL C. DENNET, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND MEANINGS OF LIFE 50 (Simon & Schuster Inc. 1995). See infra text
accompanying note 443.
22 "A digital computer ...operates on data expressed in digits, solving a problem by
doing arithmetic as a person would do it by head and hand." 409 U.S. at 65. See infra note 76
Other reasons given by the Court in Benson for the unpatentability of algorithms is that they are
unpatentable ideas and that they are-or are the equivalent of-natural laws that express
universal truths that cannot be invented, but only discovered. See infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
23 Like me.
24 See infra Part VI.A. 1. I even worked as a computer for a couple of evenings in the mid-
fifties of the last century when I was employed as a gravity observer up in the Northwest
Territories of Canada. It should be noted that people are kickable and tangible just like other
computers, even if they do not make very good doorstops. See supra text accompanying note
17. It should also be noted that human computers were not required to understand what it was
that they were doing. See supra note 19 and infra note 62.
25 Except perhaps for some patent attorney dreaming of becoming the master of the world.
26 With the possible exception of thinking.
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and of the Press of the First Amendment.27 I doubt that even the most
determined advocates of software patents would argue that "mental
processes" as such are, or should be, patentable.
II. YOU CAN'T PATENT SOFTWARE: BENSON AND ITS PROGENY
There are three cases decided by the Supreme Court that
collectively hold beyond any doubt that software as such cannot be
patented: 28 Gottschalk v. Benson,29 Parker v. Flook,3 0 and Diamond v.
Diehr.3
1
A. Gottschalk v. Benson
Benson was the first case in which the Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether software is patentable.32 Here is how Justice
Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the unanimous 33 Court in Benson,
described the patent claims that were at issue in that case:
Respondents filed in the Patent Office an application for an
invention which was described as being related "to the
processing of data by program34 and more particularly to the
programmed conversion of numerical information" in
general-purpose digital computers. 35 They claimed a method
for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into
pure binary numerals.36 The claims were not limited to any
particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or
machinery, or to any particular end use. They purported to
cover any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose
digital computer of any type....
27 See infra Part VI.B.5.
28 For an excellent short description of what these cases hold, as well as of the
constitutional authority to grant patents, see the passage from the dissent of Chief Judge Archer
in the Alappat case that is quoted infra Part II1.A. 1.
29 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
30 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
31 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
32 The patent claim in issue was filed by Gary Benson and Arthur Talbott, employees of
Bell Telephone Laboratories to whom they had assigned their patent rights. See Donald S.
Chisum, The Patentability ofAlgorithms, 47 U. Pir. L. REv. 959, 972,972 n.45 (1986).
33 Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell did not take part in the consideration of the
case. See, e.g., id. at 977 n.61.
34 As we shall see, all that programmable computers do is "the processing of data by
program." See infra Part VI.A.
35 All that general purpose digital computers can do is convert-i.e., process-
information that can be represented by numerals.
36 See infra text accompanying note 52.
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The patent sought is on a method of programming a general-
purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-
coded decimal form into pure binary form. A procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem is known as an
"algorithm., 37 The procedures set forth in the present claims
are of that kind; that is to say, they are a generalized
formulation for programs to solve mathematical problems of
converting one form of numerical representation to another.
From the generic formulation, programs may be developed as
specific applications.
38
The question before the Court was whether the method described
and claimed-whether the claimed way of converting numerical
information-was a patentable "process."
Even though the Patent Act defines a method as a process, 39 the
Court in Benson held that the claimed method was not patentable,
because, in the first place, a mathematical process is an "idea" and
ideas themselves are not patentable and, in the second place,
mathematical processes represent fundamental truths or laws of
nature and such truths or laws are not patentable.40 The Court, of
course, did not deny that processes can be patented, but it said that,
"Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines.
'Al
The Court in Benson held that the process sought to be patented
did not meet this test, which amounts to a holding that a means of
processing data or information42 is not a patentable process. And,
since one of the claims in Benson did include a specific reference to a
particular type of machine, a so-called "reentrant shift register,' ' 3 and
both claims could only be used in conjunction with a particular type
of machine-a digital computer44 -it also amounts to a holding that
37 As we shall see, all computer programs are algorithms, although not all algorithms are
computer programs. See infra Part VI.B. 1.
38 409 US at 64-65.
39 See supra note 20.
40 These two reasons are not separate, for the truths or laws of mathematics are both a
special case of the truths or laws of nature and a classic example of what is meant by an idea.
Thus, for example, the idea that 2+2 = 4 is a truth or law of mathematics. (Using the normal
definitions of"2" and "+").
41 409 U.S. at 70. In the context of Benson it is clear that the Court did not consider the
data that was processed was the type of "article" to which this description applies.
42 As to the meaning of "data" and "information" See infra Part VI.C.
43 409 U.S. at 73. For more on registers, see infra Part VI.A.6.
44 See infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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such a method is not patentable even if-or especially if-it requires
the use of a computer.45
1. Proceedings Below
Initially the patent examiner and the Patent Board of Appeals in
the Patent Office both held that the processes described in Benson's
claims 46 were not patentable because they "set forth 'mental
45 Or a component part thereof like a shift register. On the other hand, nothing in Benson
suggests that a new type of computer or shift register could not be patented like any other type
of machine.
46 The two independent claims at issue in Benson are set out in an appendix to the opinion
of the Supreme Court in that case. 409 U.S. at 73.
Claim 8 reads:
"The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary
which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is
a binary '1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and,
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of
said register."
Claim 13 reads:
"A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number
representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position '1,' beginning with the least
significant binary digit position, of the most significant decimal
digit representation for a binary '0' or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least
significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal
digit representation;
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary '1' at the (i + l)th and (i
+ 3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser
significant decimal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for
the next least significant binary digit position of said most
significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant
decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the
next lesser significant decimal digit representation as modified by
the previous execution of steps (1) through (3); and,
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant
decimal digit representation has been so processed."
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processes' and 'mathematical steps'," neither of which were
patentable subject matter "as construed by a long line of decisions. ' 7
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A") rejected
this analysis because, even though in theory the process disclosed in
the claims could be carried out by a human being using pencil and
paper, the only practical application of the claims involved the use of
a machine-a general purpose digital computer-and general purpose
digital computers do not perform mental steps. 8
Before reaching that conclusion, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals explained what the claimed method or process was all about,
in a passage that you may feel tells you more about bits and the
representations of numbers than you ever wanted to know:
49
Most digital computers perform their computing operations
on information" in binary form, a system of representation
having only two elementary constituents, called "bits,"
indicated by "1" and "0". Men, on the other hand, are
accustomed to quantitative information in decimal form and,
for the computer to work on or utilize it, it must be converted
into binary form. It has become a general practice to make
this conversion in two stages: from decimal to BCD; from
BCD to binary. The following table shows the ten familiar
decimal digits and their binary equivalents expressed in









47 In re Benson, 58 C.C.P.A. 1134, 1137 (C.C.P.A. 1971). For a short history of the
"mental steps" doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 100.
48 Id. That, I submit, amounted to saying that if one uses a tool like a computer or an
abacus or one's fingers to carry out a calculation that calculation is not a mental process.
49 This description does, however, serve as a pretty good introduction to the nature of
computer programs down at the lowest level where the instructions interact directly with the
hardware.
50 Nota bene this recognition that computers perform their operations upon
"information"--that computers process information. For a discussion of the nature of
information and an explanation of why methods of processing information should not be
patentable, see infra Part VI.C.
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In BCD notation the decimal number 53 would be
represented as 0101 0011, the binary form of 5 followed by
the binary form of 3, each group of four bits being a BCD
"digit." Although the BCD notation is in terms of"I" and "0"
only and can be represented in a binary machine, it is not in a
form in which the machine can utilize it to perform its
computing operations. In true binary the decimal number 53
is represented by 110101. The problem is to convert the
intermediate BCD representation into the true binary. Various
ways of doing this were known prior to appellants'
invention. They claim to have discovered a better and simpler
way of doing it having various advantages recited in the
specification such as reducing the number of steps required to
be taken, dispensing with the repetitive storing and retrieval
of partially converted information, eliminating the need for
interchanging signals among various equipment components
and the need for auxiliary equipment, and decreasing the
chance of error.51
It is, I think, important to realize that the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals did not reach its decision that Benson's claims
describing a process for converting BDC representations of numbers
to pure binary representations were patentable on any theory that
mental processes and mathematical steps are patentable; rather it held
that, since the steps and processes described in the claim were to be
carried out by a computer they were not mental processes or
mathematical steps, a claim that clearly was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Benson.
Here is what the C.C.P.A. had to say about Claim 852-the claim
describing the use of a "reentrant shift register":
We have set forth claim 8 above and have stated that the
examiner and board rejected it because they considered it to
be directed to "mental processes" and "mathematical steps.".
... [T]he question we have here [is]: ".... would a reasonable
interpretation of the claims include coverage of the process
implemented by the human mind?" The answer clearly is
51 58 C.C.P.A. at 1137.
52 See supra note 46.
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"No.".... 3 Claim 8 is for a method to be practiced in part on
particular apparatus specified to be a "reentrant shift
register." . . . . At argument, the Patent Office Solicitor
admitted that the reference to this piece of apparatus in the
claim was, for him, its "most embarrassing phrase., 54 It is not
only a phrase; it is referred to expressly in elements (1), (2),
(3), (4) and (7) and by implication in element (5) which refers
to "shifting." Claim 8, moreover, refers to the operations of
storing, shifting, and masking "signals" which, by a
reasonable interpretation in the light of the specification, can
only mean signals of the kind upon which the disclosed
electronic digital computer hardware operates. . . . The
process can be carried out with no intervention by a human
being once the apparatus is set up-that is to say, the
appropriate computer system has been assembled and
programmed....
On the other hand, the process can only be carried out in order to
satisfy human ends, directly or indirectly, and the ultimate outcome of
the process is useful only if there is a human being to interpret it. The
fact that the process can be carried out with no intervention by a
human being after the computer has been programmed is not a very
persuasive argument for saying that the program itself is not an idea
of a human mind.
The court also rejected the argument of the Patent Office Solicitor
that the claimed method was not a patentable process because it is
merely " a "tool of the mind,, 55 and that the method was basically
"mental" in character, because its "work stuff' was numbers which
are mathematical abstractions, supporting this rejection with the non
sequitur that "Cash registers, bookkeeping machines, and adding
machines also work only with numbers56 but this has never been
53 Justice Douglas's opinion in Benson in effect says that the answer clearly is "Yes."
54 58 C.C.P.A. at 1142. There was, as far as I can see, no reason for the Solicitor to be
embarrassed by the fact that claim 8 specified that the described program would run on a
particular apparatus. That fact certainly did not embarrass Justice Douglas when the issue
reached the Supreme Court. The supposed embarrassment, and the confusion, apparently arose
from the fact that it sounds strange to say that the computations done by a computer are mental
processes, rather than saying that they are "steps in the performance of mental processes" or
something like that. Justice Douglas avoided this embarrassment by not referring directly to
mental processes, but rather to "ideas" and "truths or laws of nature."
55 If a computer is not a "tool of the mind," then what is it?
56 The fact that cash registers, bookkeeping machines, and adding machines-and
computers and their components-are patentable as the machines that they are does not in any
way suggest that the instructions on how to use those machines are themselves machines.
[Vol. 58:2
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considered a ground for taking them out of the 'machine' category of
section 101."
57
And here is what the court had to say about the other independent
claim:
[Claim 13] was rejected on the same ground as claim 8 from
which it differs in containing no reference to any apparatus
and in referring to the thing operated upon not as "signals"
but as "representations." The claimed method is one for
converting "binary coded decimal number representations"
into "binary number representations." 58 The supporting
disclosure against which the claim must be reasonably
interpreted is the identical programmed digital computer
system which supports claim 8. The operational steps to be
carried out call for "testing each binary digit position" to
determine whether it is a "binary '0' "or a "binary '1 ' and
performing a specified act according to what is found, i.e.,
moving to the next position if it is "0" and repeating the test
or adding a binary "1" at two specified positions and then
moving to the next position, and so on, each action being
prescribed so that no human judgment or decision is
required-merely observation and taking prescribed action
according to what is observed .... 59
Now, as I look back on it, I recall that, during the time when I was a
computer6° I only had to make observations and take prescribed
actions6' although, being human, I saw incapable of totally forgoing
the making of human judgments and decisions.62
The court then proceeded to describe the "apparatus" that it
claimed was disclosed in that claim:
Apparatus, machinery, "hardware"--whatever it may be
called-is disclosed by which the steps can be carried out
without human intervention but at the same time, since the
claim does not itself call for any particular hardware, the
method within the claim can be practiced either with
57 58 C.C.P.A. at 1142.
58 What exactly is a "representation"?
59 58 C.C.P.A. at 1142.
60 See supra note 24.
61 am afraid that I had very little understanding about what I was doing as I pushed back
and forth the slides on the slide rule in the way that I had been instructed to do.
62 The judgments and decisions that I did make almost certainly led to errors that reduced
the accuracy of my computations.
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apparatus other than that described or with the simplest of
equipment which will enable one to provide and to
manipulate "binary coded decimal representations" and
convert them into "binary number representations." This
could in theory be any kind of writing implement and any
kind of recording medium--"pencil and paper"--or even, we
suppose, red and blue poker chips and a surface to put them
on or slots to put them in so that "0"s and "l"s can be
represented. 63
This is a remarkable, and important, concession, for it appears to
equate computers with pencils and paper and seems to amount to the
claim that any, except the most trivial, mathematical operations are
patentable. If pencil and paper counts as an apparatus that does not
involve mental processes, then a formula for finding the value of x
when ax 2 + bx + c = 0, or any other formula of similar or greater
complexity would be patentable; in other words one could, were it
novel, get a patent on the quadratic formula,
-b ± - 4ac2a
provided only that the inventor wrote it down using pencil and paper
or some equivalent technology.
And finally the court argued:
The only argument put forward by the Patent Office for
holding claim 13 non-statutory under section 101 is that the
method is basically "mental" in character. Looking at the
present case in the light of all its circumstances, we observe
in claim 13 a process consisting of a sequence of steps which
can be carried out by machine implementation .... In no case
is the exercise of judgment required or even the making of a
decision as between alternatives.
Realistically, the process of claim 13 has no practical use
other than the more effective operation and utilization of a
machine known as a digital computer. 64 It seems beyond
question that the machines-the computers-are in the
63 58 C.C.P.A. at 1142-43.
6 It should be noted that Justice Douglas used this same fact as an argument for holding
Benson's discovery to be patentable.
[Vol. 58:2
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technological field, are a part of one of our best-known
technologies, and are in the "useful arts" rather than the
"liberal arts," as are all other types of "business machines,"
regardless of the uses to which their users may put them.
How can it be said that a process having no practical value
other than enhancing the internal operation of those machines
is not likewise in the technological or useful arts? 65
Of course, the fact that computer hardware lies within the
traditional technological arts does not in anyway suggest that
computer software-such as the quadratic equation-or logical
operations like those involved in Benson-are not in the liberal arts
that have never been protected by patents. Still, logically or not, the
C.C.P.A. concluded that "the Patent Office has put forth no sound
reason why the claims in this case should be held to be non-
statutory.,66 And reversed the decision of the Patent Office.
Now, at first glance, this may appear to have been a reasonable
decision, since computers-not having minds--quite obviously do
not indulge in mental processes or take mental steps. But this
overlooks the critical fact that people-who do have minds-use
computers as an aid to thinking-an aid to carrying out mental
processes-and as an aid to carrying out mathematical steps.
67
It is thus hardly surprising that the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the C.C.P.A.
2. The Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court-which has, of course, the final word in such
matters-rejected the holding and the reasoning of the Court of
Custom and Patent Appeals, saying:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea.68 But in
practical effect that would be the result if the formula for
converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were
.patented in this case. The mathematical formula 69 involved
65 58 C.C.P.A. at 1143.
6 Id. at 688.
67 Thus, for example, in my old age I find that I am incapable of carrying out all but the
most simple mathematical steps without the assistance of a computer or a calculator nor would I
have been able to carry out the mental steps that were necessarily involved in writing this article
without the assistance of computers and their software.
68 Note that the term "idea" is used here as the equivalent of a "mental process" or,
perhaps, in the Platonic sense of an ultimate reality-or both.
69 Notice that Justice Douglas seems to use the terms "algorithm" and "mathematical
formula" almost interchangeably.
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here has no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, which means that if the
judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.
70
Justice Douglas, who never bothered to mention the lower court's
rejection of the mental steps doctrine, 7' here clearly rejected the
argument that the algorithm was patentable because it was carried out
by a machine-by a general purpose digital computer-and instead
said that the "mathematical formula" was unpatentable precisely
because it had "no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer." This is, I submit, equivalent to
saying that that the algorithm was unpatentable because its only
practical application was in the processing of "information" or
"data, ''72 which, of course, is all that computers do.
3. The Issues in Benson in More Detail
The Court in Benson stressed the fact that digital computers are
used only to process digits 73-a claim that is almost tautological and,
at the same time, I suspect, almost incomprehensible to one whose
only experience with computers involves "clicking" on an "icon" or
sending email74 or who thinks that the term "digits" only refers to
fingers.
70 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). Immediately before this passage, the
Court said:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a "different state or
thing." We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision precludes a patent for
any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we have before
us a program for a digital computer but extend our holding to programs for analog
computers. We have, however, made clear from the start that we deal with a program
only for digital computers. It is said we freeze process patents to old technologies,
leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not
our purpose.... The fact that the Court was careful not to extend its holding beyond
the issues raised in Benson does not, of course, mean that the Court held that some of
those processes are, in fact, patentable.
71 The mental steps doctrine was, however, later favorably referred to by the dissenters in
Diehr. See infra text accompanying note 100.
72 With the qualification, that some may find significant, that the results would only be
useful in other computer programs. See infra Part VI.C.
73 That is to say "numerals."
74 Anyone who believes that knowing how to click and to send email makes one
"computer literate" should read: Neil Stephenson, In the Beginning Was the Command Line
(1999), http://www.cryptonomicon.com/beginning.htnil.
YOU CAN'T PA TENT SOFTWARE
Describing the claims at issue, the Justice Douglas said:
A digital computer ... operates on data expressed in digits,
75
solving a problem by doing arithmetic as a person would do it
by head and hand.76 Some of the digits are stored as
components of the computer. Others are introduced into the
computer in a form which it is designed to recognize." The
computer operates then upon both new and previously stored
data. The general-purpose computer is designed to perform
operations under many different programs.
The patent sought is on a method of programming a general-
purpose digital computer to convert signals78 from binary-
coded decimal form into pure binary form. A procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem is known as an
"algorithm." The procedures set forth in the present claims
are of that kind; that is to say, they are a generalized
formulation for programs to solve mathematical problems of
converting one form of numerical representation to another.
79
From the generic formulation, programs may be developed as
specific applications.8°
The decimal system uses as digits the 10 symbols 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The value represented by any digit depends,
as it does in any positional system of notation, both on its
individual value and on its relative position in the numeral.
Decimal numerals are written by placing digits in the
appropriate positions or columns of the numerical sequence,
i.e., "unit" (100), "tens" (101), "hundreds" (102), "thousands"
(103), etc. Accordingly, the numeral 1492 signifies (1 X 103)
+(4x 102)+(9x 10)+(2x 100).
75 That is the fundamental fact about digital computers: they operate on-i.e., process-
data, i.e., information, represented as digits.
76 note that the person who does the computations "by head and hand" may not have any
idea of why the computations are being done or what they represent. See infra Part VI.A. 1.
77 The word "recognize" is not really felicitous here, for computers, of course, do not
recognize things the way people and other sentient beings recognize them.
78 Le., data received as part of a temporal process, in contrast to "signs" which represent
data stored in some tangible medium of expression.
79 The "numerical representations" are the way that the data are represented as numbers.
90 Nota bene the relation between algorithms and programs: the algorithms are general
descriptions such as one finds in patent claims; the actual programs, on the other hand, are
implementations of the algorithm that can be run on a particular type of digital computer or
written in a particular computer language.
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The pure binary system of positional notation uses two
symbols as digits - 0 and 1, placed in a numerical sequence
with values based on consecutively ascending powers of 2. In
pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the
twos position; what would be hundreds position is the fours
position; what would be the thousands position is the eights.
Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be represented in the
binary system with four digits or positions as indicated in the
following table.
Shown as the sum of powers of 2
23  22 2' 20
Decimal (8) (4) (2) Pure
Binary
0 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0000
1 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 20 - 0001
2 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 0 = 0010
3 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 20 = 0011
4 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 0 - 0100
5 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 20 = 0101
6 = 0 + 22 + 2' + 0 0 110
7 = 0 + 22 + 21 + 20 = 0111
8 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1000
9 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 20 = 1001
10 = 23 + 0 + 2' + 0 - 1010
The BCD system using decimal numerals replaces the
character for each component decimal digit in the decimal
numeral with the corresponding four-digit binary numeral,
shown in the right-hand column of the table. Thus decimal 53
is represented as 0101 0011 in BCD, because decimal 5 is
equal to binary 0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary
0011. In pure binary notation, however, decimal 53 equals
binary 110101. The conversion of BCD numerals to pure
binary numerals can be done mentally through use of the
foregoing table. The method sought to be patented varies the
ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by changing the
order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the
multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after
each successive operation. The mathematical procedures can
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be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new
machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be
performed without a computer.
81
Now you may well feel at this point that Justice Douglas has
insisted on telling you more about binary digits than you ever wanted
to know, but the explanation was necessary if he was to explain what
the claims were and why the claims were not patentable. And I am
afraid that we will have to spend more time trying to get our minds
around the relation between numbers and numerals and especially the
concept of binary digits-or "bits"-because bits and patterns of bits
are, when one gets right down to fundamentals, all that are operated
on by digital computers.
4. The Critical Holding
Although there can perhaps be debate about the exact reasons for
the Court's rejection of the claims in Benson, at least one thing is
clear: the Court held that algorithms for processing data-in
particular instructions to be carried out by a general propose digital
computer-are not patentable subject matter. Let me repeat that: in
Benson the Supreme Court held that mathematical algorithms 82 for
processing data to be carried out on a computer are not patentable.
And the Supreme Court has never overruled--or even questioned-
that holding.
B. Parker v. Flook
Flook83 did little more than reaffirm the holding in Benson and
make it clear that no mathematical calculation, even if it is to be
performed with the aid of a computer, is patentable. The Court's
opinion, by Justice Stevens, begins:
Respondent applied for a patent on a "Method for Updating
Alarm Limits." The only novel feature of the method is a
mathematical formula. In Gottschalk v. Benson we held that
the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula
may not be patented.84 The question in this case is whether
s Gottschalk, 409 US at 64-67 (footnote omitted).
82 Which the Court also referred to as mathematical formulae. See id. at 71. As to what an
algorithm is, see infra Part VI.B. 1. It should be noted that all patent claims are-or, at least,
should be-algorithms and that every computer program, no matter how trivial, satisfies the
definition of a "mathematical algorithm."
83 437 U.S. 594.
8 Of course, if the formula is not novel or not useful it not patentable for those reasons as
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the identification of a limited category of useful, though
conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula
makes respondent's method eligible for patent protection.85
The Court held that it did not.
Perhaps the major difference between Benson and Flook is that in
the latter case there was no discussion of numerals or binary digits,
the Court referring only to "numbers," and the algorithm at issue was
also described as a "formula." Thus in Flook the Court said:
An "alarm limit" is a number. During catalytic conversion
processes, operating conditions such as temperature, pressure,
and flow rates are constantly monitored. When any of these
"process variables" exceeds a predetermined "alarm limit,"
an alarm may signal the presence of an abnormal condition
indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger. Fixed alarm
limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but during
transient operating situations, such as startup, it may be
necessary to "update" the alarm limits periodically.
Respondent's patent application describes a method of
updating alarm limits. In essence, the method consists of
three steps: an initial step which merely measures the present
value of the process variable (e. g., the temperature); an
intermediate step which uses an algorithm 86 to calculate an
updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the actual
alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value. The only
difference between the conventional methods of changing
alarm limits and that described in respondent's application
rests in the second step-the mathematical algorithm or
formula.87 Benson Using the formula, an operator can
calculate an updated alarm limit once he knows the original
alarm base, the appropriate margin of safety, the time interval
that should elapse between each updating, the current
temperature (or other process variable), and the appropriate
well.
95 Parker, 437 U.S. at 585 (citation omitted).
86 We use the word "algorithm" in this case, as we did in Gottschalk v. Benson to mean
"[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem ...." (footnote by the Court,
renumbered) (citation omitted).
87 Note how the Court here equates formulae with algorithms and treats Benson as dealing
only with mathematical algorithms.
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weighting factor to be used to average the original alarm base
and the current temperature.
The patent application does not purport to explain how to
select the appropriate margin of safety, the weighting factor,
or any of the other variables. Nor does it purport to contain
any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an
alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a
formula for computing an updated alarm limit. Although the
computations can be made by pencil and paper calculations,
the abstract of disclosure makes it clear that the formula is
primarily useful for computerized calculations producing
automatic adjustments in alarm settings.
The patent claims cover any use of respondent's formula for
updating the value of an alarm limit on any process variable
involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical
conversion of hydrocarbons. Since there are numerous
processes of that kind in the petrochemical and oil-refining
industries, the claims cover a broad range of potential uses of
the method. They do not, however, cover every conceivable
application of the formula. 88
In Flook, the Court not only followed Benson but clarified and
extended it, holding that the addition to the claim of "postsolution"
activity that limited the possible uses of the algorithm did not make
the algorithm a patentable process:
The line between a patentable "process" and an unpatentable
"principle" is not always clear. Both are "[conceptions] of the
mind, seen only by [their] effects when being executed or
performed." In Benson we concluded that the process
application in fact sought to patent an idea, noting that
"[the] mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if the
judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly
pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."
88 Parker, 437 U.S. at 585-86 (footnotes omitted.)
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Respondent correctly points out that this language does not
apply to his claims. He does not seek to "wholly preempt the
mathematical formula," since there are uses of his formula
outside the petrochemical and oil-refining industries that
remain in the public domain. And he argues that the presence
of specific "post-solution" activity-the adjustment of the
alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula-
distinguishes this case from Benson and makes his process
patentable. We cannot agree.
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some
form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical
formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent
application contained a final step indicating that the formula,
when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying
techniques. 89 The concept of patentable subject matter under
§ 101 is not "like a nose of wax which may be turned and
twisted in any direction .... "90
The Court was, however, careful to point out that: "While a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be." And then the Court explained
that, for a process to be patentable: "The process itself, not merely the
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty
of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of
the claimed invention, as one of the 'basic tools of scientific and
technological work, it is treated as though it were a familiar part of
the prior art."
91
89 It should be noted that in Benson there was a specific end use contemplated for the
algorithm-utilization of the algorithm in computer programming. Of course, as the Court
pointed out, the formula had no other practical application; but it is not entirely clear why a
process claim is any more or less patentable because the specific end use contemplated is the
only one for which the algorithm has any practical application. (footnote by the Court,
renumbered) (citation omitted).
90 437 U.S. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
91 Id. at 591-92 (citation omitted). Thus in a case like Diamond v. Diehr, see infra Part
II.C, where the claim covers patentable subject matter but the only novelty is in a mathematical
formula-though in Diehr itself there appears to have been no novelty whatsoever-the claim
would be unpatentable for lack of novelty, no matter how novel the formula.
[Vol. 58:2
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1. The Dissent in Flook
There was a dissent filed in Flook by Justice Stewart in which
Chief Justice Berger and Justice Rehnquist joined, but that dissent in
no way questioned the holding in Benson. Rather, anticipating the
majority opinion in Diamond v. Diehr,92 the dissenters argued that the
claimed process did satisfy the requirements of Section 101 of the
Patent Act, since it involved physical changes, even though it was
probably unpatentable under Sections 102 and 103.
Justice Stewart said:
Section 101 is concerned only with subject-matter
patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue depends
upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, which include novelty
and inventiveness, among many others. It may well be that
under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on
the process claimed in this case, because of anticipation,
abandonment, obviousness, or for some other reason. But in
my view the claimed process clearly meets the standards of
subject-matter patentability of § 101.93
C. Diamond v. Diehr
The only other case in which the Supreme Court considered the
patentability of algorithms or mathematical formulae was Diamond v.
Diehr.94 The claim involved in that case was for "a process for
molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.
The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material
under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the
mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally
operative after the molding is completed.
'9 5
Not surprisingly the Court96 held that the subject matter of the
claim was patentable under Section 101 of the Patent Act even though
one element of the claim was the use of a computer to solve a
mathematical formula. The only question before the Court was
whether the claim presented patentable subject matter under Section
92 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
93 Parker, 437 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
- 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
95 450 U.S. at 177. There was a dissent in Diehr, but the dissenters' objection was not to
the majority's reasoning, but only to their interpretation of this claim that was at issue. See infra
Part II.C.1.
96 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
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101, even though it is quite clear-at least it is quite clear to me-that
the claim was not novel and was obvious and thus did not satisfy the
requirements of Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.97 The Court
in Diehr did not question, but rather restated and reaffirmed, the
holdings in Benson and Flook, saying:
We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a
mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon
of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is
seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A
mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93
(1972), and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978). Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.
To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to
evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter
eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a
claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101. Because we do not view
respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for
the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.98
Although there have been claims that Diehr somehow weakens the
presidential value of the holding in Benson that algorithms--or
mathematical formulae-and computer programs implementing them,
are not patentable subject matter, nothing could be further from the
97 The Court specifically stated:
"In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents' process is not
deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of
novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these
grounds does not affect the determination that respondents' claims recited subject
matter which was eligible for patent protection under § 101."
Id. at 191.
9s Id. at 191-93.
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truth. At the most, Diehr allows only that in a few cases in which the
claims contain mathematical formula that are well disguised by
careful drafting that the claims be treated as covering patentable
subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. 99 It should be
noted that the leading cases in the Federal Circuit that uphold
software patents do not disguise the fact that the claims cover
mathematical process that are not tied to a physical result.
1. The Dissent in Diehr
Four justices'00 dissented in Diehr, complaining that the Court's
decision rested on a misreading of the patent applications in question
and "by ignoring the critical distinction between the character of the
subject matter that the inventor claims to be novel-the § 101 issue-
and the question whether that subject matter is in fact novel-the §
102 issue."10' 1 The dissent begins with a short but useful history of the
"mental steps" doctrine:
Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law
probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent
on almost any conceivable computer program. Under the
"mental steps" doctrine, processes involving mental
operations were considered unpatentable. The mental-steps
doctrine was based upon the familiar principle that a
scientific concept or mere idea cannot be the subject of a
valid patent. The doctrine was regularly invoked to deny
patents to inventions consisting primarily of mathematical
formulae or methods of computation. It was also applied
against patent claims in which a mental operation or
mathematical computation was the sole novel element or
inventive contribution; it was clear that patentability could
not be predicated upon a mental step. Under the "function of
a machine" doctrine, a process which amounted to nothing
more than a description of the function of a machine was
unpatentable. This doctrine had its origin in several 19th-
" See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 136 (2000):
Initially, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate in Gottschalk v. Benson that software
algorithms could not be protected under patent law. The Court reached much the
same result in Parker v. Flook, but subsequently modified its rule in Diamond v.
Diehr to hold that software could be patentable under rather stringent constraints. In
particular, the Supreme Court specified that the operation of the computer program
must be tied to some physical result .... (footnotes omitted).
100 Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
'o0 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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century decisions of this Court, and it had been consistently
followed thereafter by the lower federal courts. Finally, the
definition of "process" announced by this Court in Cochrane
v. Deener, seemed to indicate that a patentable process must
cause a physical transformation in the materials to which the
process is applied.
0 2
The real disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in
Diehr did not involve the mental steps doctrine or any other limitation
on the patentability of ideas. The only dispute was about the proper
reading of the patent claims in question. Thus Justice Stevens, who
wrote the dissenting opinion, expressly said:
As the Court reads the claims in the Diehr and Lutton patent
application, the inventors' discovery is a method of
constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber
molding press. As I read the claims, their discovery is an
improved method of calculating the time that the mold should
remain closed during the curing process. If the Court's
reading of the claims were correct, I would agree that they
disclose patentable subject matter. On the other hand, if the
Court accepted my reading, I feel confident that the case
would be decided differently.
10 3
There thus appears to have been no dispute in Diehr about the
validity of the rule that an improved method of calculating something
is not patentable, the only question was whether the claims in
question fell within the ambit of that rule.
The disagreement as to whether lack of obviousness and novelty
renders a claim unpatentable under the terms of Section 101104 does
not, however, in any way weaken the holding of the Court in Diehr or
detract from the fact that the Court in Diehr reaffirmed the holdings
in Benson and Flook that:
A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the
protection of our patent laws and this principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to
a particular technological environment. Similarly,
102 Id. at 195-97 (footnotes and citations omitted).
103 Id. at 206-07 (footnotes omitted).
104As opposed to Parts 102 and 103. See supra note 92.
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insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.
10 5
D. Patenting Anything Under the Sun
There is one more decision of the Supreme Court's that should be
mentioned here: Diamond v. Chakrabarty,10 6 a case holding that a
new and useful type of bacteria was patentable as a "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" and that quotes Congressional committee
reports saying that Congress intended patentable subject matter to
include "anything under the sun that is made by man.
' 10 7
At first glance this might be taken to mean that anything
whatsoever can, if it is useful and novel and made by man, be
patented, but the Court in Chakrabarty was careful to say:
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable.' 0 8 Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
Such discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none."10 9
I would only add to this disclaimer mention of the fact that
software is composed of text, or of numbers, or of information" l0 and
that it is used, and can only be used, to instruct a computer to process
information or data. When one thinks about it for a moment, unless
there is something wrong with the way one thinks, it is obvious that
texts,"' numbers, information, and data are not the sort of things that
have a spatial location, are not the sort of things that can be said to be
"under the sun."'
112
105 Diamond, 450 U.S. at 191-92.
1-447 U.S. 303 (1980).
107 Id. at 309.
108 Citing, inter alia, Benson and Flook.
109 Id. (citations omitted).
Io See infra Part VI.B.
I I As opposed to physical embodiments of a text.
112 Or over the sun--or East or West of it for that matter.
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III. HAS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OVERRULED BENSON, FLOOK AND
DIEHR?
In the twenty-five years since the decision of the Supreme Court in
Diehr the Court has not considered a single case in which there was a
challenge to a software patent. Instead, until very recently, it has left
issues of patent law to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, a specialized Article III Court created in 1982 that now hears
all appeals from the Board of Patent Appeals in patent cases as well
as most such appeals from the federal district courts." 1
3
Over the years since then, the Federal Circuit has tried to wriggle
its way around the Supreme Court's holdings in Benson, Flook and
Diehr and now acts as if it had overruled those decisions.
The initial wriggling took place in a 1994 case named In re
Alappat;1 4 where the Federal Circuit held that a claim that specified
that the computations in question were to be run on a machine-that
is, a computer-was patentable as a "machine," willfully overlooking
the fact that the Supreme Court in Benson had held that the claims
there were not patentable even though--or perhaps because-they
were to be run on a computer. The ultimate wriggle, where the
Federal Circuit ended up completely rejecting the holding-and the
rationale---of the Supreme Court in Benson, occurred in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group."' In State Street the
Federal Circuit held that a claim that specified that certain
bookkeeping functions were to be calculated on a computer was
patentable because those calculations were useful, willfully
overlooking the fact that the claims that were held to be unpatentable
in Benson were also useful.
A. Alappat
In Re Alappat involved an appeal from a decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals of the Patent Office holding that Alappat's claimed
invention of a means of smoothing the curves shown on the screen of
13 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
Before then appeals from decisions of the Patent Office were heard by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals while appeals from decisions of the federal district courts in patent cases were
treated as all other such appeals and were heard by the federal courts of appeal for the numbered
circuits. The Supreme Court has recently held that the numbered circuits can hear appeals from
the district courts in patent cases where the patent issues were raised, not by the plaintiff's cause
of action, but rather by the defendant's counterclaim. See generally Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vomado Aircirculation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). For further discussion of this
development see infra Part III.C.
11433 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
115 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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a digital oscilloscope was not patentable under the provisions of
Section 101 of the Patent Act,' 16 because it consisted of nothing but a
process consisting of a "mathematical algorithm for computing...
information." 1
7
The Federal Circuit, in a majority opinion written by Circuit Judge
Rich, held that "the appealed decision should be reversed because the
appealed claims are directed to a 'machine' which is one of the
categories named in 35 U.S.C. § 101.,,118
Judge Rich argued:
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called
mathematical subject matter exception to § 101 alleged herein
is to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a
disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as a
mathematical formula, mathematical equation, mathematical
algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents nothing
more than a "law of nature," "natural phenomenon," or
"abstract idea." If so, Diehr precludes the patenting of that
subject matter. That is not the case here.
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements
recited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that perform
mathematical calculations, which is essentially true of all
digital electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is
directed to a combination of interrelated elements which
combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform
data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data
to be displayed on a display means. This is not a disembodied
mathematical concept which may be characterized as an
"abstract idea," but rather a specific machine to produce a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.
Furthermore, the claim preamble's recitation that the subject
matter for which Alappat seeks patent protection is a
rasterizer for creating a smooth waveform is not a mere field-
of-use label having no significance. Indeed, the preamble
specifically recites that the claimed rasterizer converts
116 See supra note 20.
l"7 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1538.
lISId. at 1536. Note that this amounts to claiming that, although a process of solving an
algorithm is not patentable under Part 101, a machine that does nothing but implement that
process is patentable.
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waveform data into output illumination data for a display, and
the means elements recited in the body of the claim make
reference not only to the inputted waveform data recited in
the preamble but also to the output illumination data also
recited in the preamble. Claim 15 thus defines a combination
of elements constituting a machine for producing an anti-
aliased waveform.
The ... Board majority also erred in its reasoning that claim
15 is unpatentable merely because it "reads on a general
purpose digital computer 'means' to perform the various
steps under program control.".... Alappat admits that claim
15 would read on a general purpose computer programmed to
carry out the claimed invention, but argues that this alone also
does not justify holding claim 15 unpatentable as directed to
nonstatutory subject matter. We agree. We have held that
such programming creates a new machine, because a general
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose
computer once it is programmed to perform particular
functions pursuant to instructions from program software.' 19
This amounts to claiming that an unpatentable mathematical
process for converting one form of data to another form of data,
becomes a patentable machine if it is claimed that the process can be
carried out on a properly programmed general purpose computer. But
if that were the law, the claims in Benson would have been patentable
because they could be carried out on a general purpose computer and
in particular a computer containing a shift register.'
20
1. The Dissent in Alappat
Perhaps the most useful antidote to the illogic espoused by the
majority in Alappat is the dissent of Chief Judge Archer in that case.
Since it contains a short and excellent description of the holdings in
Benson, Flook, and Diehr, I feel justified in quoting from it at some
length.
Now Judge Archer's dissent itself starts with a lengthy quotation
that I also consider worthy of quotation:
119 Id. at 1544-45 (footnotes omitted).
120 In Benson, the Court said: "The patent sought is on a method of programming a general
purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary
form." Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65.
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In 1873, George Curtis made certain general observations
about patent law, the scope of patentable subject matter being
at its heart. He stated them with such force and eloquence,
and in my view they have such relevance to the issue we face
today, that I repeat them as follows:
It is necessary... to have clear and correct notions of
the true scope of a patent right . . . which may be
found to assist, in particular cases, the solution of the
question, whether a particular invention or discovery
is by law a patentable subject.
In this inquiry it is necessary to commence with the
process of exclusion; for although, in their widest
acceptation, the terms "invention" and "discovery"
include the whole vast variety of objects on which the
human intellect may be exercised, so that in poetry,
in painting, in music, in astronomy, in metaphysics,
and in every department of human thought, men
constantly invent or discover, in the highest and the
strictest sense, their inventions and discoveries in
these departments are not the subjects of the patent
law. . . . The patent law relates to a great and
comprehensive class of discoveries and inventions of
some new and useful effect or result in matter, not
referable to the department of the fine arts. The
matter of which our globe is composed is the material
upon which the creative and inventive faculties of
man are exercised, in the production of whatever
ministers to his convenience or his wants. Over the
existence of matter itself he has no control. ...
The direct control of man over matter consists,
therefore, in placing its particles in new relations.
This is all that is actually done, or that can be done,
namely, to cause the particles of matter existing in
the universe to change their former places, by moving
them, by muscular power or some other force. But as
soon as they are brought into new relations, it is at
once perceived that there are vast latent forces in
nature, which come to the aid of man, and enable him
to produce effects and results of a wholly new
2008]
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character, far beyond the mere fact of placing the
particles in new positions. He moves certain particles
of matter into a new juxtaposition, and the chemical
agencies and affinities called into action by this new
contact produce a substance possessed of new
properties and powers, to which has been given the
name of gunpowder. He takes a stalk of flax from the
ground, splits it into a great number of filaments,
twists them together, and laying numbers of the
threads thus formed across each other, forms a cloth,
which is held together by the tenacity or force of
cohesion in the particles, which nature brings to his
aid. He moves into new positions and relations
certain particles of wood and iron, in various forms,
and produces a complicated machine, by which he is
able to accomplish a certain purpose, only because
the properties of cohesion and the force of gravitation
cause it to adhere together and enable the different
parts to operate upon each other and to transmit the
forces applied to them, according to the laws of
motion. It is evident, therefore, that the whole of the
act of invention, in the department of useful arts,
embraces more than the new arrangement of particles
of matter in new relations. The purpose of such new
arrangements is to produce some new effect or result,
by calling into activity some latent law, or force, or
property, by means of which, in a new application,
the new effect or result may be accomplished. In
every form in which matter is used, in every
production of the ingenuity of man, he relies upon the
laws of nature and the properties of matter, and seeks
for new effects and results through their agency and
aid. Merely inert matter alone is not the sole material
with which he works. Nature supplies powers, and
forces, and active properties, as well as the particles
of matter, and these powers, forces, and properties
are constantly the subjects of study, inquiry, and
experiment, with a view to the production of some
new effect or result in matter.
Any definition or description, therefore, of the act of
invention, which excludes the application of the
[Vol. 58:2
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natural law, or power, or property of matter, on
which the inventor has relied for the production of a
new effect, and the object of such application, and
confines it to the precise arrangement of the particles
of matter which he may have brought together, must
be erroneous. 121
Chief Judge Archer then explained:
The Patent Clause of the Constitution empowers the
Congress to "promote the Progress of... useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to .. . Inventors the
exclusive right to their... Discoveries."
Congress has implemented this limited grant of
power in 35 U.S.C. § 101 by enumerating certain
subject matter, the invention or discovery of which
may entitle one to a patent: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." The terms used in § 101 have been used
for over two hundred years-since the beginnings of
American patent law-to define the extent of the
subject matter of patentable invention.
Coexistent with the usage of these terms has been the
rule that a person cannot obtain a patent for the
discovery of an abstract idea, principle or force, law
of nature, or natural phenomenon, but rather must
invent or discover a practical "application" to a
useful end. 122 Thus patent law rewards persons for
inventing technologically useful applications, instead
of for philosophizing unapplied research and
theory...123
121Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1551-52 (citing G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS xxiii-xxv (4th ed. 1873) (emphasis added)).
122 Id. (citing, inter alia, Diehr).
123 Id. at 1552. Chief Judge Archer went on to give this telling example of what would
happen were the law otherwise:
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He then discussed Benson, Flook, and Diehr:
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases in this area must
be applied to determine whether an invention or
discovery in the field of digital electronic related
subject matter is within the scope of the patent law.
These cases govern both product and process claims.
In the first case, Gottschalk v. Benson, the Supreme
Court held that claims to a method of converting
binary-coded decimal numbers into pure decimal
numbers did not recite an invention or discovery
within § 101, and thus were ineligible for patent
protection. In Benson, the claimed method was to be
performed specifically in a general purpose digital
computer, and one of the claims (claim 8) contained
express digital electronic structure limitations by
reciting "signals" and a "reentrant shift register." The
Court found that the "practical effect" of a patent for
the method would be the impermissible award of a
Consider for example the discovery or creation of music, a new song. Music of
course is not patentable subject matter; a composer cannot obtain exclusive patent
rights for the original creation of a musical composition. But now suppose the new
melody is recorded on a compact disc. In such case, the particular musical
composition will define an arrangement of minute pits in the surface of the compact
disc material, and therefore will define its specific structure. Alternatively suppose
the music is recorded on the rolls of a player piano or a music box.
Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, can a composer now
claim as his invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano roll containing
the melody he discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be no. The
composer admittedly has invented or discovered nothing but music. The discovery of
music does not become patentable subject matter simply because there is an arbitrary
claim to some structure.
And if a claim to a compact disc or piano roll containing a newly discovered song
were regarded as a "manufacture" and within § 101 simply because of the specific
physical structure of the compact disc, the "practical effect" would be the granting of
a patent for a discovery in music. Where the music is new, the precise structure of
the disc or roll would be novel under § 102. Because the patent law cannot examine
music for "nonobviousness," the Patent and Trademark Office could not make a
showing of obviousness under § 103. The result would well be the award of a patent
for the discovery of music. The majority's simplistic approach of looking only to
whether the claim reads on structure and ignoring the claimed invention or discovery
for which a patent is sought will result in the awarding of patents for discoveries well
beyond the scope of the patent law.
Id. at 1553-54 (citation omitted).
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patent for a discovery in mathematics because the
whole of the subject matter sought to be patented was
a mathematical formula that had "no substantial
practical application except in connection with a
digital computer." In Benson the Court made clear
that it was "dealing with a program only for digital
computers."
In the second case, Parker v. Flook, the Court held that a claim to
a method of updating "alarm limits" (numbers) did not recite an
invention or discovery within § 101, and thus was ineligible for patent
protection. The claims in Flook did not "wholly preempt" the claimed
mathematical formula because they did not cover every application of
the formula. The claimed method was expressly limited to operation
"in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons," and thereby to application in a particular
technological environment. The claimed formula also was "primarily
useful for computerized calculations." And the claim recited specific
activity beyond the solution of the mathematical formula (so called
"post-solution" activity), namely adjusting an "alarm limit" to the
figure computed according to the formula. The Court reasoned that
the updating of alarm limits in chemical processes was well known,
and all that Flook purported to invent and claim was a new formula
coupled to a computer for doing so (limited to certain postsolution
activity in a technological environment). On these facts, the Court
reasoned that the claimed invention or discovery was an alleged
newly discovered mathematical formula, which was "not the kind of
'discovery' that the statute was enacted to protect."
In the third case, Diamond v. Diehr, the Court held that a
process for operating a rubber-molding press was within
§ 101. An element of the claimed process was a digital
computer programmed to perform a mathematical function. It
was known that temperature inside a rubber-molding press
determined in part the time the press was required to remain
closed. The problem faced in the art was that when the press
opened during operation, it cooled, thereby changing the
amount of time needed for curing. By including a
thermocouple or other temperature-detecting device for
measuring temperature inside the press, feeding signals to a
computer which would repeatedly calculate the cure time and
then cause the press to open at the right moment, the
applicant claimed to have invented a new, useful, and
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nonobvious precision method of curing rubber. The Court
reasoned that the claimed subject matter was, as a whole, a
process for precision rubber curing that included a computer
performing a mathematical formula; the totality of claimed
subject matter was not just the mathematical formula.
Therefore, held the Court, the claimed subject matter was
eligible for patent protection.
The Court in Diehr distinguished its decision in Flook. Both
cases involved claims including mathematical formulae to be
performed by digital electronics, with application in chemical
processes. Flook's patent application, however, "did not
purport to explain how the variables used in the formula were
to be selected." Flook's patent application did not "contain
any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an
alarm system." In contrast, Diehr's claims were neither to the
mathematical formula nor to the "the isolated step of
'programming a digital computer.' " They were to a process
"beginning with the loading of [a] mold and ending with the
opening of [a] press and the production of synthetic rubber
product that has been perfectly cured-a result theretofore
unknown in the art." The chemical process in Flook was not
the alleged invention or discovery but only was related
tangentially to the mathematical formula; the applicant
simply "limited the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment" and claimed "insignificant
postsolution activity." All this demonstrated that in Diehr the
applicant was, in substance, asserting and claiming to have
invented a new and useful chemical process, thereby
qualifying the subject matter for examination under the
remaining provisions of the patent law, while in Flook as in
Benson the applicant was, in substance, asserting and
claiming as his invention or discovery a mathematical
function (to be performed by a computer), thereby placing the
subject matter outside the patent law. 124
Another important point that was made by Chief Judge Archer in
Alappat was that, if the majority were correct in holding that a
specific physical structure, like the holes on a compact disk, is
patentable, then a musical work-or any other information-stored
124 Id. at 1556-57 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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on a compact disk-or a player piano role-would be patentable as a
"manufacture" simply because of the physical structure of the
compact disk, 125 a reductio ad absurdum that goes a long way toward
establishing that the majority's holding is actually untenable. Imagine
for a moment that you are a judge of one of the numbered circuits
hearing an appeal from a judgment of a district court upholding-or
denying-a counter-claim seeking to have a patent like that in
Alappat declared invalid. 1
26
Which opinion in Alappat would you find more persuasive, that of
the majority? Or that of Judge Archer?
B. State Street
In State Street, State Street Bank & Trust Co. initially obtained a
judgment from the Federal District Court for Massachusetts declaring
that a patent for a "Data Processing System 127 for Hub and Spoke
Financial Services Configuration.' ' 128 issued to Signature Bank was
invalid because its subject matter was not patentable according to the
provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit then reversed this
decision of the District Court even though the patented invention was
simply "a system 129 that allows an administrator to monitor and record
125 Consider for example the discovery or creation of music, a new song. Music of course
is not patentable subject matter; a composer cannot obtain exclusive patent rights for the
original creation of a musical composition. But now suppose the new melody is recorded on a
compact disc. In such case, the particular musical composition will define an arrangement of
minute pits in the surface of the compact disc material, and therefore will define its specific
structure. Alternatively suppose the music is recorded on the rolls of a player piano or a music
box. Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, can a composer now claim
as his invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano roll containing the melody he
discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be no. The composer admittedly has
invented or discovered nothing but music. The discovery of music does not become patentable
subject matter simply because there is an arbitrary claim to some structure.
And if a claim to a compact disc or piano roll containing a newly discovered song were
regarded as a "manufacture" and within § 101 simply because of the specific physical structure
of the compact disc, the "practical effect" would be the granting of a patent for a discovery in
music. Where the music is new, the precise structure of the disc or roll would be novel under
§ 102. Because the patent law cannot examine music for "nonobviousness," the Patent and
Trademark Office could not make a showing of obviousness under § 103. The result would well
be the award of a patent for the discovery of music. The majority's simplistic approach of
looking only to whether the claim reads on structure and ignoring the claimed invention or
discovery for which a patent is sought will result in the awarding of patents for discoveries well
beyond the scope of the patent law. Id. at 1553-54.
126The Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over an appeal from such a counter-
claim. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
127 Recall that claims held to be unpatentable in Benson were also for a data processing
system. See supra text accompanying note 34.
12 State Street, 149 F.3d 1368.
129 Which the Federal Circuit had the temerity to describe as a machine.
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the financial information flow and make all calculations necessary for
maintaining a partner fund financial services configuration."' 3 °
According to the Federal Circuit:
"[A] partner fund financial services configuration essentially
allows several mutual funds, or "Spokes," to pool their
investment funds into a single portfolio, or "Hub," allowing
for consolidation of, inter alia, the costs of administering the
fund combined with the tax advantages of a partnership....
In particular, this system provides means for a daily
allocation of assets for two or more Spokes that are invested
in the same Hub. The system determines1 31 the percentage
share that each Spoke maintains in the Hub, while taking into
consideration daily changes both in the value of the Hub's
investment securities and in the concomitant amount of each
Spoke's assets.
132
And the "system" also makes other calculations, using-surprise!
surprise!-a computer: "Given the complexity of the calculations, a
computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity to perform the
task.' ' 133 Thus the abstract idea 134 of partners investing in a partnership
where an administrator frequently calculates each partner's interest
using a computer is, according to the Federal Circuit, a patentable
invention.
On rereading-time after time after time-this opinion of the
Federal Circuit's, I still marvel that the judges of that court had the
nerve to hold that the described "invention" was patentable in the face
of the Supreme Court's statement in Diehr that "Excluded from...
patent protection are . . . abstract ideas.' 3' and the Supreme Court's
holdings in Benson and Flook that using a computer to make
calculations is not a patentable process even if the calculations have
some element of novelty, an element that is completely lacking in the
patent claims that were upheld in State Street. Using a computer,
130State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
131 It is, of course, the system's administrator, not the system, who makes these
determinations. The Federal Circuit seems to be suggesting here that mutual fund managers are
simply parts of a machine, quite lacking in any of the attributes of humanity. If that were the
case, then the teams of "girls" who acted as computers for the Manhattan Project were also mere
machines. See infra Part VI.A. 1.
132 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
1331d. at 1371.
13 If it even rises to the level of an idea.
135 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
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personal or otherwise, to process data is exactly what Benson holds is
not patentable.136
What I find even more troubling is that the Federal -Circuit made
an extensive argument-and, in fact seems to have held a la
Alappat-that Signature Bank's patent application claimed not a
process, but rather a machine 137 and yet, in the end, admitted that it
136 Of course, in Benson the Court was speaking of the "processing of data by program"
(supra note 5), but that hardly strengthens the Federal Circuit's case in State Street since the
computers used by the Hub's administrator would have to be programmed to do whatever it was
that they were supposed to do. That there was no reference in the patent claims at issue in State
Street to any program or formula raises the question of what the supposed invention was: was it
just a means of doing business? See infra note 142.
137 Here is the Federal Circuit's explanation of why the claimed invention was a machine:
[The patent application] initially contained six "machine" claims, which incorporated
means-plus-function clauses, and six method claims. According to Signature [the
defendant patentee], during prosecution the examiner contemplated a § 101 rejection
for failure to claim statutory subject matter. However, upon cancellation of the six
method claims, the examiner issued a notice of allowance for the remaining present
six claims on appeal. Only claim 1 is an independent claim. The district court began
its analysis by construing the claims to be directed to a process, with each "means"
clause merely representing a step in that process. However, "machine" claims having
"means" clauses may only be reasonably viewed as process claims if there is no
supporting structure in the written description that corresponds to the claimed
"means" elements. See In re Alappat (citations omitted). This is not the case now
before us. When independent claim 1 is properly construed . . . it is directed to a
machine, as demonstrated below, where representative claim 1 is set forth, the
subject matter in brackets stating the structure the written description discloses as
corresponding to the respective "means" recited in the claims.
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a
portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of
funds, comprising:
a) computer processor means [a personal computer including a CPU] for
processing data;
b) storage means [a data disk] for storing data on a storage medium;
c) first means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to prepare the data disk to
magnetically store selected data] for initializing the storage medium;
d) second means [an arithmetic logic circuit135 configured to retrieve
information from a specific file, calculate incremental increases or decreases
based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and store
the output in a separate file] for processing data regarding assets in the
portfolio and each of the funds from a previous day and data regarding
increases or decreases in each of the funds, [sic, funds'] assets and for
allocating the percentage share that each fund holds in the portfolio;
e) third means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on
specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the output
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makes no difference in determining whether the invention was
patentable under § 101 whether the invention was claimed as a
process or as a machine.
13 8
After holding both that Signature Bank's "invention" was a
machine the Federal Circuit went on to say that the "invention" was
patentable even if it were not a machine:
This does not end our analysis, however, because the [District
C]ourt concluded that the claimed subject matter fell into one
of two alternative judicially-created exceptions to statutory
in a separate file] for processing data regarding daily incremental income,
expenses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating
such data among each fund;
f) fourth means (an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on
specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the output
in a separate file] for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or
loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
g) fifth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from specific files, calculate that information on an aggregate basis and store
the output in a separate file] for processing data regarding aggregate year-
end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of
the funds. Each claim component, recited as a "means" plus its function, is
to be read, of course,... as inclusive of the "equivalents" of the structures
disclosed in the written description portion of the specification.
Thus, claim 1, properly construed, claims a machine, namely, a data processing system for
managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, which
machine is made up of, at the very least, the specific structures disclosed in the written
description and corresponding to the means-plus-function elements (a)-(g) recited in the claim."
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371-72. Now that is some machine! Do you think that you could
recognize it if you saw it? Is it the sort of thing that you could kick? Is it even the sort of thing
that you could point to and ask, "What's that?"
138 After holding that the "invention" was a machine the Federal Circuit on to say that:
A "machine" is proper statutory subject matter under § 101. We note that, for the
purposes of a § 101 analysis, it is of little relevance whether claim I is directed to a
"machine" or a "process," as long as it falls within at least one of the four
enumerated categories of patentable subject matter, "machine" and "process" being
such categories.... Id. at 1372 (emphasis added). In other words, after entertaining
us with the lengthy description of the most unmachinelike machine supposedly
claimed by Signature Bank in its patent application, the Federal Circuit admits that,
under its interpretation of the Patent Act, it does not make any difference whether the
claim refers to a machine or a process. [And it is true, of course, that under the
holding in Benson that it does not make any difference whether a process or a
machine is claimed, for the claims in Benson were held by the Court to be
unpatentable, even though at least one of them specified that the claimed invention
was to run upon a computer containing a shift register and both could be used only in
conjunction with a computer.]
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subject matter. The court refers to the first exception as the
"mathematical algorithm" exception and the second
exception as the "business method" exception. 3 9 Section 101
reads:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.
The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any
invention falling within one of the four stated categories of
statutory subject matter may be patented, provided it meets
the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35,
i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112, P2.
The repetitive use of the expansive term "any" in § 101
shows Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on the
subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond
those specifically recited in § 101. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that Congress intended § 101 to extend to
"anything under the sun that is made by man." Diamond v.
Chakrabarty; see also Diamond v. Diehr, Thus, it is improper
to read limitations into § 101 on the subject matter that may
be patented where the legislative history indicates that
Congress clearly did not intend such limitations. "We have
also cautioned that courts 'should not read into the patent
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed."14
0
And then, at last, the Federal Circuit came to the issue of whether
"mathematical algorithms" are patentable.
The Supreme Court has identified three categories of subject
matter that are unpatentable, namely "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas."' 4' In Diehr, the Court
139 For more on the court's treatment of the "business method" exception, see infra note
142.
140State Street, 149 F.3d at 1372-73 (citations omitted). For an explanation of why
Chakrabarty does not imply that computer programs are patentable, see infra Part I.D.
141 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (citing Diehr). The Federal Circuit then added: "Of
particular relevance to this case, the Court has held that mathematical algorithms are not
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explained that certain types of mathematical subject matter,
standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas
until reduced to some type of practical application, i.e., "a
useful, concrete and tangible result." 142
Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by
showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not "useful. 143 From
a practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable an
algorithm must be applied in a "useful" way. In Alappat, we
held that data, transformed by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations to produce a smooth waveform
display on a rasterizer monitor, constituted a practical
application of an abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation), because it produced "a useful,
concrete and tangible result"-the smooth waveform.
Similarly, in Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp. we held that the transformation of
electrocardiograph signals from a patient's heartbeat by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations
constituted a practical application of an abstract idea (a
mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation), because it
corresponded to a useful, concrete or tangible thing-the
condition of a patient's heart. Today, we hold that the
transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts,
by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations
into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a
mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it
produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result"--a final
share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades .... 1l44
patentable subject matter to the extent that they are merely abstract ideas." Id. (citing Diehr,
Flook and Benson). You may look as long as you like at those cases, but will never find the
limitation that mathematical algorithms are unpatentable only to the extent that they are merely
abstract ideas.
142 Id. (citing Alappat). Alappat may say that, but is it a true statement of what the Court
said in Diehr? And does it make any difference considering the holding in Benson that
mathematical algorithms are not patentable? And, in any case, although the result, whatever it
was, in State Street may have been useful, it certainly was neither concrete nor tangible.
143 But, of course, the algorithm at issue in Benson was "useful."
'- 149 F.3d at 1373 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The Federal Circuit also said toward the end of its opinion in State
Street that:
As an alternative ground for invalidating the.., patent under
§ 101, the [trial] court relied on the judicially-created, so-
called "business method" exception to statutory subject
matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest. Since its inception, the "business method"
exception has merely represented the application of some
general, but no longer applicable legal principle . . . ., Since
the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should
have been, subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability as applied to any other process or method.
45
This ignores the fact that most business method patent claims, like
those in State Street, are abstract ideas that involve only the
processing of information without inducing any change in anything
material. If computer programs, some of which are novel, unobvious,
and useful are not patentable according to the Supreme Court, as I
argue here, it is inconceivable that business methods like those
disclosed in State Street should be patentable. It seems unlikely to me
that anyone could read Benson, Flook, and Diehr, on the one hand,
and State Street, on the other, and not conclude that the Federal
Circuit believes that it has overruled the decisions of the Supreme
Court. Need I remind you, once again, that the Federal Circuit lacks
the power to do that?
C. The Supreme Court Begins to Wake Up
For many years by far the strongest argument for concluding that
the Federal Circuit's decisions in cases like Alappat and State Street
permitting software patents stated the law-and that the contrary
decisions of the Supreme Court in Benson, Flook, and Diehr were,
shall we say, obsolete-was that it seemed improbable that the
Supreme Court would ever again consider an appeal from a decision
in a case involving the validity or infringement of a patent, but would
rather let those issues be decided by the supposedly expert judges of
the Federal Circuit, which has almost exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals from the lower courts) 46 After all, if Justice Holmes
was right-as he pretty much was 147-when he said that: "The
145 Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted).
'46 See supra text accompanying note 111.
147At least from the point of view of a lawyer trying to advise a client as to what the law
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prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law,"'148 then the decisions of the
Federal Circuit as to the patentability of software did indeed state the
law.
Although for years the Supreme Court has lived up to that
prediction, it has shown signs of awakening from its slumber and
shown a willingness to reverse the decisions of the Federal Circuit in
at least one arcane area of patent law for in a case known as Festo
149
the Court showed a willingness to overrule the Federal Circuit in a
case involving two arcane and contentious issues of patent law. More
recently the Court has sua sponte in the Metabolite case'50 asked for a
brief from the Solicitor General:
expressing the views of the United States limited to the
following question: Respondent's patent claims a method for
detecting a form of vitamin B deficiency, which focuses upon
a correlation in the human body between elevated levels of
certain amino acids and deficient levels of vitamin B. The
method consists of the following: First, measure the level of
the relevant amino acids using any device, whether the device
is, or is not, patented; second, notice whether the amino acid
level is elevated and, if so, conclude that a vitamin B
deficiency exists. Is the patent invalid because one cannot
patent "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas,?5'
Personally, I find it very difficult not to believe that that request
indicates that the Court is ready to give the Federal Circuit a whack
along the side of the head and reaffirm Benson, Flook, and Diehr.1
52
148O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
149Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyokabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). For an
extensive and suggestive discussion of Festo, see John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002).
150 Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 543 U.S. 1185
(2005). The writ of certiorari was later dismissed as improvidently granted, almost certainly
because the question that interested the Court had not been briefed below, but even so there was
a strong dissent by three justices who would have held that the invention was not patentable
because the application covered a "law of nature." 126 S. Ct. 2921.
I' Metabolite, 543 U.S. at 1185 (citing Diamond v. Diehr). Note that the process of
"noticing" whether the amino acid level is elevated could be conducted using a computer and
that if the claim in question had specified using a computer, the patent at issue in Metabolite
would have been as much a software patent as was the patent at issue in State Street.
152 The fact that the claim in Metabolite does not refer to a computer or a computer
program hardly weakens this conclusion. The process of "noticing whether the amino acid level
is elevated" involves some sort of computation that can probably be done by head and hand
without the aid of a computer, but that could also be done using a properly programmed
computer.
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The argument that the decisions of the Federal Circuit permitting
software patents are the law, no matter what the Supreme Court has
said about the matter, was strengthened.53 until recently by the fact
that all appeals in patent cases were heard by the Federal Circuit so
that there could never be a conflict between the circuits' 54 in such
cases.
But that is no longer true, for, since the Court's 2002 decision in
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Aircirculation Systems, Inc. ,55
appeals from cases in which it is the defendant rather than the
plaintiff who first raises the issue of the validity of a patent are no
longer heard by the Federal Circuit.
Thus, even if the Supreme Court is not awakening of its own
accord, someday there will be a case where the holder of a software
patent sues for breach of contract because the defendant has ceased
paying the royalty agreed upon in a patent licensing agreement and
the defense will be that there was a failure of consideration because
the patent was invalid. Now, according to Holmes Group, no matter
what the trial court 56 decides about the validity of the patent, an
appeal from that decision will not be heard by the Federal Circuit. In
such a case, who would dare prophesize that the appellate court
would follow the precedents of the Federal Circuit rather than those
of the Supreme Court?
IV. THE ACADEMIC REACTION TO BENSON & Co.
Benson was decided before "computer law" or what is now, most
unfortunately, called "cyberlaw"'' 57 had become a part of the curricula
of law schools, so it is hardly surprising that Benson did not initially
inspire a large number of law review articles. Since by the time
Computing and the Law became a fashionable subject, Benson and
153 And undoubtedly to a large extent justified.
154 Or between the Federal Circuit and a state court of last resort.
55S See supra note I 11.
156 The trial court will either be a state court or a Federal District Court that has diversity
jurisdiction or has subject matter jurisdiction where the subject matter is not the patent law.
157 It is fashionable I fear for courses about computers and the law to dwell not on the
fundamental legal issues involving the process of computing, but rather on the more
fashionable, but less fundamental, issues involving the Internet. One consequence of this is the
proliferation in law schools of courses with names like "Cyberlaw" or "Law and Cyberspace,"
"Cyberspace" being one of those mind destroying metaphors that I wish would just go away,
The term "cyber"--Greek for governor or steersman-that is part of the term "cybernetics,"
refers to the study of control mechanisms. Even for courses that are about the Internet
"Cyberlaw" is not an appropriate name, for the Internet is not a space in which a steersman-or
even a computer program-can navigate or over which a governor could exercise control.
Whatever control is exercised over the Internet, is exercised by people and devices and their
programs that are at the edges of the network, not within the "space" of the network itself.
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company were ancient history, it is hardly surprising that little
attention has been paid to them recently in the groves of legal
academia. There the assumption appears to be that software is
patentable as a matter of law and that the only issue relating to
software patents that merits discussing is whether or not such patents
can be condemned or justified in economic terms.
There are, however, two articles from the mid-eighties and one
from 1990 about Benson-and, to a much lesser extent, its progeny-
that merit discussing here.
A. The Patentability ofAlgorithms
Donald S. Chisum, the author of the treatise Chisum on Patents,
1 58
wrote an extremely critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decision
in Benson entitled The Patentability of Algorithms' 59 that was
published in a symposium on The Future of Software Protection,
published by the University of Pittsburgh Law Review in 1986.
Chisum's major criticism of the Supreme Court's decision in
Benson appears to be that the Supreme Court in that decision failed to
follow the established principles of patent law as Chisum-and
probably most patent lawyers at the time-understood them. Here is
how Chisum summarized his argument:
New and useful algorithms, including mathematical
algorithms, should constitute subject matter eligible for patent
protection. Yet, the current state of the law is that
"mathematical" algorithms "as such" or "in the abstract" do
not constitute patentable subject matter-at least not in
theory.
In this Article, I hope to demonstrate the weakness of the second,
descriptive statement and the soundness of the first, normative
statement. My case consists of the following (nonalgorithmic) line of
analysis. First, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v.
Benson in 1972, the lower courts had, for appropriate reasons,
rejected earlier doctrine on the nonpatentability of so-called mental
steps and established a firm basis for the patenting of algorithmic
ideas. Second, the Benson decision, which held that mathematical
algorithms could not be patented, was poorly reasoned and stemmed
from an antipatent judicial bias 60 that cannot be reconciled with the
158 DONALD S. CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (New York,
NY: M. Bender, 1996).
159 Caisum, supra note 32.
160 As opposed to a pro-patent, patent lawyer bias? Whose bias, if bias it be, is more likely
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basic elements of the patent system established by Congress. Third,
the awkward distinctions and seemingly irreconcilable results of the
case law since Benson, including the Supreme Court's decisions in
Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr, are a product of the analytical
and normative weakness of Benson itself. Finally, an examination of
the policy implications of extending patent protection to new
algorithms will show that such extension will not harm the creation
and dissemination of knowledge in computer science and other areas
of technology and will in fact provide much needed additional
incentives for investment in computer software development. 1
61
As you probably can guess, I do not believe that Chisum came
anywhere near to proving his case. But he certainly supplies a much
more detailed history of the relevant patent law cases than I have
done here. If you are more interested in patent law than I am, you
really should read his entire article.
Here is part of what Chisum has to say about the relevant pre-
Benson cases and Patent Office practice:
Early case law and Patent Office practice developed three
vaguely defined limitations on the scope of patentable subject
matter that would later cast doubt on the patentability of
algorithms designed for use in computer programming. The
limitations relate to (1) business systems, (2) printed matter,
and (3) mental steps. All three limitations suffer from a
common infirmity-the absence of a firm footing in either
statutory language or well-reasoned, extrastatutory policy.
A. Business Systems
It is thought to be black-letter law that a "system of
transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system" does not constitute patentable
subject matter. The 1908 decision by the Second Circuit so
stating offers no precise reason for such an exclusion.. 162
B. Printed Matter
Early court decisions held that an invention consisting of the
arrangement of information on a substrate, however new and
to prevail in determining how patent cases should be decided?
161 Chisum, supra note 32, at 960-62.
162 The Federal Circuit completely rejected the business systems exception in its opinion in
State Street. See supra Part III.B.
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useful, could not constitute patentable subject matter unless
the invention called for a new relationship between the
information and the substrate. This limitation was closely
related to that on business systems since most attempts to
patent "printed matter" involved arrangements of information
designed to implement some business system. But the
decisions give no reason for excluding printed matter
independent of a desire not to allow a subversion of the
exclusion of patents on business systems. Recent decisions
question the scope of the printed matter limitation without
directly repudiating it....
C. Mental Steps
The mental steps doctrine has a more complicated history.
Early decisions struggled with the definition of a "process" or
"art." It was established that, on the one hand, one could not
patent a newly-discovered "principle" or "law of nature" in
the abstract, but that, on the other hand, one could patent the
application of such a principle to create a new product or
method. In developing the distinction between unpatentable
principles and patentable applications, some decisions
suggested (without actually holding) that "process" must
involve the transformation of matter in some way. This
definition, if rigorously applied, might limit processes to
chemical and some mechanical processes. And indeed the
earliest "mental steps" decision in the Patent Office took this
position. In Ex parte Meinhardt, the Commissioner ruled that
a "system for spacing free-hand letters on a page" did not
constitute patentable subject matter, relying solely on case
law concerning the definition of processes.
With the coming of the computer age, processes involving
"mental steps" no longer would necessarily be performed by
the human brain but rather could be performed by the
marvelous new computing machines. Relying in part on the
mental steps doctrine, the Patent Office as a matter of policy
would not allow patents on "software" or computer
programming inventions. But, in a brief three-year period
beginning in 1969, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.), in reviewing Office actions rejecting software
[Vol. 58:2
YOU CAN'T PATENT SOFTWARE
patent applications, dismantled the mental steps doctrine...
163
Chisum then included as an entire section in his article a
discussion about the "Definition of an Algorithm" where he claimed
that:
In Benson, the Supreme Court recited a definition of an
algorithm:
A procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem is known as an "algorithm." 164  The
procedures set forth in the present claims are of that
kind; that is to say, they are a generalized formulation
for programs to solve mathematical problems of
converting one form of numerical representation to
another. From the generic formulation, programs may
be developed as specific applications.
The Court erred both in implying that algorithms
relate only to mathematical problems 65 and in
characterizing the method involved in Benson as
directed to "mathematical" problems. It is true that
algorithms are often devised to solve problems of a
mathematical nature.1 66 But algorithms may also be
163 Chisum, supra note 32, at 964-71 (citations and footnotes omitted).
164Nota bene, the Court did not say that an "algorithm" is a procedure for solving (only) a
given type of mathematical problem.
165 Where did the Court imply that? There is some confusion here, for it is clear that the
Supreme Court in Benson was dealing only with algorithms for processing data.
166 At this point, Chisum inserts the following footnote:
Perhaps the most famous is the algorithm derived from Euclid for finding the
greatest common divisor of two positive integers a and b. One text relates the
algorithm as follows:
I. Compare a and b (a = b, or a < b, or a > b). Go on to 2.
2. If a = b then either is the greatest common divisor. Stop the computation. If a
not = b go on to 3.
3. Subtract the smaller from the larger number and write down the subtrahend
and the remainder. Go to the next instruction.
4. Assign symbol a to the subtrahend, and symbol b to the remainder. Return to
direction 1.
5. The procedure is repeated until a = b. Then the computation is stopped.
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devised to solve all sorts of nonmathematical
problems. 67 The method at issue in Benson meets all
of the ... definitions of an algorithm .... But is the
method one for solving a "mathematical problem" as
the Court states? 168 It would seem that a conversion
of decimal numbers to binary-coded numbers to
binary numbers is a "mathematical" problem only in
a very loose sense. It is more properly described as a
translation problem-comparable to converting
temperature values from Fahrenheit to Celsius.' 69 The
algorithm involves some arithmetic steps (such as
adding in binary form), but the problem solved is not
a mathematical one (such as finding the greatest
common divisor of two numbers or a trigonometric
function). 170  The imprecision of the Court in
characterizing the algorithm before it in Benson
created uncertainty as to the scope of the
exclusionary rule that it upholds. 17 After all, what
Benson dealt with is an algorithm that was used to
process information-to convert one representation
of data to another representation.
Chisum then purports to "unravel" the "confusion" in the Benson
opinion, 172 claiming that "[T]he reasoning in Benson monstrously
bad."'
1 73
This "unraveling" consists primarily of describing the cases-all
from the Supreme Court-cited in Benson and then claiming that they
do not support Justice Douglas's judgment in that case. 174 Chisum's
Chisum, supra note 32, at 976 n. 56.
167 This certainly is true: for example, there might be an algorithm solving the problem of
how to cook a seagull or how to cure rubber.
168 As long as we know the exact nature of the algorithm, why should we worry about
whether it is "mathematical" or not?
169 And that, of course, is a classic example of a mathematical problem! I remember
studying it early on if high-school algebra.
'7OTranslating binary coded digits to pure binary digits (or "bits") most certainly is a
mathematical problem. Mathematics, after all, covers much more than arithmetic; in particular it
includes the Boolean logic that is the basis for all computer programs. See infra Part VI.A.5. But
even were this not the case, one should note that shifting a binary representation of number to
the right (or left) is the equivalent of multiplying (or dividing) that number by two. See infra
note 391 and accompanying text.
"7 Chisum, supra note 32, at 977 (footnotes omitted). Would it not be more accurate to say
that the alleged imprecision allowed the patent bar to raise doubts about the scope of that rule?
172 Which I submit is more in Chisum's head than in the opinion itself.
173 Chisum, supra note 32, at 977-78.
174 That the cited cases do not fully support Justice Douglas's conclusion is, of course,
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arguments are perhaps a legitimate criticism 175 of the reasons Justice
Douglas gave for his conclusions but they do not in any way address
the holding in that case that algorithms for the processing of
information are not patentable. And, of course, it is the holding in
Benson that is binding on the lower courts and that will be followed
by the Supreme Court unless it decides to overrule it. However much
Chisum and his allies may feel that Benson was wrongly decided, it is
still protected by the doctrine of stare decisis.
Here are what I take to be the most persuasive part of Chisum's
critique:
After quoting . . . three cases, Benson offers a dogmatic
statement: "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work." This statement makes three assertions-
two explicit and one implicit. The explicit assertions are that
(1) natural phenomena, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are to be lumped together as
unpatentable subject matter, and (2) the reason for such
nonpatentability is that all are "basic tools" of technological
work. The implicit assertion is that an algorithm . . . is a
phenomenon of nature, mental process or abstract intellectual
concept. None of the three assertions will bear up fully under
analysis.
First, a mathematical or other algorithm is neither a
phenomenon of nature nor an abstract concept. 76 The
Benson-Tabbot algorithm is very much a construction of the
human mind. 77 One cannot perceive an algorithm in
nature.178 The algorithm does not describe natural phenomena
hardly surprising; after all Benson dealt with issues that had never been considered before by the
Supreme Court.
175 Though I do not think so.
176As to whether there is a distinction between a phenomenon of nature and one of
mathematics, consider the philosophical question of whether the law that "one and one makes
two" is a phenomenon of nature or one of mathematics. Should the answer have any bearing on
the question of whether mathematical algorithms are patentable? And what on earth is a
mathematical algorithm if it is not an abstract concept?
I Which human mind?
178 There are those who know far more about nature than any law professor who seem to
have difficulty in perceiving anything other than algorithms in nature. See SETH LLOYD,
PROGRAMMING THE UNIVERSE (2006); see also DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS
GAME (1995).
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(or natural relationships). 179 Indeed, it does not describe
anything other than a series of operations to be performed by
a machine or possibly by a human being.' 80 ... Neither is the
algorithm fairly described as an "abstract intellectual"
concept (such as "all persons are created equal" or "for every
action there is an equal and opposite reaction").' 8 ' Algorithms
are by definition highly specific rather than abstract.
182
Second, there is no basis for lumping together phenomena of
nature and abstract concepts with "mental steps." A process
consisting partially or wholly of "mental steps" does not exist
in nature183 and can be quite specific. 8 4 The Court's reference
to "mental processes" is disturbingly terse. Arguably, the
Benson-Tabbot algorithm as stated in claim 13 (though not in
the machine claim 8) did involve "mental processes" if the
claim is construed as covering human and not just machine
implementation.... 85
Third, the unpatentability of "phenomena of nature" is not so
clear and self-evident as the Court in Benson would have us
believe.... 8 6
If the trio of "unpatentables" are in fact property excluded
from the patent system, it is for distinct reasons and not their
"tool" status. If natural phenomena are excludable, it may
simply be because they are not "new" as the patent statutes
require. Abstract concepts are excludable because of the
disclosure and clear claiming requirements of the patent
statutes.
87
179 If an algorithm describes something, which I rather doubt, what is it that it describes?
Something super natural?
190 Aren't those operations natural?
181 Is Chisum claiming here that the algorithms describing how to do long division or the
one describing how to find the square root of an arbitrary number are not abstract intellectual
concepts?
182 Is not the number "2" very specific and, at the same time, completely abstract?
183 So when you or I think of something, we are doing something unnatural?
184What earthly difference dose it make whether mental steps are specific, as I suspect
they usually are?
185 What difference does it make whether a human being uses pencil and paper, an abacus,
or a computer in implementing an algorithm in order to process data?
1s6 Now, if that be true, it hardly vitiates the Court's holding in Benson, now does it?
1s7 Chisum, supra note 32, at 980-84. Chisum then claims that the decisions in Flook and
Diehr are confusing because of the defective reasoning in Benson, gives a short history of some
subsequent cases decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and finally argues on
policy grounds that software patents are a good thing. In my opinion none of this need concern
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Again, while I believe that Chisum's critique of Justice Douglas's
presentation of the Court's reasons for its holding in Benson may
have some merit-the opinion is, after all, quite difficult to parse-I
cannot find any argument in his article that suggests that the holding
in that case is wrong.
B. The Models Are Broken, the Models Are Broken!
Allen Newell, one of the earliest computer scientists and one of the
first to explore the field of artificial intelligence and what today is
known as cognitive science, wrote, in the same symposium, a
response to Chisum's article entitled The Model's Are Broken, The
Models are Broken!188 In this article Newell explains-or at least
begins to explain-why we lawyers find the issues in Benson so
confusing and also, I think, why Justice Douglas's opinion in that
case is not as clear as one-especially one who thinks it correct-
might wish.
Still, as we shall see, Newell failed to discuss what I find to be the
most confusing aspect of Benson, the fact that, though the case
involved an algorithm for processing information, few of us can say
with any certainty what information is, 189 a matter that Newell did not
discuss.'
90
Newell claimed to be agnostic on the question of whether software
patents should be issued. 191 His position was that, as the title of his
article suggests, our models-our ideas-about the nature of
algorithms and related matters are going inevitably to plunge us into
confusion, no matter whether we allow software patents or forbid
them.
Thus Newell says at the beginning:
Professor Chisum's Article launches a full scale attack on
Gottschalk v. Benson, which held-erroneously in Chisum's
view-that algorithms are not patentable. Chisum may well
be right that the Benson case has brought on much analytic
confusion in the software patent area. He may also be right in
us here.
188 Allen Newell, The Model's Are Broken, The Models are Broken!, 47 U. PITr. L. REv.
1023 (1986).
189 See infra Part VI.C.
"9OMy suspicion is that as a computer scientist Newell was so immersed in the
understanding that computers are machines which process data, i.e., information, that he did not
appreciate how confusing that can be to those who think of machines as gadgets that produce
material objects like automobile engine blocks or properly cured rubber.
191 It seems to me though that most of his remarks suggest that such patents not be issued.
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supposing that, if Benson had only been decided differently,
the specific confusion that occurred in its aftermath would not
have materialized. It seems to be his view that a different
holding in Benson would have brought about analytic
sweetness and light.
My point is precisely to the contrary. Regardless how the
Benson case was decided-whether that algorithm or any
other was held patentable or not patentable-confusion would
have ensued. The confusions that bedevil algorithms and
patentability arise from the basic conceptual models that we
192use to think about algorithms and their use....
Now that statement should perhaps be taken as a warning that
Newell's comments are primarily directed at algorithms in
general, not those, like that in Benson, that can be used only
in data processing. Nor does Newell discuss, at least not
directly, the issues in Flook,193 a case that involved a
"mathematical formula" rather than an algorithm. 194 Newell
starts his discussion with a section entitled "The Nature of
Algorithms" in which he first points out that "the one thing




The first confusion is using involvement with numbers as the
hallmark for distinguishing mathematics from
nonmathematics, as an aid to determining what is an
algorithm. This confusion is easily cleared up. Algorithms are
192 Id. at 1023 (footnote omitted).
193 That is hardly surprising since Chisum did not discuss Flook at any length.
194 But see supra note 87 and accompanying text where the Court in Flook equates a
mathematical algorithm with a mathematical formula. See also infra Part VI.B.1 where it is
contended that all computer programs, including those that solve numerical problems are
basically algorithms and that all computers programs can be viewed as performing numerical
calculations.
195 Newell, supra note 188, at 1024. He may be being too sanguine, but Newell then
continues:
An algorithm is an unambiguous specification of a conditional sequence of steps or
operations for solving a class of problems. This definition is perfectly reasonable, it
is not arcane, and I believe we can all live with it. The confusion, then, is not in the
nature of algorithms. It is all the things around it that get confused.
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certainly mathematical objects. That is an acceptable model.
However, mathematics deals with both nonnumerical things
and numerical things. Correspondingly, there are both
numerical and nonnumerical algorithms. Therefore, any
attempt to find a helpful or cutting distinction between
mathematics and nonmathematics, as between numerical or
nonnumerical, is doomed. 1
96
This implies, of course, that if mathematical algorithms are held
not to be patentable, as they were in Benson, then non-mathematical
algorithms should be treated in the same fashion. Note, however, that
that does not mean that algorithms that process data and those that
process more material things, like rubber, for example, need be
treated in the same way. One can also-contra Newell-make a
strong argument that, since digital computers deal only with strings of
"bits" that can always be interpreted as a binary representation of a
number, all algorithms implemented with a digital computer must be
numerical algorithms. Those two points seem at least somewhat to
abate the confusion that Newell finds inherent in Chisum's
interpretation of the issues in Benson.
Newell goes on to say:
Next consider algorithms and mental steps. 197 The main line
of progress in psychology for the last thirty years (called
cognitive psychology) has been to describe human behavior
as computational. We model what is going on inside the
thinking human brain, as the carrying out of computationai
steps. Therefore, humans think by means of algorithms.
Sequences of mental steps and algorithms are the same thing.
Any attempt in the law to make distinctions that depend upon
contrasting mental steps versus algorithms is doomed to
196d. Newell then explains:
Indeed, in the mid-1930s the central argument of a famous proof, by the
mathematician Kurt Godel, involved showing that all of logic is a part of number
theory. The scheme, which ever after has been called Godel numbering, assigns an
integer to each logical expression, such that all the truths in logic become theorems
about the integers. Although lawyers need never become acquainted with Godel
numbering, they should realize there is an underlying identity between the numerical
and the nonnumerical realms that will confound any attempt to create a useful
distinction between them.
Id. at 1024-25.
197 Recall that, though Chisum discussed the mental steps doctrine at some length, that
doctrine was never mentioned, at least by name, in the Supreme Court's opinion in Benson.
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eventual confusion.... Any attempt to erect a patent system
for algorithms that tries to distinguish algorithms as one sort
of thing and mental steps as another, will ultimately end up in
a quagmire. Just avoiding the use of this distinction is only
half the story. An identity between algorithms and mental
steps leads to such questions as whether you can keep people
from thinking patented thoughts .....
98
Is not this a powerful argument against the patentability of
algorithms: if one cannot patent mental steps-or ideas-then
one cannot patent algorithms-at least not those algorithms
that can be implemented as a series of mental steps? 199
In the next section of his article, entitled "Algorithms and Basic
Truths," Newell says:
[T]he natural question is whether algorithms are to be
considered either natural laws or mathematical truths,200
hence not to be encouraged by patents; or whether they are
inventions that jump the gap from such laws and truths to
application, hence to be encouraged by patents. One view
comes from observing how practical algorithms can be. They
are directly related to use in specific tasks, tasks that can be
of the utmost value. That would seem to place them as
devices to jump the gap to application, hence as patentable.
But a more confounding answer flows from the general
nature of computer science. All of computer science is
directly related to use. There is essentially no gap, no matter
how pure or basic the science is...
Let us pursue the consequences of patenting algorithms.
Would it have been possible to patent the integers? "No,"
comes the reply-integers are mathematical truths. Even I
know that .... 201 So the integers cannot be patented. But
198 Newell, supra note 188, at 1025.
199 See also infra text following note 203.
200 Note that Newell here treats natural laws and mathematical truths as being equivalent,
overlooking the potential confusion that can arise-at least in some people's heads-when
natural laws, which deal with material objects like galaxies and atoms and seagulls, are equated
with mathematics, which is not concerned with such matters.
201 Newell then qualifies this answer:
Actually, the integers are abstract, mathematical objects, and mathematical truths are
things like," Between every two consecutive odd integers there is exactly one even
integer." But let that pass.
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certainly one might contemplate patenting addition. "Well,
that is still not true," comes the reply-addition is defined to
be a mapping of pairs of integers (the addends), to integers
(the sum). 202 Doing addition is accomplished by carrying
out an algorithm. If algorithms are patentable, then I can keep
you from doing addition with the algorithms invented for it.
There would be ever so many things that the poor would not
be able to do, such as add up their grocery bill.
203
204
Newell concludes this section by remarking that:
There is one last way to avoid the swamp that seems to await
the patenting of addition methods. We can focus on the
primeval character of addition. Yes, it might have been a
problem, but not now. Addition cannot be patented, because
it is already in the public domain. Moreover, it is special-we
will not see its like again in terms of generality and
pervasiveness. But this answer will not do. Computer science
is nothing but a breeding ground for new algorithms, and
computer science is hardly out of its swaddling clothes.
Algorithms of immense generality and scope will continue to
emerge for as long as the science endures. Examples are easy
to come by. The simplex algorithm for doing linear
programming was invented by G. Dantzig in 1948. It was,
until recently, the only practical algorithm for solving a huge
class of management and production problems. The fast
Fourier transform was invented by J. W. Cooley and J. Tukey
in 1965. It essentially created the entire field of digital signal
processing. Although considering the patenting of algorithms
Newell, supra note 188, at 1027.
202 Once again Newell adds a qualification:
That is not even a truth, that is just a definition. Ah, but if you want actually to do
addition-that requires doing a sequence of things, not to the integers, which are
abstract (so you cannot do things to them anyhow), but to some representation of the
integers.
Id.
203 See also infra text accompanying notes 204-06.
204 Newell, supra note 188, at 1027.
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for addition may seem a bit melodramatic, it is perhaps not
entirely unrepresentative.
20 5
That is an extremely important point. The simplex algorithm, for
example, is certainly novel enough and useful enough to be patented
if such algorithms can indeed be patented, but if it were patentable
then 20 6 Newton's invention of the calculus would have been
patentable.0 7 And if Newton had a patent on the calculus, no
subsequent mathematician or natural scientist could20 8 have done any
serious work without Newton's permission. Nor could any student
have studied mathematics beyond the high-school level legally
without Newton's consent-imagine the police coming to your door
and informing you that your daughter has been arrested for practicing
calculus without a license.
The next section is entitled "The Embodiments of Algorithms." It
is the most technical portion of Newell's article, but it is, I submit,
well worth our consideration.
Let us turn to the embodiments of algorithms. Computer
science understands well the essential feature of a digital
computer. First, there is a machine (call it the operations-
machine) that can perform any of a collection of operations.
For standard computers these are mostly operations that
modify, store or retrieve data; but many other sorts of
operations are possible. This is a real machine, by anyone's
standards. However, when turned on, it does not actually do
any of its operations, but awaits some signals from the
outside to evoke them. Second, there is a specification (the
program) of what behavior is desired, that is, what operations
are to be performed and in what sequence. This specification
is essentially a textual document,20 9 although it is not encoded
as marks on paper, but as marks in some other medium.
Lastly, there is an interpreter, which is also a real machine by
anyone's standards. Except that electrons are very quiet it
would clank. If you feed the specification into the interpreter,
the interpreter will send signals to the operations-machine to
make it carry out the sequence of steps specified. By now
205d. at 1028.
206 Provided that the same rules of patent law existed in Newton's day as exist today.
207 Unless Leibnitz were able to establish priority.
208 As long as the patent was in force.
209 In other words, it consists of information or, to be more precise, data, just as any other
text does. See infra Part VI.C.
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there is nothing obscure about this arrangement and I daresay
you are all familiar with it.
210
There may be nothing obscure about the arrangement, but
several remarkable consequences flow from it. The one of
interest to us can be called the transfer of creativity. The
operations-machine has a certain scope for action. It is a
physical arena in which one can imagine inventing how the
machine might do new things and then reducing this to
practice. What the interpreter does is to transfer all these
possibilities for action to the specification. Going through the
interpreter does not lose any of the capabilities of the
operations-machine or behavior. Consequently, nothing is
added to the nature of creation and invention beyond that
which happens in the programming language. .1.
In more modem-although sometimes misleading-terminology
the interpreter takes the "source code" written by a programmer and
converts it to "machine code." that is implemented by the computer.
Newell then says:
What is true of programs is true of algorithms. An algorithm
is just an abstract program, which is to say, just an abstract
specification. The abstraction involved in an algorithm
concerns relatively routine matters-what exact
representation of the data to use, how to modify these
representations in detail to accomplish the primitive steps
specified by the algorithm, etc. These are important and their
choice may make important efficiency differences. But the
essential issues of what is to be done are reserved to the
algorithm. Indeed, the whole point of writing an algorithm is
to convey the essential of what the operations-machine is to
do. Thus, any attempt, for the purposes of locating creativity
and invention, to distinguish between the algorithm and any
particular embodiment of it turns out to be extremely
difficult.
210 To modem readers this seem more obscure than Newell thinks, but that is only because
today we are accustomed-at least if we use personal computers-to using the same chunk of
hardware as both the operations-machine and the interpreter. See infra note 400 and
accompanying text.
211 Newell, supra note 188, at 1029.
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This also explains why algorithms cannot be distinguished
from programs... 212
This is an extremely important point, for if algorithms cannot be
distinguished from programs, then the rule established in Benson that
algorithms that can be implemented on a digital computer are not
patentable must also apply to computer programs in general. If one
cannot tell one from the other, then the fact that one cannot be
patented implies that, for any practical purpose, the other cannot be
patented.
And, then, in a section entitled "The Form of Algorithms" Newell
says:
Let us talk about how to recognize an algorithm when you see
one. The definition of algorithm at the beginning says it
determines a sequence of steps. Thus, we might expect an
algorithm to be in the form of a procedure-do this, and then
do this, and then do this, and so on. Anyone can tell a
procedure, for it lays out exactly the steps to be taken.... So
212 Id. at 1029. Newell adds:
Computer science makes the distinction all right, but to express degrees of
abstraction. An algorithm is more abstract than a program. Given an algorithm, it is
possible to code it up in any programming language. You might think that a program
should be something like an algorithm plus implementation details. Thus, you
examine the text of a purported algorithm-if you find an implementation detail, you
know it is a mere program. But it is not so, at least not in any way useful to the law.
For a program is also abstract. It is a general specification for action that is
interpreted for a particular occasion by the interpreter. The program is missing
certain details, which must be added when the program is to be run (by other
programs variously called compilers, assemblers and loaders). The root difficulty is
that one man's detail is another man's essential. It all depends on the purposes. This
analysis can be turned around. Since an algorithm determines the sequence of steps
to be performed, then there must exist some, perhaps powerful, interpreter than can
go directly from the specification of the algorithm to carrying out the steps. The
existence of such an interpreter is the acid test of whether an algorithm has really
been given. But then the algorithm in this high-level representation looks just like a
programming language of a high-level and powerful interpreter. There are certainly
matters of degree-algorithms are conventionally more abstract than programs. But
there are no separations of kind, even though in the current art we often do not know
enough to construct the powerful interpreters. This state of affairs, by the way, is
reflected currently in the automatic programming field, where they refuse to draw
any hard and fast line between systems to design algorithms and systems to design
programs. From their point of view, it is just a continuum of design tasks. The
computer science field maintains a distinction (so you can buy textbooks on
algorithms and textbooks on programming), but it is more the distinction between
what specifications to write to do tasks of interest versus the details of particular
schemes for writing the specifications.
Id. at 1029-30.
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that is a model for how to tell an algorithm when you see one.
Look at the text and examine its form to see if it is a
procedure. Historically, that describes pretty closely what
programming languages (Fortran, Ada, Cobol, assembly
languages, etc.) and informal notations for algorithms (in
textbooks, etc.) are like.
But alas, for our models, the reality of computer science
moves on. This reality leads to conceptually richer ground
that is highly productive for both theory and application. But
it destroys the clean model whereby an algorithm could be
recognized by its having a procedural form. Computer
science takes an algorithm to be any specification that
determines the behavior of a system. These specifications can
be of any kind whatsoever as long as they actually provide
the determination through the interpreter. Consequently, the
form of the specification need no longer be procedural.
Sequences of steps must march out after interpretation, but
sequences of steps need not march into the interpreter.
This is hardly an idle possibility. We now have languages for
writing algorithms that look very different from a sequence of
steps. For instance, in some programming systems one simply
provides a set of constraints that are to be satisfied by the
ultimate actions, and the interpreter (or compiler) determines
what actions are needed to satisfy them, and then executes
them. A set of constraints does not look like a step-by-step
procedure, but it is just as good as one, because it determines
the steps. Other cases are no longer even esoteric and have
moved well beyond the realm of research. The form of many
expert systems is simply a collection of if-then rules that
provide the knowledge that is needed to perform a task. There
is no easy way of seeing such an expert system as a sequence
of steps-except that the rule interpreter determines at each
moment one rule to fire. Some of you may be familiar with
the rhetoric of PROLOG, a prominent expert-system
language, "You don't have to say how it's done, you can
simply give to the system the knowledge about the task and it
will go and do it." The rhetoric is a little overblown, but it
illustrates how difficult it will be to detect whether some text
is an algorithm from its form alone. If all that counts is the
2008]
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knowledge, then the specifications can look declarative or
procedural or any other way....
Fortunately we do not have to recognize an algorithms when we
see one. Since algorithms and computer programs are
interchangeable, as long as we can recognize a computer program-
and the proof that something is a computer program is that it can be
run on a computer-we can be sure that it, and any of its
specifications, are not patentable under the rule established in Benson.
And then, in the final section of his article, entitled "Increasing the
Invention of Algorithms" Newell wonders into that slough of despond
where economic arguments grow.
My final example concerns whether patenting algorithms will
lead to more or less innovation in the software field. The
standard economic model lying behind the patent system,
which was in evidence in several places in Professor
Chisum's Article, is that inventors produce inventions that, in
turn, produce more of the consumables 214 that society desires.
Giving control of the invention to the inventors increases the
price of the ultimate products to society, over what would be
the case if the inventions were available for all to use. But
this cost is more than offset by the increased number of
inventions that become available to society, due to the
incentive to inventors. These inventions raise the net
productivity of the economy.l 5
Consider an alternative model, in which inventions produce,
not consumables, but "inventables." That is, suppose the
primary effect of every product is to enable additional
inventions. There will be consumption as well, but mostly
new invention based on ownership of the products. To be
clear about the key assumption: New invention comes from
the products produced by the original invention, not from the
original invention itself. The price increase due to the patent
monopoly will restrict the amount of product sold, just as in
the original model. But now this implies that the number of
2131d. at 1031-32.
214
"Consumables" is certainly not the right word here. Computer programs are not
consumable, for they can never be consumed. One can make and run as many copies of a
program that one wants, and can give them all away, and the program as such still exists in all
its unconsumed ontic glory.
215 How on earth could anyone ever tell whether the cost is offset by the value of the
increased number of inventions, or even that there would be an increased number of inventions.
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new inventions that occur will also be restricted. As long as
there is some baseline flow of inventions in society, then it is
possible that the loss of inventions to society from the
monopoly price restrictions will more than offset the gains in
inventions from the financial encouragement. The patent
system could discourage invention rather than encourage it.
216
This may seem like an extreme alternative model. However,
some computer communities may approximate it. There,
people take each other's programs freely, then enhance them,
and then pass them on to others, who do more of the same. Of
course, they also use them as well. But consuming the
217behavior of a program does not consume the program.
Furthermore, it is the possession of the previously invented
program that permits the new invention to occur. For the new
inventor adds, modifies, enhances and reshapes the existing
system, mostly in small ways, though occasionally
substantially. The capabilities of the system evolve and grow.
The motivations for such enhancements are partly that one
benefits from the inventions themselves, for one gets to use
the enhanced system. But the motivations are also partly
those that keep the artist and the mathematician creating-it
becomes a medium of expression and a coin of the realm. If
patentability implies that mostly what is used is left
untouched and unenhanced, then the total improvements in
the community's software may well decrease, even though
some people are induced to work harder at innovating to
capture the rewards from patents. They must do their
inventing from a poorer base.21 8
And then Newell adds:
I do not seriously defend this alternative model. My goal is
more modest - to point out that the world of algorithms and
computers may have a different character than the standard
economic model of incentives that underlies the patent law.
Even this model may be broken.21 9
216 Except for the last sentence, I simply cannot understand what Newell is trying to say in
this paragraph.
2!7 Exactly!
218 Newell, supra note 188, at 1033-34.
2i91d. at 1034.
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If Newell was not prepared to defend his alternative model, the
fact is that it seems a prescient description of the world that is
occupied by those who produce what is known as "free" or "open"
software, software that includes the Linux and BSD operating
systems, the GNU compilers, editors and other utilities, the World
Wide Web and the Apache servers that support it, and even the
protocols that underlie the Internet itself.
C. Benson Revisited
In 1990 Pamela Samuelson, one of the leading experts-and
probably the leading expert-on computer law, published, before the
Federal Circuit made its decisions in Alappat and State Street, an
article entitled Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions.220 I
suspect that if this article had been given the attention that it deserved
back then I would not now be writing this article, except perhaps to
clarify a few details here and there.221
Samuelson's article begins:
For most of the past twenty-five years, it was widely believed
that computer program-related inventions were rarely, if ever,
patentable. The 1972 Supreme Court decision, Gottschalk v.
Benson, in which the Court ruled that a computer program
algorithm is not patentable, contributed significantly to this
view. This decision also seemed to call into question the
patentability of other computer program innovations.222 Two
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Parker v. Flook in 1978
and Diamond v. Diehr in 1981, reaffirmed the Benson ruling
on the unpatentability of algorithms. Even though the
Supreme Court did conclude that Diehr's invention was
patentable, the Diehr decision was regarded as a very limited
one for many years. It is limited in that it affirms only that
patents can issue for traditionally patentable industrial
processes which include a computer program as an element.
220Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990).
221 According to Shepard's only one judicial opinion has cited Samuelson's article, our old
friend Chief Judge Archer's dissent in Alappat. See supra Part lIl.A. 1. The lack of judicial
attention to Samuelson's article can largely be explained by the fact that since the creation of the
Federal Circuit with its nearly exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases there have been few
patent cases that have gotten to the Supreme Court and none involving software patents. See
supra Part III.C.
222 1 am afraid that even Samuelson failed to grasp the fact that all computer programs are
algorithms (although not all algorithms are computer programs).
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Despite the consistency in the Supreme Court's rulings
against the patenting of algorithms, the Patent Office is now
issuing patents for a wide variety of non-industrial computer
program-related inventions and even seems to be issuing
patents for computer program algorithms. Some patent
lawyers argue that this change is consistent with Diehr, which
they read to hold that only claims for "unapplied" algorithms
are unpatentable. Professor Donald Chisum, the prominent
patent scholar, attacks the Supreme Court case law more
directly by calling for Benson to be overruled and for patent
law to embrace the patentability of algorithms and other
computer program-related inventions.
The purpose of this article is to restate the case against patent
protection for algorithms and many other computer program-
related inventions in order to clarify the legal and public
policy debates on this important subject.... 223
The article contains an excellent history of the treatment of
software patents by the courts before the decisions in Alappat and
State Street. Unfortunately, however, the Federal Circuit paid no
attention to Samuelson's arguments.224
There is, however, one passage in this article where Samuelson
makes a critical mistake, arguing, in effect, that computers are texts
and that computer programs are machines:
.... Programs defy the conceptual molds provided by the
traditional patent and copyright systems for understanding
how to protect intellectual work. The computer scientist and
mathematician John von Neumann realized that it would be
possible to construct a computer that could store not only the
data on which the computer was to operate, but also sets of
instructions (computer programs) to guide its operations. By
executing different sets of stored instructions, a general
purpose digital computer could "become" different
machines.225  The von Neumann machine operates by
processing symbolic representations (encoded instructions
which prescribe the order in which the computer is to perform
223 Samuelson, supra note 220, at 1028-30 (footnotes omitted).
224 Except for Chief Judge Archer's dissent in Alappat. See supra Part III.A. 1.
225 It is fortunate that at this point Samuelson resorted to scare quotes, since the machine
obviously remained the same machine even though it was performing different functions, just as
a food processor remains the same machine whether it is being used to make bread dough at one
time and chop liver at another.
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specified functions to accomplish a given task).226 With von
Neumann's discovery, machines could become writings, and
writings could become machines.... 227
Lawyers want to be able to make firm distinctions and to
make legal rulings turn on these distinctions. However, even
seemingly meaningful distinctions, like those between
computer programs and computers or between programs and
data, have a measure of artificiality to them. There is no fixed
dividing line between computer programs and computers
because anything that can be implemented in software can
also be implemented in hardware.226 Professor Newell
explains why there is no firm line between data and
programs:
As anyone in computer science knows, the boundary
between data and program-that is, what is data and
what is procedure-is very fluid. In fact,... there is
no principled distinction in terms of form or
representation of which is which. What counts is the
total body of knowledge represented somehow in the
assembled symbolic expressions. This totality
determines the ultimate behavior of the : machine.228
To come to terms with the legal implications of this fluidity is
no easy task.229
Samuelson was undoubtedly correct when she claimed that not
being able to tell a computer-a patentable machine-from a
program-an unpatentable writing-makes it difficult for lawyers to
226 That amounts to saying, correctly, that a Von Neumann machine processes the symbolic
representations of the instructions-that is, the symbolic representation of an algorithm-just as
it processes other data. For more about "Von Neumann machines," See infra note 400.
227 This claim, unless taken metaphorically, is simply wrong, for the kickable machine and
the written program are always radically different types of things: machines are made of matter;
programs consist of information. The idea that machines can become writings and that writings
can become machines, if taken literally, leads to a dangerous muddle that allows proponents of
sofitware patents to argue that computer programs should be patentable like any other machine.
228 That no distinction can be drawn between programs and data is not a cause for legal
confusion for neither the software nor the other data that together determine the behavior of a
computer are patentable under the holding in Benson.
229 Samuelson, supra note 220, at 1128-31 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 58:2
YOU CAN'TPA TENT SOFTWARE
determine the patentability of software 23 0 She was wrong, however, in
claiming that it is difficult to tell a computer from a program; what
she should have said is that it is easy for lawyers and legislators, who
for the most part know little about computers and programs, to
confuse the two and it is that unwarranted confusion that makes the
issue raised in Benson appear to be difficult and to justify the-by
now largely successful--efforts to get the Federal Circuit to
"overrule" Benson.
But be that as it may, Samuelson ultimately came to the reasonable
conclusion that the courts-even the Supreme Court-should not
overrule Benson.
This article asserts that there is simply too much at stake-
not only for the computer software industry, but for the public
at large-for such an important change in the subject matter
boundaries of the patent system to be made by the courts;
especially given the courts' befuddlement thus far about
computer program innovations in patent cases.
And then Samuelson demonstrates that very little has changed in
the arguments about whether software should be patentable, except
that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has been replaced by
the Federal Circuit.
As reflected in the popular press, the current "controversy"
over software patents has nothing whatsoever to do with the
fine points of the court decisions, doctrinal analysis, and
Patent Office practice on which this article has mainly
concentrated. Rather, the issue has a more legislative tone, as
though the patentability of computer programs and algorithms
is an open issue about which it would be appropriate to ask if
patents are "good" or "bad" for the industry and for society.
Predictions that patents may be harmful to the software
industry, computer science, mathematics, or society as a
whole have been quite frequent, even from some of the most
well-known people in the software and computer science
fields.
Patent lawyers tend to respond to such concerns by saying
that, although this may be an interesting social policy issue,
the reality is that the legal system has already established a
230 And gives a lot of support to Chisum's argument that software should be as patentable
as any other machine.
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rule in favor of software patents. Court decisions have upheld
the patentability of program-related inventions. There are
many issued patents now, there will be many more in future
years, and all are presumed to be valid. It would take
congressional action to alter what has become the status quo,
and that is not likely to happen.
This article argues that the legal foundation on which the
current belief in the patentability of all program-related
inventions rests is not as solid as many patent lawyers would
like to believe. The CCPA decisions upholding software
patents are hardly models of enlightened clarity and well-
explicated principles. Indeed, the only principle which seems
to have guided that court's deliberations over the years is one
of upholding the patentability of as many program-related
inventions as possible while still appearing to show some
respect for the Supreme Court's decisions. 23 1 Both the CCPA
decisions and the Patent Office's current more generous
attitude toward software patents go beyond what the Supreme
Court approved in the Diehr case. As a result, the legal debate
over the patentability of computer program-related inventions
may not be as settled as some patent lawyers claim.232
Although the author's study of the computer program patent
cases has caused her to be critical of those decisions and of
Professor Chisum's argument for overturning Benson, it is
primarily because of the widespread concerns about the ill
effects of patents from within the industry and the technical
community that she has pursued this study.233
V. ARE SOFTWARE PATENTS NECESSARILY BAD THINGS?
As Samuelson pointed out 234 there were back in 1990
"[W]idespread concerns about the ill effects of patents from within
the industry and the technical community," concerns that are far more
widespread today. There are, however, also those who believe that
software patents are a good thing, increasing the amount of
innovation in the software field and increasing the well being of
231 Of course, with the decisions in Alappat and State Street the Federal Circuit would stop
showing any respect for the actual decisions of the Supreme Court in Benson, Flook and Diehr.
232 That, of course, is a milder way of saying one of the things what I am claiming here.
233 Samuelson, supra note 220, at 1133-34 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
234 See supra text accompanying note 232.
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society as a whole, while others, like Professor Chisum, believe that
those who would exclude software from the processes that are treated
as patentable subject matter must bear the burden of proof-and
cannot satisfy it.
235
Although, as I have argued--quite persuasively I think-that the
law as established by the Supreme Court is that software is not
patentable, that does not mean that the rulings of the Supreme Court
on this subject should not be reversed. Although software is not
patentable, perhaps it should be.
Now as far as I can tell no arguments were made by the Federal
Circuit in Alappat and State Street as to why software should be
patentable, other than the implicit claim that software should be
patentable like any other process.236
As it turns out, however, there is a great deal of argument 237 about
whether software patents-as distinguished from other types of
patents-are good things or bad things from the point of view of
encouraging innovation238 or improving the economy.
Frankly, I doubt whether arguments that software patents increase
or decrease innovation or our economic well-being can ever persuade
anyone to change their mind about the such matters. And, in fact, I
235 Over the years, there has been a lively debate among economists, lawyers and others
over the economic and social justification for a patent system. Do the grants of limited exclusive
rights really induce a higher level of innovation or a higher degree of utilization of innovations?
Do such grants really induce disclosure of useful information that otherwise would not be
disclosed? Is the incrementally higher level of innovation or disclosure worth the economic cost
of higher prices and lower production that exclusive rights may cause? At times, the debate is
framed in conceptual terms. For example, is a patent for an invention a "monopoly," which
should be kept within bounds given this country's "traditional antipathy" toward monopolies, or
is it "property," which should be afforded the same full legal protection as is afforded other
types of tangible and intangible property?
Interesting though these questions about the patent system in gross may be, they need not
and should not be raised anew or debated de novo in deciding whether algorithms constitute
patentable subject matter. The patent system is a given. It was established by statute in 1790 and
has been maintained by Congress ever since. This represents a policy determination by
Congress that in fact the public interest is served by offering limited periods of exclusive rights
in disclosed innovations in the useful arts. The statutory scheme includes within its subject
matter the category of "processes" in a broad sense. In the Flook decision, the Supreme Court
admitted that a mathematical algorithm came within the normal definition of a process. Given
that literal inclusion of algorithms within the patent system, the burden of proof on the
excludability of algorithms in a judicial or administrative forum should shift to the side that
seeks such exclusion. The burden of proof should be carried only by a demonstration that (1) the
evident policies of the statutory patent system prescribe that the word "process" be given a
special nonliteral meaning that excludes algorithms or (2) the constitutional provision that
authorizes Congress to establish a patent system places algorithms outside the permissible scope
of such a system. Chisum, supra note 32 at 1010-11 (footnotes omitted).
236 We shall see, hereafter that information processing is quite unlike processes that modify
material substances. See infra Part VI.C.
237 See, e.g., Wikipedia, Software Patent Debate, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Softwarepatent debate.
238 Which is what patents are supposed to do.
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sincerely doubt that any of those arguments could possibly be
"rational" in the sense that their results could be calculated by a
properly programmed computer.239
The issue is confused by the fact that, even if software patents are
not necessarily bad things, many of them-like the patent at issue in
State Street-should never have been issued.
And there is also the problem that if special rules are to apply to
software patents, why should there not also be special rules for other
types of patents: one rule for patents for means of cooking rubber,
another for patents for means of making chocolate cookies, and
another for patents on adding machines, until the whole body of
patent law becomes as balkanized, complex, and unworkable as the
law of copyright.240
The later argument might be persuasive-and I would have to
admit that it is not so easy to justify discrimination against software
2391 find it amusing-and instructive-to imagine a patent on a computer program that
proves that software patents increase-or, even more amusingly, decrease-the well being of
society. I suppose that I should admit a certain bias here, for I have long thought, and have
argued at length, that economic arguments-about much simpler issues than the economic
consequences of software patents-are a complete waste of time. See Junger, A Recipe for Bad
Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1976).
Thus fear that all those law review articles that describe patents as "non-rivalous goods," and
discuss whether that means that they are not going to be allocated efficiently, are exercises in
religious dialectics that bear no relation to any reality that we can actually experience. For a
discussion of the economic issues relating to patents, see Frangois Lv~que & Yann Mdni~re,
The Economics of Patents and Copyright (2004), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1001&contentleveque. You might also look at ERICK STASIK, NOT SO PATENTLY
OBVIOUS (2006), a book that is addressed primarily to law students. (I should hope that most
law students would have the good sense not to take this treatise very seriously, while still
realizing that it can supply arguments that may be found persuasive by their more gullible
professors and perhaps even some judges.) For citations to many articles and reports on the
economics of software patents, see Research on the MacroEconomic Effects of Patents,
http://swpat.ffii.org /vreji/minra/sisku/.












12. pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
13. pseudonymous works;
14. sound recordings; and,
15. transmission programs
as well as "food service or drinking establishments" and many other arcane matters. Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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patents-unless there is some reasonable basis for treating software
inventions differently from other inventions. Fortunately for my
claims in this article, there is indeed such a basis: permitting patents
on means of processing information amounts-as Supreme Court
held in Benson-to permitting the patenting of ideas, i.e., the very
processes of thought.241
Unlike patentable processes like cooking rubber-or cooking
seagulls--or constructing adding machines, the processes specified in
computer programs involve the processing of information, not of
matter, and that makes all the difference. Computer programs are not
tangible machines-or machines of any kind-despite what the
Federal Circuit says in Alappat; computer programs are information
about how one can use a computer-or one's head and one's hands-
to process other information.
2 42
A more lawyer-like, or, at least, lawyer-convincing, version of this
argument is to point out that the constitutional authority for the
granting of patents-and copyrights-is contained in Clause 8 of
Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution, which
provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.
What is critical for our purposes here it the distinction between
"writings" that are copyrightable in order to promote the progress of
"science" and "discoveries" that are patentable in order to promote
the progress of the "useful arts." At the time of the writing of the
Constitution and the first Patent Act in 1790 "science" referred to
"knowledge" in general, not to the more limited range of subjects that
,,243
we think of today when we hear the word "science.
On the other hand,
The men who participated in drafting the Constitution
and the first patent act in the United States (Patent
Act of 1790) conceived of a world in which the term
241 See infra Part VI.B.6.
242 Including other computer programs.
243 "In the 17th and 18th c. the notion now usually expressed by science was commonly
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"arts" captured within it various skills and branches
of learning. The realm of the arts was divisible into
cultural and useful arts, the former including liberal
arts (grammar, logic/dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic,
geometry, music, and astronomy) and fine arts
(painting, drawing, architecture, sculpture, poetry,
dancing, and drama). . . . The useful arts, then,
comprised the "mysteries" of the European craft
guilds; these mysteries were processes and tools used
by trained human beings operating in the physical
world to produce physical objects generally regarded
as being practically useful and marketable to other
human beings. 2"
As we shall see, computer programs are texts-i.e., writings-
containing instructions on how to perform arithmetical and other
mathematical and logical operations and, as such, may be
copyrightable, but they are not within the useful arts, and thus are not
patentable, because they do not "operate in the physical world to
produce physical objects."
VI. OF COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION
I am not unaware that there are conceptual difficulties in
understanding, and justifying, the Supreme Court's decision in
Benson, Flook and Diehr. That is, after all, my excuse for writing at
such length about those decisions. There are, I am sure, many who
would argue that the Federal Circuit was right in refusing to follow
the Supreme Court's decisions in those cases as a matter of policy, if
not of jurisdiction, and that if the issue were to come again before the
Supreme Court,245 the Court should overrule those cases.246
There is one glaring problem with that position, however, for the
fact is that the Court was right in Benson, Flook and Diehr in holding
that algorithms and mathematical formulae are the equivalent of ideas
and that they also are the equivalents of "natural laws," all of which
should be unpatentable.247
244Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the
Chimerical Mind-Machine, 42 CAL. W. L. REv. 49, 55-56 (2005) (footnotes omitted; emphasis
added).
245 As it inevitably will now that the Federal Circuit no longer has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals in patent cases. See supra text accompanying note I11.
24 it would be a cruel sort of fun to hear the argument of counsel trying to persuade the
Court that the Federal Circuit was right when it refused to follow the Court's decisions; I
wonder whether anyone would actually dare make such an argument.247 See supra note 40 and accompanying text as well as the remainder of this article.
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These are, I fear, truths that are difficult for lawyers to grasp. Most
of us have-quite reasonably-an allergic reaction to discussions of
the nature of "algorithms" or "ideas" or "mental processes" or
"mathematical processes" or "information"-at least in the context of
legal arguments. Who, after all, would want law cases resolved one
way or the other because the judges of law or fact agreed or disagreed
with Plato's concept of "Ideas" or Descartes's concept of the "mind"?
I submit, however, that we are never going to understand what
was-and is-at issue in Benson and its progeny, if we do not
understand the meaning of such terms in the context of computers and
software. It is important, if we are to understand Benson, that we
understand what computers are and what computer programs are and
how, despite what many appear to think, these two terms are not
interchangeable. Furthermore, if we are going to understand what
computers are and what computer programs are we denizens of the
so-called "information age" are going to have to at least begin to
understand what information is.
And if we are going to understand why software should not be
patentable we are going to have to cure ourselves once and for all of
the perverse delusion that machines can be texts and that texts can be
machines.248 And we are also going to have to cure ourselves of the
delusion that a process, like a thought, that processes only
information, rather than matter or energy, is somehow more
patentable than other abstract ideas and mental processes.249
In the remainder of this article I shall therefore be discussing some
matters that are not typically discussed in law review articles. 250 I
cannot, of course, set out a detailed history here of the evolution of
computers nor can I give a detailed description of their nature and the
nature of their software.25 1 I hope, however, this following sketch will
be sufficient to persuade you that programs are more like ideas than
they are like machines.
If you already understand that a text cannot be a machine, or a
machine a text, and that all that computers and their programs do is
process information, just as we process information when we are
doing computations with the aid of nothing but a pencil and some
248 That delusion is the basis on which the Federal Circuit in Alappat held that software is
patentable. See supra Part III.A.
249 That delusion is the basis on which the Federal Circuit held in State Street that
computations are patentable. See supra Part III.B.
2501 compensate for this deviation from the standard by another deviation: I spend little
time indulging in the nearly mandatory, and normally unilluminating, "economic analysis" of
law-or of whatever. I figure that I can get away with it because my job description now
includes the word "emeritus."
25, I have neither the competency nor the room to do that.
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paper, then you do not really need to read further in this section-but
if you do you will may well find some of the material not
uninteresting. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced of those
facts, then you really should read on, although you may want to skip
some of the more technical sounding parts.
For convenience I am next going to discuss computers-i.e., the
machines 252 --and computer programs-i.e., descriptions of what
those machines253 are supposed to do-as if they were to some extent
separable. In reality, of course, computers and their programs are
inseparable when they are actually computing something: 254 the
computer is a material device, the program is what that device does, is
its functionality. 255 If computer programs are patentable subject
matter, then novel melodies 256 should be patentable, even though they
can be hummed by a human being, played upon a piccolo, or played
mechanically by a player piano.257
A. Computers
The words "computer" and "computing" have a somewhat
misleading connotation when applied to machines, since computation
is usually thought of as an act that can be performed only by
intelligences, and-for all practical purposes in so far as we know-
only by human intelligences. In fact a "computer" was originally, as
the Second Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary puts it: "One
who computes; a calculator, reckoner; spec. a person employed to
make calculations in an observatory, in surveying, etc.,, 258 It is rather
as if we were to call a typewriter simply a "writer" and then assume
that it-rather than a human author-actually does the writing. When
a computer is, as it almost always is today, a machine rather than a




234"The computer poses fundamental challenges to traditional definitions of technology
because it combines attributes of the human mind with those of a machine and because the end
results of its activities inextricably combine the physical realm of hardware and the symbolic
realm of software." Ford, supra note 244, at 52.
255 Let me point out that not all functions are patentable; for example, surely no one would
dream that the following "factorial function," though useful, could be patented if only it were
novel,
r(z + 1) = z!
for, were it patentable, every mathematical function would fall into the category of patentable
subject matter.
2 56 Which are useful for soothing the savage beast, etc.
257 Cf supra note 121.
258 See supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text and infra Part VIA. I.
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To make matters worse, the type of machine that we call a
"computer" is used for much more than merely computing, it is also
used for word processing and data processing and language
translation and any other process, such as encrypting and decrypting,
that involves the manipulation of symbols--or, rather, of signs. It
would probably abate some of the confusion surrounding computers
were we to call them-as we sometimes do-"information
processors.,
259
1. Computers as People
Once upon a time-during my life time, in fact--computers were
people. When I was in high school260 my teacher in the course in plain
geometry worked one summer as a computer for my father, although,
according to my father, he could not always compute. In those days,
in the late forties of the last century, "computer" was an occupational
title-a job description-just like, for example "gravity observer."
Now, I never was really a computer myself, but the summer that I let
my father talk me, against my better judgment, into working as a
gravity observer on a seismic exploration crew up in the Northwest
Territories of Canada near the confluence of the Liard and the
Nahanni rivers-a land that was primarily muskeg, which is just a
fancy word for swamp-I worked for a couple of evenings for a
computer who, because of his Glaswegian accent, was inevitably
known as "Scotty."
It was my job to go slogging through the swamp with a gravity
meter on my back and, every so often, when I came across a stake
with certain markings placed on it by the surveyors, I would unsling
the gravity meter, place it on a tripod, and look through an eye piece
with a vernier dial, twisting the dial until a little bubble, very much
like the bubble in a carpenter's level, appeared in the very center of
the eyepiece. At that point I could, by reading the numbers on the
dial, supposedly determine the force of gravity acting at that
particular location to the nearest thousandth of a gal or so.261 As I
recall, being rather a klutz, I never could reach quite that degree of
accuracy.
259 This usage would also make explicit the fact that computers process "information," not
"matter" as patentable machines are required to do. See supra note 119.
260 Which, by the way, was the same high school that Vice President Cheney later
attended.
261 A gal is, according to the on-line version of the American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, "The centimeter-gram-second unit of acceleration, equal to one centimeter
per second per second."
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That hardly mattered though since finding what we were looking
far hardly required that degree of accuracy and, in any case, there
were other forces-especially tidal forces 26 2-that messed up the data
that I was collecting.
We, Scotty and I, were looking for buried river beds whose
existence in turn was likely to mess up the seismic data that the rest of
the crew was collecting. The whole purpose of the entire project was
to make records of the reflections that were detected from
underground strata when some dynamite was exploded that would
allow seismologists like my father to locate and map underground
structures where significant amounts of oil and gas might be trapped.
So the ultimate goal was to find oil, but Scotty and I were merely
collecting and manipulating data that would help others locate river
beds that might be a source of noise in their own data.
I was supposed to collect the data; Scotty the computer was
supposed to manipulate it. That is, after all, what computers are
supposed to do: manipulate data. So I supplied the data to him, and
someone-a seismologist-gave Scotty instructions as to how he was
to process that data. But there were actually a couple of evenings that
Scotty handed me a slide rule 263 and gave me some hasty instruction
on how to use it in order to filter out the noise attributable to tidal
forces and changes in temperature and things like that that messed up
the data I had collected.2 4
Scotty just wanted me to recheck some computations that had
already been done by someone else. But that allows me to claim with
at least some legitimacy that I myself was a computer for a couple of
evenings, or, at least, a computer's assistant. I'm not quite sure that I
ever understood exactly what it was that I was doing, other than
sliding scales around inside the slide rule, but that did produce
numbers which satisfied Scotty.
Computers are not required-or even encouraged-to understand
exactly what it is that they are doing.
Now those instructions that the seismologist gave to Scotty and the
ones that Scotty gave to me were, by definition, instructions to a
computer. And a set of instructions to a computer is exactly what is
meant by the term "computer program.,
265
262 Those tidal forces were, of course, also caused by gravity, but they were attributable to
the mass and location of the moon, which were not what we were concerned with.263 See http://www.hpmuseum.org/sliderul.htm.
264 It was possible to do that because every two hours I had to return to my the point where
I had started from two hours before and take another reading, which allowed an estimate to be
made as to how much drift there had been between each of the points where I had taken a
reading.265Or, at least, one of the meanings of that term. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
406 [Vol. 58:2
YOU CAN'T PA TENT SOFTWARE
Keep that in mind. The earliest computer programs were sets of
instructions to human beings like Scotty and myself.
Of course, Scotty and my old geometry teacher were not the only
nor the earliest computers. During the second world war there were a
large number of computations that had to be made and most of the
computers making those computations were women-typically
working in teams assisted by mechanical calculators. Thus the
History of the Manhattan Project of The Manhattan Project Heritage
Preservation Association, Inc. recounts in the section entitled
Evolving from Calculators to Computers266 that:
Computers were people using desk calculators when Los Alamos
began....
Early calculations relating to the diffusion of neutrons in a
critical assembly of uranium were made by Eldred Nelson
and Stanley Frankel, who were members of Robert Serber's
group in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of
California, Berkeley, in 1942. When they came to Los
Alamos in the spring of 1943, they ordered the same sorts of
machines that they had used in California: Marchant and
Friden desk calculators 267 to make the calculations required in
the design of nuclear weapons.
To perform some of these repetitive calculations, a group of
scientists' wives were recruited to form a central computing
pool....
Dana Mitchell, whom Laboratory Director J. Robert
Oppenheimer had recruited from Columbia University to
oversee procurement for Los Alamos, recognized that the
calculators were not adequate for the heavy computational
chores and suggested the use of IBM punched-card machines.
He had seen them used successfully by Wallace Eckert at
Columbia to calculate the orbits of planets and persuaded
Frankel and Nelson to order a complement of them.
2
6 See http://www.childrenofthemanhattanproject.org/HISTORY/H-06c 18.htm.267 See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
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The new IBM punched-card machines26s were devoted to
calculations to simulate implosion, and Metropolis and
Feynman organized a race between them and the hand-
computing group. "We set up a room with girls in it. Each
one had a Marchant. But one was the multiplier, and another
was the adder, and this one cubed, and all she did was cube
this number and send it to the next one," said Feynmann. For
one day, the hand computers kept up: "The only difference
was that the IBM machines didn't get tired and could work
three shifts. But the girls got tired after a while."
One important fact to notice here is that, although the "girls,"
as Feynman called the computers, were human beings, they
clearly did not have to know how the program that they were
implementing worked or even what it was intended to do.
Each of them just sat there throughout the whole shift either
just multiplying pairs of numbers, or just cubing numbers, or
doing something equally mechanical, over and over again, a
process that undoubtedly was at least as mind numbing as
working on an assembly line.
Computers may in the early days have been people, but that
does not mean that they knew why they were doing what they
did. Whatever feelings of love and hate, attachment and
revulsion, boredom and intellectual curiosity they may have
had, to the extent that the "girls" were viewed purely as
computers, they were as functional as a ditch digger or a
backhoe. Of course they did get tired and sometimes made
errors, but then, the vacuum tubes on early electronic
computers also wore out with great regularity and when those
tubes were tired, those computers too were prone to error.
There was, of course, a purpose behind instructing those
computers to carry out particular programs, but that purpose
belonged to the scientists at Los Alamos, not to the computers
themselves.
268See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
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2. Computers As Machines
Today, of course, we no longer think of computers as being people
like Scotty and myself or the "girls." Rather we think of computers as
devices, as mechanisms, that-for the time being at least269-lack the
characteristics of sentient beings. 70
Nowadays computers are tangible, "physical" devices containing
wires and switches, or their equivalents,27  that can be used to perform
various operations on a stream of digits in accordance with their
programs, which are normally encoded as a string of digits.272 Those
streams and strings of digits can represent-we can understand those
digits as symbolizing-almost anything, but for the purpose of
understanding how our modem electronic digital computers work, it
is easiest to treat those digits as a binary representation 273 of a number
or a string of numbers.274 We can then, by sending the computer's
central processing unit a set of instructions in the form of a stream of
digital numbers, cause the computer to perform mathematical or
logical operations upon a string of digits encoding a set of signs or
269 In science fiction there are many works that explore the possibility of computers
becoming sentient; the prime example being HAL in STANLEY KUBRIC, 2001: A SPACE
ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1968).
270 Even back in the days when "computer" was a job description, the ideal computer was a
person who could suppress all human characteristics and simply function as a machine, just as
the ideal human steel driver approximated a machine as closely as possible:
John Henry said to his Captain,
"A man ain't nothin' but a man,
And before I'll let your steam drill beat me down,
Die with the hammer in my hand,
Die with the hammer in my hand."
The steam drill, on the other hand, did not care whether it won or not. The steam drill
did not care about anything.
271 Some students at MIT once made out of a set of Tinker Toys a simple computer that
was programmed to play tic-tac-toe. See http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/cfs/472 html/Intro/
TinkertoyComputer/TinkerToy.html.
2 72 See infra Part VI.A.3(b)(i). There is an important, if subtle, distinction, between a
"stream" and a "string." A "stream" takes place in time, with one digit being sent to the
computer at a time; a "string," on the other hand, occupies space and is all present at the same
time, like the string of digits
123571113
that appears before you as you read this article in a journal or a computer screen. On the other
hand, if someone were to read the text of that string to you out loud, you would apprehend it as
a stream. The stream is an on-going process; the string is a set of symbols, i.e., a text.
273 Recall that in Gottschalk v. Benson, where the Supreme Court first held that a computer
program was not patentable, the "invention" at issue was a process for converting binary coded
decimal representations of numbers into simpler and more useful binary representations.
274 What a "number" is an interesting and contentious metaphysical question that need not
concern us here. See infra note 280.
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symbols and thus produce another string or stream of digits that we
can interpret as representing other signs or symbols.
Or something like that.
A simpler definition is that a computer is a device that can be used
to process information.275
But let us look a little more deeply into this matter.276
3. Protocomputers: Tools to Assist in Calculations
There have been devices, if we are willing to count fingers as
devices, that we have used to assist us in calculating since the first
members of our species walked upon the earth. Fingers are still used
today as memory devices to help us remember how far we have
counted, and counting is the basic arithmetic operation. The fact that
we have ten fingers-ten digits-on our hands helps to explain why
today we commonly use a ten-based numbering system, rather than a
binary or octal or duodecimal system.
Fingers are also useful when performing the arithmetic function of
addition. If one set of items has five members and one has three and
we represent each member by a finger, then all we have to do if we
want to calculate how many members there are in the two sets is to
count the five fingers that represent the members of one set and then
the three fingers that represent the members of the other set.277
Now a major problem with using fingers for calculations is that we
don't have enough fingers to count very far, although we can stretch
their capacity a bit by letting each finger stand let us say for ten items.
275 What information is a difficult question, but one that is of critical importance to an
understanding of the nature of computer programs. See infra Part VI.C.
276 For an overview of the historical development of devices that assist in calculating and
otherwise processing information you may want to look at the "time line" included in Jeremy
M. Norman, From Gutenberg to the Internet: An Annotated Chronology of the History of
Information from About 30,000 B.C.E. to the Present, http://www.normanpublishing.com/
G2I/docs/timeline/index.shtml. Using references to discoveries, social developments, and
documents, this timeline attempts to arrange in approximate chronological sequence landmarks
in the history of methods used to record, distribute, exchange, organize, store, and search
information. Topics include Writing, Manuscript Copying, Papermaking, Printing, Publishing,
Bibliography, Libraries, Archives, Survival of Information, Book and Manuscript Collecting,
Conservation, Education, Computing Theory, Computing, Software, Networking, Telegraph,
Photography, Cinematography, Telephone, Radio, Television, Cryptography, Computer Games,
Law, Privacy, and related fields. One of ways that the timeline attempts to reflect the "survival
of information" is to discuss the earliest extant texts of documents, and in certain instances the
history of their survival in physical form. The timeline also tracks projects for the long term
preservation and conservation of digital objects. Id.
277 The total number of fingers representing the members of the two sets is, of course,
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A simple solution to that problem that probably occurred early in
the history of our species is to use some small objects, such as
pebbles, so that each pebble represents an item in the set of things to
be counted.278 In time the pebbles came to be used with counting
boards, which were the forerunners of the abacus,2 7 9 and the abacus
itself, in which beads on wires replace the pebbles on a counting
board, still is used in some countries to perform calculations. 80
In this list of primitive tools for calculation we should probably
include a very different sort of device: the portions of the human
brain that are capable of doing primitive and limited calculations
without any additional tools.
Number is a fundamental parameter by which we make sense
of the world surrounding us. Not only can we quickly and
accurately perceive the numerosity of small collections of
things; but all languages have number words; all of us have
learned, more or less spontaneously, to calculate on our
fingers; and most of us have strong arithmetic intuitions
which allow us to quickly decide that 9 is larger than 5, that 3
falls in the middle of 2 and 4, or that 12+15 cannot equal 96,
without much introspection as to how we perform those feats.
I collectively refer to those fundamental elementary abilities
or intuitions about numbers as "the number sense"
My hypothesis is that number sense qualifies as a biologically
determined category of knowledge. I propose that the
foundations of arithmetic lie in our ability to mentally
represent and manipulate numerosities on a mental "number
line", an analogical representation of number; and that this
representation has a long evolutionary history and a specific
cerebral substrate. "Number appears as one of the
fundamental dimensions according to which our nervous
system parses the external world. Just as we cannot avoid
seeing objects in color ... , in the same way numerical
quantities are imposed on us effortlessly through the
specialized circuits of our inferior parietal lobe. The structure
278 The Latin word for pebble is calculus which is the root of the English words "calculate"
and "calculator" and, of course, "calculus."
279 See http://www.mathmojo.com/abacus/abax/abax2.html.
280 In Japan in 1946 a contest was held to see which was speedier, an abacus or a modern-
at that time--electric calculator. The abacus won. The Abacus vs. the Electric Calculator,
http://www.ee.ryerson.ca/ elf/abacus/abacus-contest.html.
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of our brain defines the categories according to which we
apprehend the world through mathematics.,
281
Perhaps the most that can be said about such matters is to ask the
question first raised by Warren McCulloch: "What is Number, that a
Man may know it, and a Man, that he may know a Number?
' 282
In more modem times more complex mechanical calculating
machines were invented, although they, like the abacus, still had to be
programmed by head and hand, a human being turning dials or
depressing keys. They were programmed to perform various
numerical calculations, but it was still a human being who had to
implement the program.
In 1649, Blaise Pascal received a patent for his calculating
machine283 from King Louis XIV of France.
Pascal invented the first digital calculator to help his father
with his work collecting taxes. He worked on it for three
years between 1642 and 1645. The device, called the
Pascaline, resembled a mechanical calculator of the 1940s.
This, almost certainly, makes Pascal the second person to
invent a mechanical calculator for Schickard 284 had
manufactured one in 1624.285
There were problems faced by Pascal in the design of the
calculator which were due to the design of the French
currency at that time. There were 20 sols in a livre and 12
deniers in a sol. The system remained in France until 1799
but in Britain a system with similar multiples lasted until
1971. Pascal had to solve much harder technical problems to
work with this division of the livre into 240 than he would
have had if the division had been 100. However production of
the machines started in 1642 [and by] 1652 fifty prototypes
had been produced, but few machines were sold, and
281 Stanislas Dehaene, Pricis of "The number sense ", http://www.unicog.org/publications/
Dehaene PrecisNumberSense.pdf.
282 WILLIAM MCCULLOUGH, EMBODIMENTS OF MIND. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
1963).
283 Note that this patent covered the tangible machine not the instructions on how to use it
to make calculations.281 See 1625 AD: Wilhelm Schickard's Mechanical Calculator, http://www.maxmon.com/
1625ad.htm.285 Shickard described his machine in a letter to the astronomer Johannes Kepler, but no
examples of the machine have survived, although prototypes have been built based on his
description. Id.
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manufacture of Pascal's arithmetical calculator ceased in that
year.2
86
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, who invented the differential
calculus 287 at about the same time as Isaac Newton, designed a greatly
improved version of Pascal's calculator around 1673 called the
"Stepped Reckoner," but it was not until the early 1800s that
Charles Xavier Thomas de Colmar (1785-1870) made the
first practically successful calculator, the Arithmometer. This
worked on the stepped gear principle of Leibnitz and could
perform all four basic arithmetic operations....
The gear train of the arithmometer was driven in the forward
direction only and could perform addition and multiplication.
To perform subtraction or division a reversing gear had to be
engaged.
The first patent for this device was granted in November
1820. Derivative devices were still being manufactured after
1900 and some were still in use in the 1940s. 2 8 8
By the 1940's many different types mechanical calculators were
being marketed and electric calculators had been introduced that did
not require the operator to turn a crank in order to cause the calculator
to carry out its operations. Among these were the Marchant and
Friden Calculators that were used by the human computers of the
Manhattan Project.289 These computers were "programmed" by
depressing the keys on a keyboard and they were capable of doing the
basic mathematical operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division, although they did so quite noisily.290
Another type of electric powered calculating machine was the
electric tabulating machine designed by Hermann Hollerith to assist
in calculation the results of the 1890 census. 291 Descendants of this
286 http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/ history/Mathematicians/Pascal.html.
287 Do you think that anyone at that time would have believed that Leibnitz-or his
competitor Newton-could have been granted a patent on the differential calculus? Differential
calculus was classified as belonging to science-or philosophy-not to the useful arts.
288 Old Computer Hut: In the Beginning, http://tinyurl.com/sxqlk.
289 See supra note 267.
290 1 remember instructing one of these calculators--one that was bolted to a table with
metal legs-to divide a positive integer by zero: the calculator shook so energetically that the
table started walking across the floor. The only way to stop it that I ever found was to pull the
plug out of the wall socket.
291 H. Hollerith, An Electric Tabulating System, THE QUARTERLY 238-55, Columbia
University School of Mines, Vol. X, No. 16 (Apr. 1889).
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tabulator were also used in the Manhattan Project.292 Data was fed
into the tabulator using punch cards, which were first used to control
the Jacquard loom 293 and later were used to feed programs and data
into early mainframe computers.294 The original electric tabulators
were hard wired and could not easily be reprogrammed; later models
had a plugboard which allowed them to be reprogrammed the same
way that the ENIAC was reprogrammed.295
a. Two Computers That Never Were
Before the first actual computer in the modem sense was built,
there were two prototypes that were never constructed. One was not
constructed because it was a mechanical device whose components
needed to be made with an accuracy that probably could not even be
duplicated today, to say nothing of the time when it was designed; the
other because it was conceived of as part of a thought experiment and
thus was never intended to actually be built.
(i) Babbage's Analytical Engine
More than a hundred years before the first working digital
computers were actually constructed one was designed by Charles
Babbage:
Seldom, if ever, in the history of technology has so long an
interval separated the invention of a device and its realization
in hardware as that which elapsed between Charles
Babbage's description, in 1837, of the Analytical Engine, a
mechanical digital computer which, viewed with the benefit
of a century and a half s hindsight, anticipated virtually every
aspect of present-day computers. Charles Babbage (1792-
1871) was an eminent figure in his day, elected Lucasian
Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge in 1828 (the same
Chair held by Newton and, in our days, Stephen Hawking);
he resigned this professorship in 1839 to devote his full
attention to the Analytical Engine. Babbage was a Fellow of
the Royal Society and co-founder of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science, the Royal Astronomical
Society, and the Statistical Society of London. He was a close
292 See supra note 267.
293 See infra Part VI.A.3(b)(ii).
294 For a wonderful description of how punch cards were used to program mainframe
computers back in the 1970's, see Dale Fisk, Programming with Punched Cards,
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/history/fisk.pdf.
295 See infra Part VL.A.4.
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acquaintance of Charles Darwin, Sir John Herschel, Laplace,
and Alexander Humboldt, and was author of more than eighty
papers and books on a broad variety of topics.
His vision of a massive brass, steam-powered, general-
purpose, mechanical computer inspired some of the great
minds of the nineteenth century but failed to persuade any
backer to provide the funds to actually construct it. It was
only after the first electromechanical and later, electronic
computers had been built in the twentieth century, that
designers of those machines discovered the extent to which
Babbage had anticipated almost every aspect of their work.29 6
Here is a contemporary description of the Analytical Engine:
Those labours which belong to the various branches of the
mathematical sciences, although on first consideration they
seem to be the exclusive province of intellect, may,
nevertheless, be divided into two distinct sections; one of
which may be called the mechanical, because it is subjected
to precise and invariable laws, that are capable of being
expressed by means of the operations of matter; while the
other, demanding the intervention of reasoning, belongs more
specially to the domain of the understanding. This admitted,
we may propose to execute, by means of machinery, the
mechanical branch of these labours, reserving for pure
intellect that which depends on the reasoning faculties. Thus
the rigid exactness of those laws which regulate numerical
calculations must frequently have suggested the employment
of material instruments, either for executing the whole of
such calculations or for abridging them; and thence have
arisen several inventions having this object in view, but
which have in general but partially attained it. For instance,
the much-admired machine of Pascal is now simply an object
of curiosity, which, whilst it displays the powerful intellect of
its inventor, is yet of little utility in itself. Its powers extended
no further than the execution of the first four operations of
arithmetic, and indeed were in reality confined to that of the
first two, since multiplication and division were the result of a
series of additions and subtractions. The chief drawback
hitherto on most of such machines is, that they require the
296 John Walker, The Analytical Engine: The First Computer, http://www.fourmilab.ch/
babbage/.
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continual intervention of a human agent to regulate their
movements, and thence arises a source of errors; so that, if
their use has not become general for large numerical
calculations, it is because they have not in fact resolved the
double problem which the question presents, that of
correctness in the results, united with economy of time.
Struck with similar reflections, Mr. Babbage has devoted
some years to the realization of a gigantic idea. He proposed
to himself nothing less than the construction of a machine
capable of executing not merely arithmetical calculations, but
even all those of analysis, if their laws are known. The
imagination is at first astounded at the idea of such an
undertaking; but the more calm reflection we bestow on it,
the less impossible does success appear, and it is felt that it
may depend on the discovery of some principle so general,
that, if applied to machinery, the latter may be capable of
mechanically translating the operations which may be
indicated to it by algebraical notation. 297
And here is a modem description of Babbage's Analytical Engine:
.... The Analytical Engine was not only automatic but also
general purpose i.e. it could be 'programmed' by the user to
execute a repertoire instructions in any required order. The
engine was envisaged as a universal machine for finding the
value of almost any algebraic function. The Analytical
Engine is not a single physical machine but a succession of
designs that Babbage refined until his death in 1871.
The designs for the Analytical Engine include almost all the
essential logical features of a modem electronic digital
computer. The engine was programmable using punched
cards.298 It had a 'store' where numbers and intermediate
results could be held and a separate 'mill' where the
arithmetic processing was performed. The separation of the
'store' (memory) and 'mill' (central processor) is a
fundamental feature of the internal organisation of modem
computers.
297 L.F. Menabrea of Turin, Officer of the Military Engineers, Sketch of The Analytical
Engine Invented by Charles Babbage, from the Bibliothque Universelle de Genve, October,
1842, No. 82, available at http://www.fourmilab.ch/babbage/sketch.htm.298 See infra note 291.
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The Analytical Engine could have 'looped' (repeat the same
sequence of operations a predetermined number of times) and
was capable of conditional branching (IF. . . THEN...
statements) i.e. automatically take alternative courses of
action depending on the result of a calculation.
The Engine would have been vast. Had it been built it would
have needed to be operated by a steam engine of some kind.
Babbage made little attempt to raise funds to build the
Analytical Engine. Instead he continued to work on simpler
and cheaper methods of manufacturing parts and built a small
trial model which was under construction at the time of his
death.
The movement to automate mathematical calculation in the
nineteenth century failed and the impetus to continue this
work was largely lost with Babbage's death. From the
vantage point of the modem computer age we are better
placed to appreciate the full extent to which Babbage was
indeed the first pioneer of computing.299
Although the Analytical Engine was never completed it inspired
The Right Honourable Augusta Ada, Countess of Lovelace, Lord
Byron's only legitimate daughter, to write the first computer
program-a program for calculating Bernoulli numbers. °°
Although the Analytical Engine was never actually constructed, it
has been "emulated" 30 1 on modem digital computers.
Now there surely is no question that Babbage could have obtained
a patent on the Analytical engine, if it ever had been built. The
question that we are concerned with here is: Could Lady Ada have
obtained a patent on her program, a patent on the instructions that she
wrote describing how to calculate Bernouli numbers on that machine?
299Science Museum, Analytical Engine, http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/online/
babbage/page5.asp.
3OThe Bernoulli numbers may... be defined using the technique of generating functions.
Their exponential generating function is x/(ex - 1), so that:
inf
e -- 1 71
for all values of x of absolute value less than 2_ (the radius of convergence of this power series).
Wikipedia, Bernouli number, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bemoulli number. Nota bene: I do
not claim that I understand this definition. To view that first computer program, see
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Lovelacellovelace.htm.
301 For what it means to "emulate" a computer, see infra note 315.
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(ii) Turing Machines
Turing machines are imaginary devices that, unlike Babbage's
Analytical Engine, were never actually intended to be built. On the
other hand, Turing machines are capable, in theory at least, of running
any program that can be run by any other computer, from human
beings like Scotty,30 2 through the Analytical engine, were it ever to be
built, to the latest general purpose digital computer. In other words,
there are Turing machines that can "emulate" 303 any computer
whatsoever.3°
We shall spend a little more time examining Turing machines and
what is known as the Church-Turing Thesis, but for our purposes the
critical fact about Turing Machines is that they demonstrate that
programming a computer to perform a particular task cannot be
viewed as the flipping of switches that thus create a new-and
potentially patentable-machine, for the new program can equally
well 30 5 be run on another computer that lacks the corresponding
physical switches, or that like Scotty or the Turing machines
imagined by Turing does not have any switches at all.
Turing machines were first imagined by Alan Turing30 6 around
1936 in order to explore the limitations of any effective device that
can be "programmed," as we now term it, to perform any logical or
arithmetical operation. A Turing machine can thus perform the same
operations that are performed by a modem general purpose computer.
Turing machines were conceived-before the actual development of
the programmable general purpose computer-as a way of exploring
mathematically what is and what is not computable in theory.
The best description that I know of Turing machines and what they
can and cannot do is given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy in the entry entitled "Turing Machines:,
30 7
3 02 See supra Part VIA. 1.
3 03 
"To imitate the function of (another system), as by modifications to hardware or
software that allow the imitating system to accept the same data, execute the same programs,
and achieve the same results as the imitated system." The Free Dictionary, Emulate,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/emulate. See infra note 315.304 And all general purpose computers, including human computes, can emulate such
Turing machines.
305 Though perhaps not very efficiently.
306On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem,
http://www.abelard.org/turpap2/tp2-ie.asp. For biographical information about Turing, see The
Alan Turing Home Page, Maintained by Andrew Hodges, author of Alan Turing: the Enigma,
http://www.turing.org.uk/turing/, which describes him as: "Founder of computer science,
mathematician, philosopher, codebreaker, strange visionary and a gay man before his time."
307 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine.
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Turing machines, first described by Alan Turing in (Turing
1937), are simple abstract computational devices intended to
help investigate the extent and limitations of what can be
computed.
Turing, writing before the invention of the modem digital
computer, was interested in the question of what it means to
be computable. Intuitively a task is computable if one can
specify a sequence of instructions which when followed will
result in the completion of the task. Such a set of instructions
is called an effective procedure, or algorithm, 308 for the
task.30 9 This intuition must be made precise by defining the
capabilities of the device that is to carry out the instructions.
Devices with different capabilities may be able to complete
different instruction sets, and therefore may result in different
classes of computable tasks ....
Turing proposed a class of devices that came to be known as
Turing machines. These devices lead to a formal notion of
computation that we will call Turing-computability.
The proposition that Turing's notion captures exactly the
intuitive idea of effective procedure is called the Church-
Turing thesis. This proposition, being a claim about the
relationship between a formal concept and intuition, is not
provable, though it would be refuted by an intuitively
acceptable algorithm for a task that is not Turing-computable.
That no such counterexample has been found, together with
the fact that Turing-computability is equivalent to
independently defined notions of computability based on
alternative foundations, such as recursive functions 310 and
abacus machines, indicates that there is at least something
natural about this notion of computability.
Turing machines are not physical objects but mathematical
ones. We require neither soldering irons nor silicon chips to
build one. The architecture is simply described, and the
308 For more about algorithms, see infra Part VI.B. 1. It should be recalled that the claimed
invention in Gottschalk v. Benson was described by the Court as an "algorithm."
309 It is worth noting here that a "sequence of instructions"--at least if designed to be
carried out by a computer-is also exactly what today we call a "computer program."
310 If you want to explore recursive functions and related matters-and even you do not
think that you want to do that-I recommend that you at least look at Douglas Hofstadter's
G6del, Escher, Bach (1979).
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actions that may be carried out by the machine are simple and
unambiguously specified....
The formal concept proposed by Turing is that of
computability by Turing machine. He argued for the claim..
. that whenever there is an effective method for obtaining the
values of a mathematical function, the function can be
computed by a Turing machine. The converse claim is easily
established, for a Turing machine program is itself a
specification of an effective method: without exercising any
ingenuity or insight, a human being can work through the
instructions in the program and carry out the required
operations.311 If Turing's thesis is correct, then talk about the
existence and nonexistence of effective methods can be
replaced throughout mathematics and logic by talk about the
312existence or non-existence of Turing machine programs.
The idea of the Turing machine underlies the Church-Turing
Thesis that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing
machine--or its real-world equivalent, a general purpose digital
computer.
The Church-Turing thesis concerns the notion of an effective
or mechanical method in logic and mathematics. "Effective"
and its synonym "mechanical" are terms of art in these
disciplines: they do not carry their everyday meaning. A
method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is
called "effective" or "mechanical" just in case
1. M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact
instructions (each instruction being expressed by
means of a finite number of symbols);
2. M will, if carried out without error, produce the
desired result in a finite number of steps;
311 In other words, a human being is the equivalent of a Turing machine.
312 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/. Thus the issue that we are discussing
is whether Turing machine programs can be patented, programs that can be implemented by a
human being? For a description of a Turing Machine, see Jonathan Steidel's, What is a Turing
Machine?, http://www.science.gmu.edu/_jsteidel/801 -prj/turing.html.
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3. M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by
a human being unaided by any machinery save paper
and pencil;
4. M demands no insight or ingenuity on the part of
the human being carrying it out.
313
Although Turing never intended that Turing machines should
actually be constructed,314 they have often been "emulated '31 5
313 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Church-Turing Thesis,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/. Note that "effective" or "mechanical" methods
are much like algorithms. See infra Part VI.B. 1.
314 A Turing machine is a kind of state machine. At any time the machine is in any one of a
finite number of states. Instructions for a Turing machine consist in specified conditions under
which the machine will transition between one state and another.
A Turing machine has an infinite one-dimensional tape divided into cells.
Traditionally we think of the tape as being horizontal with the cells arranged in a
left-right orientation. The tape has one end, at the left say, and stretches infinitely far
to the right. Each cell is able to contain one symbol, either '0' or '1'.
The machine has a read-write head, which at any time scanning a single cell on the
tape. This read-write head can move lefi and right along the tape to scan successive
cells.
The action of a Turing machine is determined completely by (1) the current state of
the machine (2) the symbol in the cell currently being scanned by the head and (3) a
table of transition rules, which serve as the -201 cprogram-201 d for the machine.
Each transition rule is a 4-tuple:
<State0, Symbol, Statenext, Action>
which can be read as saying "if the machine is in state State0 and the current cell
contains Symbol then move into state Statenext taking Action". The actions available
to a Turing machine are either to write a symbol on the tape in the current cell ...,
or to move the head one cell to the left or right ....
If the machine reaches a situation in which there is not exactly one transition rule
specified, i.e., none or more than one, then the machine halts.
In modem terms, the tape serves as the memory of the machine, while the readwrite
head is the memory bus through which data is accessed (and updated) by the
machine. There are two important things to notice about the definition. The first is
that the machine's tape is infinite in length, corresponding to an assumption that the
memory of the machine is infinite. The second is similar in nature, but not explicit in
the definition of the machine, namely that a function will be Turing-computable if
there exists a set of instructions that will result in the machine computing the
function regardless of the amount of time it takes. One can think of this as assuming
the availability of infinite time to complete the computation.
These two assumptions are intended to ensure that the definition of computation that
results is not too narrow. This is, it ensures that no computable function will fail to
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by programs running on other types of general purpose
computers316 and a few actual working physical models have
been built-at least one out of Lego blocks.317
When one considers the patentability of computer programs it is
significant that any computer program that can be run on a Turing
machine or on a general purpose computer can be run-if perhaps not
very efficiently-on any other general purpose computer 31 8 or any
universal Turing machine. This means that machines that are capable
of carrying out any computable computation already exist, just
waiting perform any calculation that may be specified by any
mathematical algorithm, i.e., any computer program whatsoever.
b. Devices for Storing Information
Most of the devices that we have considered up to now that are
used to assist us in computation are to a greater or lesser extent what
might be called gadgets, that is, they have moving parts that have
be Turing-computable solely because there is insufficient time or memory to
complete the computation. If a function is not Turing-computable it is because
Turing machines lack the computational machinery to carry it out, not because of a
lack of spatio-temporal resources.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Turing Machines, Description.
315 The emulators, of course, do not have an infinite memory.
A software emulator allows computer programs to run on a platform (computer
architecture and/or operating system) other than the one for which they were
originally written. Unlike simulation, which only attempts to reproduce a program's
behavior, emulation attempts to model to various degrees the state of the device
being emulated. High-level emulation uses a combination of the two approaches in
an attempt to retain as much accuracy as possible while having the advantages of
simplicity and speed provided by simulation.
In a theoretical sense, the Church-Turing thesis implies that any operating
environment can be emulated within any other. In practice, it can be quite difficult,
particularly when the exact behavior of the system to be emulated is not documented
and has to be deduced through reverse engineering. It also says nothing about timing
constraints; if the emulator does not perform as quickly as the original hardware, the
emulated software may run much more slowly than it would have on the original
hardware, or it may run too fast to be usable.
Wikipedia, Emulator, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emulator. Note that any emulator must
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some sort of mechanical function. One possible exception is the
counting board and pebbles mentioned in Part VI.A.3, and even in
that case one could argue that those proto-abacuses do have moving
parts and thus fall within the definition of a "gadget."
Our major difficulty, however, when doing computing in our heads
is remembering what the results are that we have calculated and
remembering what it is that we still have to do in the future. That is
why in defining an effective method for performing calculations it is
stipulated that the method can be carried out by a human being aided
by no devices except paper and pencil.31 9 Since calculations can be
broken down into a series of simple, "mechanical" steps, the critical
need in doing computations is not for gadgets that can carry out those
steps-which we can, after all, do in our heads-but some devices
like pencil and paper--or fingers or pebbles-that can assist us in
remembering.
In other words, some means of storing information 32°--the
information to be processed and the information that has been
processed-is essential for all computers, whether human or machine.
The ability to do computations is of secondary importance.
This is amusingly illustrated by the fact that between 1959 and
1970 IBM made a computer-the 1620-that did addition and
subtraction by looking up the answer in a table stored in "memory"
rather than actually doing calculations. This machine was popularly
known as the "CADET," an acronym standing for "Can't Add,
Doesn't Even Try. 321
The invention of the printing press with movable type by Johannes
Gutenberg in 1536 can be viewed as a major contribution to the series
of devices that have been used to assist in making computations, for a
computation is of no value to anyone unless there is someway to store
its result. Devices that can process information but cannot store it are
pretty much worthless.
The development of "memory devices" in which information can
322be stored is a critical part of the evolution of modem computers,
whether men 323 or machines. Thus when I was in high school studying
319 See supra text accompanying note 314. Recall that in Benson Justice Douglas stressed
the fact that the algorithm at issue there could be carried out "by head and hand." See supra note
76 and accompanying text.
320 As to what information is See infra Part VI.C.
321 The IBM 1620 Data Processing System, http://tinyurl.com/ddxxk.
322 Digital computers have two key components, the central processing unit where the
actual processing is done-which was called the "mill" in the plan of Babbage's Analytical
Engine-and the memory where the input data and the results of the computations are stored-
which was called the "store" by Babbage.
323 Or women.
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
algebra, one of the things that we had to learn how to do in making
computations was to look up values in the tables of logarithms that
were contained in books like the Standard Mathematical Tables
324
published by the Chemical Rubber Company.325 Today, of course, we
just have a computer compute the values of logarithms for us, as we
need them.326 Thus modern computers and computer programs have to
a large extent replaced books and other more static information
storage devices that were once used in making computations by head
and hand and have also replaced those primitive storage devices with
memory chips and other electronic and optical devices.
That suggests, of course, that if the contents of books like Standard
Numerical Tables and Formulae are not patentable-and, as far as I
know, no one suggests that they are-then computer programs that
produce the same information on demand should be equally
unpatentable. There is, however, some danger that, if Alappat3 27 is
still considered to be a good precedent, a memory device like a CD-
ROM-or a player piano role-that is storing numerical tables and
formulae would be patentable as a "manufacture" because it would be
embodied in a physical structure.32 8
(i) Characters, Numerals, & Other Symbols
Books and other devices for the storage of information would have
been worthless if there had not been the earlier invention of
characters--or, more precisely, glyphs 329-- that enable a written
324 See http://home.comcast.netilkrakauer/CRC99ph/CRCbook.htm. The Standard
Numerical Tables and Formulae are still available: http://www.mathnetbase.com/ejournals/
books/book summary/sunmary.asp?id=l 129.
321 Now the CRC Press.
326 And, probably, we also have the computer do the entire series of calculations for which
we needed the value of the logarithms.327 See supra Part III.A.
328 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
329 [G]lyph In information technology, a glyph (pronounced GLIHF; from a Greek word
meaning carving) is a graphic symbol that provides the appearance or form for a character. A
glyph can be an alphabetic or numeric font or some other symbol that pictures an encoded
character. The following is from a document written as background for the Unicode character
set standard. An ideal characterization of characters and glyphs and their relationship may be
stated as follows:
1. A character conveys distinctions in meaning or sounds. A character has no
intrinsic appearance.
2. A glyph conveys distinctions in form. A glyph has no intrinsic meaning.
3. One or more characters may be depicted by one or more glyph representations
(instances of an abstract glyph) in a possibly context dependent fashion. In the
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representation of the sounds and concepts of our spoken languages,
the primary means by which we communicate information. The
invention of such characters-of which the Roman alphabet and the
Arabic numerals are for most of us the most familiar examples-
depended, in turn, upon the "invention" of those languages-and of
language itself. "Invention" is almost certainly the wrong word to use
here since language-the ability to acquire and speak a language, or
several languages-seems to have evolved as the defining
characteristic of our species. Obviously no one-not even Noam
Chomsky33 -- could ever have obtained a patent on that "means or
process of conveying information"331 that we know as language. On
the other hand, if the Federal Circuit were correct in its holdings in
Alappat and States Street, what would prevent someone from getting
a patent on a newly created language such as Esperanto or
Interlingua? Can you imagine a legal regime where one would be
required to pay a royalty every time one thought a thought in
Interlingua or expressed it in that tongue? Or one where you could be
enjoined from thinking in that language? Under a legal regime where
the means of thought can be patented, only the thoughtless will be
free.
A fundamental feature of all oral languages 332 is that they are
processes. Speech is a process, something that one does and that then
vanishes without a trace unless it is stored in some sort of memory.
Writing is also a process just like speech, but in the case of writing
the process also produces a static copy-a written record or written
text-that can be read at some other time and some other place. It is
the paper or papyrus or clay tablet, the punch card or CD or memory
chip, on which the writing is stored-i.e., that memory device-and
the tools like pens and pencils and styluses and paper punches that are
used in writing on those media that concern us here. An improvement
Unicode standard, a character is stated to be an abstract entity and not a glyph (some
visual representation of a character).
This definition is taken from the Whatis on-line data base, http://whatis.techtarget.com
definition/0,,sid9 gci212200,00.html.
330 For information about Chomsky, the founder of modem linguistics, see Chomsky.info,
http://www.chomsky.info. For an introduction to his linguistic theories, see NOAM CHOMSKY,
SYSTEMS OF SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS, THE JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC 242-56 (September,
1953), available at http://www.chomsky.info/articles/195309-.pdf, and THREE MODELS FOR
THE DESCRIPTION OF LANGUAGE, IRE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 113-24
(September, 1956).
331 As the patent application might describe it.
332 And also gestural languages like American Sign Language.
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to any one of those devices, if novel and not obvious can be patented,
but that does not mean, despite what the Federal Circuit said in State
Street, that instructions on how to use those devices-that the
processes of using those devices--can be patented.
For our immediate purpose of understanding the workings of
modem digital computers, and their programs, the most important
characters or glyphs are those that we use to represent numbers.
Digital computers, after all, at a fundamental level, deal only with
digits, that is, with numerals.' 333 The numerals that we are most
familiar with are the so-called "Arabic 334 numerals."
A key feature of the Arabic numerals as we know them is that they
contain the glyph "0" standing for the number "zero" that represents
the number of elements in a set that does not contain any elements335
The history of the invention 336 of the number zero is mysterious, 337 but
as a revealing thought experiment, one might wonder whether a
similar invention would be patentable today under the precedents of
Alappat and State Street and, if it were, how it would effect our
ability to think about numbers or do arithmetic.
The use of zero to represent a number is not, however, its primary
use:
333 Those numerals may, of course, be an encoded representation of forms of information
other than numbers. Thus this article, for example, before it was printed out on paper or on a
computer screen, was stored as a sequence of digits on a hard disk of a computer.
334 The way things are going geo-politically I fear that it may become politically correct to
call those numerals "democratic numerals" just as "sauerkraut" became "liberty cabbage"
during World War I. In any case, for historical accuracy, we should probably refer to them as
"Hindu numerals." Arabic numerals,, known formally as Hindu-Arabic numerals, and also
known as Indian numerals, Hindu numerals, European numerals, and Western numerals, are the
most common symbolic representation of numbers around the world. They are considered an
important milestone in the development of mathematics. One may distinguish between the
decimal system involved, also known as the Hindu-Arabic numeral system, and the precise
glyphs used. The glyphs most commonly used in conjunction with the Latin alphabet since
Early Modem times are 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9. The numbers were developed in India by the Hindus
around 400 BCE. However, because it was Arabs who relayed this system to the West after the
Hindu numerical system found its way to Baghdad, the numeral system became misidentified as
"Arabic" in the eyes of the Europeans.... Wikipedia, Arabic Numerals, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Arabic numerals.
335 Which mathematicians call the "null set."
336 Or was it a discovery?
337 One of the commonest questions which the readers of this archive ask is: Who
discovered zero? Why then have we not written an article on zero as one of the first in the
archive? The reason is basically because of the difficulty of answering the question in a
satisfactory form. If someone had come up with the concept of zero which everyone then saw as
a brilliant innovation to enter mathematics from that time on, the question would have a
satisfactory answer even if we did not know which genius invented it. The historical record,
however, shows quite a different path towards the concept. Zero makes shadowy appearances
only to vanish again almost as if mathematicians were searching for it yet did not recognize its
fundamental significance even when they saw it. A History of Zero, http://tinyurl.com/5tgqy.
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The first thing to say about zero is that there are two uses of
zero which are both extremely important but are somewhat
different. One use is as an empty place indicator in our place-
value number system. Hence in a number like 2106 the zero
is used so that the positions of the 2 and 1 are correct. Clearly
216 means something quite different. The second use of zero
is as a number itself in the form we use it as 0.338
Those of us who are not mathematicians could get along fairly well
without having a numeral to represent the number zero, but we would
be in terrible shape without the place holder that allows us to
distinguish between 216 and 2106. Just think what it would be like to
fill in your income tax return using the Roman numeral system, which
lacks any means of representing the digit zero in a positional notation
system.
339
Today we still use the decimal system of "Arabic" numerals 0, 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 when we are doing arithmetic by "head and
hand"; our computers, on the other hand, use a binary system
consisting of only two numbers that can be represented by the
numerals 0 and 1. The numbering system using binary digits is
known, not surprisingly, as the "binary system." Normally, when one
wants to represent those digits on a piece of paper or a blackboard, it
is simplest to write them using the familiar figures "0" and "1", but is
also possible to treat any pair of signs as a pair of binary digits; thus
the pairs "o" and 'x", "True" and False", and "Off' and "On" can
also be viewed as pairs of binary digits or "bits". 340 A binary number
can be also represented by the presence or absence of a hole on a
punch card or a paper tape, or by the presence of absence of a
magnetized spot on a floppy disk, or by any other pair of discrete
signs, including differing electrical potentials.341
338 Id.
339 See Wikipedia, Roman Numerals, http://tinyurl.com/oj9zg.
340 The term "bit" is a contraction of the phrase "binary digit.
341 Donald E. Knuth gives a short history of the use of binary notation, going back to times
before anyone dreamed of anything like the modem digital computer. The binary system of
notation has its own interesting history. Many primitive tribes in existence today are known to
use a binary or "pair" system of counting (making groups of two instead of five or ten), but they
do not count in a true radix-2 system, since they do not treat powers of two in a special manner.
The first known appearance of pure binary notation was about 1605 in some
unpublished manuscripts of Thomas Harriot (1560-1621). Harriot was a creative
man, who first became famous by coming to America as a representative of Sir
Walter Raleigh. He invented (among other things) a notation like that now used for
"less than" and "greater than" relations; but for some reason he chose not to publish
many of his discoveries.... The first published discussion of the binary system was
given in a comparatively little-known work by a Spanish Bishop, Juan Caramuel
Lobkowitz, Mathesis biceps I (Campania!, 1670), 45-48; Caramuel discussed the
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Although a few early digital computers like the ENIAC, and some
IBM mainframe computers, do arithmetic using the base 10 decimal
system, almost all modem ones do arithmetic and other calculations
using streams and strings of binary digits. That means that it is often
necessary for us to convert numbers from the decimal system that we
use to the binary system that our computers use. And that, of course,
explains why IBM wanted to get a patent on the means of converting
from binary coded decimal numbers to pure binary representations
that was at issue in Benson.
342
And the fact that we can do that conversion in our heads with the
aid of pencil and paper is one of the reasons that the Supreme Court
gave in Benson for refusing to allow a patent on that process.
(ii) Control Systems
There are programmable devices that are not used to make
computations, but rather are used to control various other mechanical
processes. Being programmable they potentially at least raise some of
the same legal issues as do computer programs. Historically the most
important of these was the Jacquard Loom, which was the ancestor of
the "punched card" tabulating machines developed by Hollerith and
representation of numbers in radices 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 60 at some
length, but gave no examples of arithmetic operations in nondecimal systems (except
for the trivial operation of adding unity). Ultimately, an article by G.W. Leibnitz
[Memoires de l'Academie Royale des Sciences (Paris: 1703), 110 116], which
illustrated binary addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, really brought
binary notation into the limelight, and this article is usually referred to as the birth of
radix-2 arithmetic. Leibnitz later referred to the binary system frequently. He did not
recommend it for practical calculations, but he stressed its importance in number-
theoretical investigations, since patterns in number sequences are often more
apparent in binary notation than they are in decimal; he also saw a mystical
significance in the fact that everything is expressible in terms of zero and one.... A
careful study of Leibnitz's early work with binary numbers has been made by Hans
J. Zacher .... Zacher points out that Leibnitz was familiar with John Napier's so-
called "local arithmetic," a way for calculating with stones that amounts to using a
radix-2 abacus. [Napier had published the idea of local arithmetic in an appendix to
his little book Rhabdologia in 1617; it may be called the world's first "binary
computer," and it is surely the world's cheapest, although Napier felt that it was
more amusing than practical....]
Charles XII of Sweden, whose talent for mathematics exceeded that of all other kings in
the history of the world, hit on the idea of radix-8 arithmetic about 1717. This was probably his
own invention, although he had met Leibnitz briefly in 1707. Charles felt that radix 8 or 64
would be more convenient for calculation than the decimal system, and he considered
introducing octal arithmetic into Sweden; but he died in battle before decreeing such a
change....
342 See supra Part II.A.
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forever associated with IBM.3 43 And the idea of using punched cards
like those used to control the Jacquard Loom was also adopted by
Babbage in his Analytical Engine.
344
The Jacquard Loom was a machine, like other looms, that was
used for weaving fabrics. The Jacquard loom, unlike any earlier loom,
could be programmed to weave a particular pattern without additional
human intervention once the program was written345 and inserted into
a mechanism that controlled the operations of the loom. It was the
first machine to be controlled by a "program" that was punched into
punch cards, an input device that were later adapted by Babbage for
use in his "analytical engine ' 346 and by Hollerith when he designed
his tabulation machines.347
343 See supra Part VI.A.8.
344 See supra Part VI.A.3(a)(ii).
345 That is, punched as a pattern of holes on a punch card.
346 See supra Part VI.A.3(a)(i).
347 See supra note 291. Here is a description of the workings of Jacquard loom written in
1842 as part of an essay on the workings of Babbage's analytical engine:
Two species of threads are usually distinguished in woven stuffs; one is the warp or
longitudinal thread, the other the woof or transverse thread, which is conveyed by the
instrument called the shuttle, and which crosses the longitudinal thread or warp.
When a brocaded stuff is required, it is necessary in turn to prevent certain threads
from crossing the woof, and this according to a succession which is determined by
the nature of the design that is to be reproduced. Formerly this process was lengthy
and difficult, and it was requisite that the workman, by attending to the design which
he was to copy, should himself regulate the movements the threads were to take.
Thence arose the high price of this description of stuffs, especially if threads of
various colours entered into the fabric. To simplify this manufacture, Jacquard
devised the plan of connecting each group of threads that were to act together, with a
distinct lever belonging exclusively to that group. All these levers terminate in rods,
which are united together in one bundle, having usually the form of a parallelopiped
with a rectangular base. The rods are cylindrical, and are separated from each other
by small intervals. The process of raising the threads is thus resolved into that of
moving these various lever-arms in the requisite order. To effect this, a rectangular
sheet of pasteboard is taken, somewhat larger in size than a Part of the bundle of
lever-arms. If this sheet be applied to the base of the bundle, and an advancing
motion be then communicated to the pasteboard, this latter will move with it all the
rods of the bundle, and consequently the threads that are connected with each of
them. But if the pasteboard, instead of being plain, were pierced with holes
corresponding to the extremities of the levers which meet it, then, since each of the
levers would pass through the pasteboard during the motion of the latter, they would
all remain in their places. We thus see that it is easy so to determine the position of
the holes in the pasteboard, that, at any given moment, there shall be a certain
number of levers, and consequently of parcels of threads, raised, while the rest
remain where they were. Supposing this process is successively repeated according
to a law indicated by the pattern to be executed, we perceive that this pattern may be
reproduced on the stuff. For this purpose we need merely compose a series of cards
according to the law required, and arrange them in suitable order one after the other;
then, by causing them to pass over a polygonal beam which is so connected as to turn
a new face for every stroke of the shuttle, which face shall then be impelled
parallelly to itself against the bundle of lever-arms, the operation of raising the
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Does State Street hold that the instructions fed into a Jacquard
loom to produce a particular pattern can be patented?
3 48
If not, why not?
The key point here is not that the loom was programmable but that
the only thing that was novel about its output was a pattern or a
design, not the cloth that was just like the material produced by other
non-programmable looms. Such a pattern clearly should be no more
patentable than the music stored or a CD-ROM or created by a Moog
synthesizer.349
More modem examples of devices like the Jacquard loom are
programmable machine tools, that originally were controlled by
programs stored on punch cards but that today may be directly
connected to computers. The only significant difference between
machine tools and the Jacquard loom is that the former turn out parts
used in traditional machines, rather than cloth with patterns woven
into it. Thus the material products of the machine tools, and even the
mechanical processes that create those products, may be patentable,
just as they would be patentable if they were implemented by a
human machinist rather than by a machine. Computer programs are
not unpatentable because they are instructions to a machine; computer
programs are unpatentable because they are instructions to a machine
to cause it to process information.
4. Modern Digital Computers
In the United States the first Turing complete electronic digital
computer350 was the ENIAC, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Computer.
threads will be regularly performed. Thus we see that brocaded tissues may be
manufactured with a precision and rapidity formerly difficult to obtain.
L.F. Menabrea, Sketch of The Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage,
http://www.fourmilab.ch/babbage/sketch.html.
348 We are not concerned here with so-called "design patents" that might-but probably
would not-allow the pattern itself to be patented.
349 See Chief Judge Archer's remarks quoted in supra note 121.
350 The first such computer was constructed by Konrad Zuse, who completed the Z3 in
1941, with recycled materials donated by fellow university staff and students. This was the
world's first electronic, fully programmable digital computer based on a binary floating-point
number and switching system. Zuse used old movie film to store his programs and data for the
Z3, instead of using paper tape or punched cards. Paper was in short supply in Germany during
the war. Mary Belis, Inventors of the Modem Computer, http://inventors.about.com/library/
weekly/aa050298.htm. Konrad Zuse [also] designed the high-level programming language
Plankalkfil (Calculus of Programs) in 1945, after moving out of Berlin at the end of World War
II. Anyone who has had the opportunity to study the original definition of Plankalklol is struck
[Vol. 58:2430
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.... When it was finished, the ENIAC filled an entire room,
weighed thirty tons, and consumed two hundred kilowatts of
power. It generated so much heat that it had to be placed in
one of the few rooms at the University with a forced air
cooling system. Vacuum tubes, over 19,000 of them, were the
principal elements in the computer's circuitry. It also had
fifteen hundred relays and hundreds of thousands of resistors,
capacitors, and inductors. All of this electronics were held in
forty-two panels nine feet tall, two feet wide, and one foot
thick. They were arranged in a "U" shape, with three panels
on wheels so they could be moved around. An IBM card
reader and card punch were used respectively for input and
output.
The ENIAC was programmed by wiring cable connections
and setting three thousand switches on the function tables.
This had to be done for every problem and made using the
machine very tedious. However, the speed of the computation
made up for this. Ballistic trajectories can take someone with
a hand calculator twenty hours to compute .... The ENIAC
could do it in thirty seconds.351
For all their apparent complexity, digital computers are
basically simple machines. Every operation they perform,
from navigating a spacecraft to playing a game of chess, is
based on one key operation: determining whether certain
electronic switches, called gates, are open or closed. The real
power of a computer lies in the speed with which it checks
these switches.
A computer can recognize only two states in each of its
millions of circuit switches-on or off, or high voltage or low
voltage. By assigning binary numbers to these states-1 for on
by its modem flavor and powerful constructs-it seems as if it had been created much later than
1945. Most amazing, however, is the fact that at the time that Konrad Zuse was writing his
Plankalk-ul document, the only two working computers in the world were the ENIAC and the
Harvard Mark I. None of them used a compiler or a formula translator-the ENIAC had even to
be rewired for every different problem. Ratil Rojas et al., Plankalk-ul: The First High-Level
Programming Language and its Implementation, http://tinyurl.com/nregf.351 Kevin W. Richey, The ENIAC, http://ei.cs.vt.edu-history/ENIAC.Richey.HTML.
Apparently it was the fact that the ENIAC could only be reprogrammed by rewiring it that led to
the perverse idea that programs are machines.
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and 0 for off, for example-and linking many switches
together, a computer can represent any type of data, from
numbers to letters to musical notes. This process is called
352digitization.
Exactly how the "hardware" that makes up the tangible computer
works or out of what it is made are matters beyond the scope of this
article. In my lifetime the switches used in digital computers have
taken the form of vacuum tubes--or valves, as the British call them-
wired together in circuits with other components like resistors and
capacitors, and then the valves were replaced by individual
transistors, which were much smaller, consumed less energy, and
were longer lasting, and then the transistors and other components,
including the wiring that connected them, were embodied in the now
familiar "microchip" etched onto a substrate of silicon. These basic
components that are used in computers continue to be refined and
may in time be replaced by entirely new technologies, but, though the
material structure of the switches may change, the logical functions of
those switches are likely to remain constant.353
352 computer, BRITANNICA STUDENT ENCYCLOPEDIA. (2005), available at
http://search.eb.com/ebi/article?tocld= 199023.
353 If the current electrical switches are replaced by optical switches as will probably
happen in some cases, the logical functioning of the switches will not change and no computer
programs will need to be rewritten except those that function at the lowest level of drivers that
direct the flow of information to, and fetch information from, the hardware devices. The
potential development of "quantum computers" or other highly parallel devices may require
different algorithms for conducting certain mathematical operations, and thus may require new
programs, but such a development will not change the fundamental nature of computer
programs or programming. Behold your computer. Your computer represents the culmination of
years of technological advancements beginning with the early ideas of Charles Babbage (1791-
1871) and eventual creation of the first computer by German engineer Konrad Zuse in 1941.
Surprisingly however, the high speed modem computer sitting in front of you is fundamentally
no different from its gargantuan 30 ton ancestors, which were equipped with some 18000
vacuum tubes and 500 miles of wiring! Although computers have become more compact and
considerably faster in performing their task, the task remains the same: to manipulate and
interpret an encoding of binary bits into a useful computational result. A bit is a fundamental
unit of information, classically represented as a 0 or I in your digital computer. Each classical
bit is physically realized through a macroscopic physical system, such as the magnetization on a
hard disk or the charge on a capacitor. A document, for example, comprised of n-characters
stored on the hard drive of a typical computer is accordingly described by a string of 8n zeros
and ones. Herein lies a key difference between your classical computer and a quantum
computer. Where a classical computer obeys the well understood laws of classical physics, a
quantum computer is a device that harnesses physical phenomenon unique to quantum
mechanics (especially quantum interference) to realize a fundamentally new mode of
information processing. In a quantum computer, the fundamental unit of information (called a
quantum bit or qubit), is not binary but rather more quaternary in nature. This qubit property
arises as a direct consequence of its adherence to the laws of quantum mechanics which differ
radically from the laws of classical physics. A qubit can exist not only in a state corresponding
to the logical state 0 or I as in a classical bit, but also in states corresponding to a blend or
superposition of these classical states. In other words, a qubit can exist as a zero, a one, or
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How these switches or logical gates function is discussed briefly in
Section VI.A.5(b).
5. Boolean Logic
Let us cease discussing hardware, for a while at least, and turn our
attention to what it is that we do with computers, whatever their
hardware may be made of.
When one thinks of what we do with computers at a fundamental
level one is likely to conclude that they are used to perform
computations, that is, that they are used to do arithmetic. A more
accurate description, however, is that we use them to perform logical
operations which are mathematical, if not necessarily arithmetical, in
nature.
Around the same time that Charles Babbage was struggling
with his Analytical Engine,354 one of his contemporaries, a
British mathematician called George Boole, was busily
inventing a new and rather cunning form of mathematics.
Boole made significant contributions in several areas of
mathematics, but was immortalized for two works in 1847
and 1854, in which he represented logical expressions in a
mathematical form now known as Boolean Algebra. Boole's
simultaneously as both 0 and 1, with a numerical coefficient representing the probability for
each state. This may seem counterintuitive because everyday phenomenon are governed by
classical physics, not quantum mechanics - which takes over at the atomic level....
In a traditional computer, information is encoded in a series of bits, and these bits are
manipulated via Boolean logic gates arranged in succession to produce an end result.
Similarly, a quantum computer manipulates qubits by executing a series of quantum
gates, each a unitary transformation acting on a single qubit or pair of qubits. In
applying these gates in succession, a quantum computer can perform a complicated
unitary transformation to a set of qubits in some initial state. The qubits can then be
measured, with this measurement serving as the final computational result. This
similarity in calculation between a classical and quantum computer affords that in
theory, a classical computer can accurately simulate a quantum computer. In other
words, a classical computer would be able to do anything a quantum computer can.
So why bother with quantum computers? Although a classical computer can
theoretically simulate a quantum computer, it is incredibly inefficient, so much so
that a classical computer is effectively incapable of performing many tasks that a
quantum computer could perform with ease. The simulation of a quantum computer
on a classical one is a computationally hard problem because the correlations among
quantum bits are qualitatively different from correlations among classical bits...,
Jacob West, The Quantum Computer, http://tinyurl.com/37b8.
354 See supra Part VI. I .C(a)(i).
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work was all the more impressive because, with the exception
of elementary school and a short time in a commercial school,
he was almost completely self-educated.
In conjunction with Boole, another British mathematician,
Augustus DeMorgan, formalized a set of logical operations
now known as DeMorgan transformations. As the
Encyclopedia Britannica says: "A renascence of logical
studies came about almost entirely because of Boole and
DeMorgan."
. . . Unfortunately, with the exception of students of
philosophy and symbolic logic, Boolean Algebra was
destined to remain largely unknown and unused for the better
part of a century, until a young student called Claude E.
Shannon recognized its relevance to electronics design.35
A key development in the history of the modem digital computer
was the recognition by Claude Shannon 356 in his 1938 Masters thesis
at MIT357 of the fact that the behavior of switching circuits of the sort
that later were to become the key components in electronic
computers-which did not exist at that time-could be described
using Boolean algebra,358 Modem digital computers typically are
programmed to perform Boolean, rather than arithmetical, operations
and often have separate processing units to deal with arithmetical
operations that are not really part of the Central Processing Unit.
Boolean algebra deals with certain logical operators like AND and
OR and NOT that we use every day in an unformalized fashion. If A
is true and if B is true then we know, instinctively as it were, that A
AND B is true. On the other hand, we also know that if A is false
then, whether or not B is true or false, it is not true-i.e., it is false-
that A AND B is true.359
For those of us who are not concerned with low level
programming and thus do not have to worry about the functioning of
the logic gates in a computer, our experience with Boolean logic is
355 These notes are abstracted from the book BEBOP BYTES BACK (AN UNCONVENTIONAL
GUIDE TO COMPUTERS), available at http://www.maxmon.com/1847ad.htm.
356 Shannon was also the author of the seminal work on communication theory that first
explored the modem concept of "information" as that term is used in computer science.
357 Which has been described as the most important master's thesis ever written.
358 C. Shannon, A symbolic analysis of relay and switching circuits, https://dspace.mit.edu/
handle/1721.1/11173.
359 The binary values "true" and "false" can equally well be represented by the binary
digits-or "bits"-"0" and "I". note that these two binary values correspond to the two symbols
that are used by Turing machines. See supra note 315.
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likely to involve searching for particular items of computerized
information. Lawyers and law students, though they may not realize
it, use Boolean logic every time they make a search through the legal
materials stored in the Lexis or Westlaw databases and anyone who
uses the advanced search function on Google is also making a
Boolean search: "Find results with all of the words" causes Google to
return all texts in which it is true that wordl AND word2 AND
word3, etc., appear while "Find results with at least one of the words"
causes Google to return all texts in which it is true that wordl OR
word2 OR word3 appear.
All relational databases, such as PostgreSQL or Microsoft SQL,360
and almost all other types of databases, also permit Boolean
searching.
Boolean operations are best understood in terms of so-called
"Truth Tables," the subject discussed in the next section.
a. Truth Tables
Around 1921 Emil Post 36 1  and Ludwig Wittgenstein 362
independently developed the idea of using "Truth Tables" to
determine whether a compound statement such as "swans are birds
AND swans are black" is true or false.3 63
The simplest sort of truth table reveals whether a simple statement
like "swans are birds" is true. There are two possible operations that
can apply to such a simple statement, the IDENTITY or IS operator
and the NOT operator. Here is the truth table for the IS operator,
which, since all it shows is that A is true if A is true and that A is




On the other hand, the truth table for the NOT operator, which
shows that NOT A is false if A is true-and vice versa-is, as we
shall see, very useful when used in conjunction with other Boolean
operators:
360 "SQL" stands for "Standard Query Language."
361 See http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/ history/Mathematicians/Post.html.
362 See http://tinyurl.com/m3ess.
363 Since, although it is true that swans are birds, it is not true that swans are black this
compound statement is false.
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Here are the truth tables for the other Boolean operators with
which we are most familiar, OR and AND:
A B AORB A B A AND B
T T T T T T
T F T T F F
F T T F T F
F F F F F F
As you can see, A OR B is true in all cases except when both A
and B are false, while A AND B is false in all cases except when both
A and B are true. At this point you may be wondering why we have
wandered off from the subject of computers and instead are
examining the truth tables for various Boolean operators. The reason,
however, is quite simple: All the instructions carried out or operations
performed by modem digital computers or a Turing machine-even
arithmetical operations-can be specified as a combination of
Boolean operations.
364
Truth tables can be used not only to specify truth or falsity: they
can be applied to any disjoint pair of relations like "yes or no," "on or
off," "up or down," or, in the case of binary digits, "1 or 0." Since
modem digital computers process their inputs in the form of binary
digits and also produce their outputs in that form, I shall hereafter
discuss truth tables using "1" instead of "T" and "0" instead of "F. 365
One important fact about truth tables-important at least when one
is designing the wiring of a digital computer-is that every Boolean
operator can be produced by some combination of the NOT and
AND-or the NOT and OR-operators. And there are two additional
operators, NOR (NOT OR) and NAND (NOT AND), either one of
which can be used to produce all other Boolean operators.
364 See supra note 314 and accompanying text and infra Part VI.A.5(b).
36s It does, after all, not matter what symbols we use to designate the two different voltage
levels that can be the input to, or the output of, a digital logic gate, for those symbols, no matter
how we interpret them, are not voltage levels.
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Here are the truth tables for NOR and NAND: 3 66
A B A NOR A B A AND B
B
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
There are two additional Boolean operator besides NOT, OR,
AND, NOR, and AND that we should discuss: the operation referred
as XOR and the one referred to as IF/THEN.
The XOR operator performs the so-called "exclusive or"
operation-also known as "exclusive disjunction"-where the result
is true whenever either A or B, but not the other, is true. Here is the
truth table for the XOR operation:
367





One important use of the XOR operation is in cryptography, the
science or art of encoding messages or other information so that they
cannot be understood without the application of some additional
secret information. One of the simplest ways of encrypting a message
is to use a so-called "one-time pad" where each bit of information in
the message is XORed368 together with the corresponding bit in
another file called the "key.,
369
It was my writing a little program to demonstrate this fact to my
students in my course in computing and the law that lead to my suit
against the United States Secretary of Commerce to establish the fact
that the First Amendment to the constitution of the United States
protects the publication of information in the form of computer
programs, even on the Internet, from governmental censorship. 370 For
366 Note that "A NAND A" has the same truth table as "NOT A" and that "NOT(A NAND
B)" has the same truth table as "A AND B." The truth tables for all Boolean operators can be
created in a similar fashion.
367 Remember that we are now using the symbols "1" for "true" and "0" for "false."
368 Or some equivalent operation is used like NOT XOR.
369 If the key is truly random and never reused, this is the one form of encryption that
cannot be broken, even in theory, unless, of course, some enemy agent steals a copy of the key.
370 Junger v. Daley, 209 F. 3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
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our immediate purposes, one might wonder if the First Amendment
would protect me if it were a holder of a patent on such encryption
programs who tried to enjoin my publication of the text of my
program?
One of the most important Boolean operations when performed by
a digital computer is the IF AND ONLY IF operation, where the
result is true if and only if both A and B are true.
Here is the truth table for the IF AND ONLY IF operator:





This operation allows one to instruct a computer, human or
electronic, to do something if and only if A and B are both
true.
371
Now this discussion has probably told you more than you, or I,
will ever need to know about Boolean operators and truth tables. But
it does serve to make a critical point: It is ridiculous to think that a
patent could be issued for a string of Boolean operations implemented
by looking up their outcomes in a set of truth tables. Yet, in theory at
least, every program for a binary computer can be implemented in
exactly that fashion.
b. Wiring Diagrams and Logic Gates
Where logicians use truth tables, electrical engineers, when
designing computers and related devices, use wiring diagrams
consisting of a representation of the wires in the device connected
with each other by so-called "logic gates," which typically take two
inputs which are either "high voltage" or "low voltage" and have a
single output, again either high or low. "High" traditionally
corresponds to "1" or "True" while "low" corresponds to "0" or
"False" in a truth table. Here are some examples of the way logic
gates are represented:
372
371 Or to do something where A = B and A is true.
372 David Warner Smith, Digital Logic Systems, http://users.senet.com.au/-dwsmith/
beginners.htm.
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A computer program, particularly one that is hard-wired into a
device, can thus be represented by a wiring diagram, so, though it is
ridiculous to claim that a computer program is a device like the
wiring in a telephone, it is quite reasonable, and sometimes even
useful, to claim that a computer program is a schematic like a wiring
diagram,373 provided always that you keep in mind that the output of
the computer running the program is going to consist of nothing but a
bunch of ones and zeros
374
c. Flowcharts
Closely related to wiring diagrams are flowcharts, which represent,
not the flow of signals through the computer, but rather the logical
steps that the computer will take.375 I gather that flowcharts are not
313 For more information about logic gates and their relation to truth tables, you might want
to look at Douglas W. Jones, Computer Organization Collection, http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/
jones/assem/notes/08arith.shtml.
374 Ones and zeros, though they may be represented by holes in a punch card or voltage
levels in a computer chip, do not themselves consist of matter or energy. They are pure
information.
375 A typical flowchart from older Computer Science textbooks may have the following
kinds of symbols:
- Start and end symbols, represented as lozenges, ovals or rounded rectangles,
usually containing the word "Start" or "End".
- Arrows, showing what's called "flow of control" in computer science. An arrow
coming from one symbol and ending at another symbol represents that control passes
to the symbol the arrow points to.
* Processing steps, represented as rectangles. Example: Add I to X.
* Input/Output, represented as a parallelogram. Examples: Get X from the user;
display X.
- Conditional (or decision), represented as a diamond (rhombus). These typically
contain a Yes/No question or True/False test. This symbol is unique in that it has two
arrows coming out of it, usually from the bottom point and right point, one
corresponding to Yes or True, and one corresponding to No or False. The arrows
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used so often these days, but back when I took the IBM Executive
Computer Concepts Course3 76 we were required to draw a flowchart
showing what our computer would do before writing down the actual
program.
377
Flowcharts have the advantage that, though they can easily be
transformed into executable code, they are not limited to the
architecture of any particular machine or the idiosyncrasies of any
particular programming language.378 Since a flowchart is neither a
machine nor a process, it is difficult to imagine how even the Federal
Circuit would deem it to be patentable or how drawing such a chart
should amount to "making" a patented computer program and thus
infringing a patent.
Yet every computer program can be represented by a flow chart.379
6. Registers
Computer programs operate on binary digits or "bits" 380 and most
operations that computer hardware can perform-and thus that
computer programs can usefully specify-involve a series of ordered
bits: eight bits (a "byte"), sixteen bits, thirty-two bits, or sixty-four
bits381 that are manipulated as a single unit in "registers" that typically
are part of the computer's central processing unit. One of the
important things that I learned in the IBM Executive Computer
Concepts course382 that I took back in the 1960's was that when
should always be labeled. Flowcharts may contain other symbols, such as
connectors, usually represented as circles, to represent converging paths in the flow
chart. Circles will have more than one arrow coming into them but only one going
out. Some flow charts may just have an arrow point to another arrow instead. These
are useful to represent an iterative process (what in Computer Science is called a
loop). A loop may, for example, consist of a connector where control first enters,
processing steps, a conditional with one arrow exiting the loop, and one going back
to the connector.
Wikipedia, Flowchart, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flowchart.
376 See infra note 387.377 And we had to write our program on coding sheets before encoding it in punch cards
using a cardpunch machine.
378T he same result can be obtained by using psuedocode, "Pseudocode (derived from
pseudo and code) is a description of a computer programming algorithm that uses the structural
conventions of programming languages, but omits detailed subroutines or language-specific
syntax." Wikipedia. Psuedocode, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psuedocode.
379 Or by a description of the program in psuedocode.
3
s0 See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
381 Note that each of these lengths is a power of 2: 8 = 23, 16 = 2 , 32 = 2', and 64 = 26.
312 That course only lasted a week, but it was by far the most exhausting course that I have
ever taken. It was not designed for relatively junior lawyers like myself, but for what are now
called Chief Financial Officers, who apparently cannot stand not being overworked. The course
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writing a program at the fundamental level of machine code or
assembly language, all instructions to an electronic computer must
specify the register or registers that are to be used in implementing
each instruction.
For example, a computer with the appropriate processor will
understand this x86/IA-32 machine language:
10110000 01100001
For programmers, however, it is easier to remember the
equivalent assembly language representation:
mov al, 061 h
which means to move the hexadecimal value 61 (97 decimal)
into the processor register with the name "al". The mnemonic
"mov" is short for "move", and a comma-separated list of
arguments or parameters follows it; this is a typical assembly
language statement.383
When writing code in "higher level" languages, 384 the programmer
does not have to worry about moving data in and out of registers or
know which register contains which chunk of data, for these matters
are taken care of automatically by the compiler or interpreter that
translate the instructions in the higher level language into code-
"machine code38 "--that the hardware can implement.
Some operations may be limited to a specific register-for
example, the Intel 8080386 chip could perform addition only in a
took the form of a series of time capsules: the first day we had to program in machine language,
where all instructions took the form of a string of numbers that were fed into the computer's
registers, the next day they invented assembly language, which allowed one to substitute strings
of alphanumeric characters, that sort of look like words, for the strings of numbers in the
corresponding machine language version of the program, see Wikipedia, Assembly language,
the next day they invented Fortran, see Wikipedia, FORTRAN, the next day they invented
COBOL, see Wikipedia, COBOL, and so on. After writing our programs we had to punch them
into a deck of punch cards that could be fed into the computer. On the last day they were going
to show us a terminal with a CRT screen and a keyboard, but unfortunately on that day IBM's
terminal in New York City was broken.383 Wikipedia, Assembly language, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assemblylanguage.
38 That is, languages other than assembly language or machine language.
385 Or, sometimes, into assembly language that an assembler then converts into machine
code.
38 The first computer that I owned was a NorthStar Horizon which had a Zilog Z80 chip
that had the same instruction set as the Intel 8080, so here I am writing from personal
experience. The assembler that I used was the CP/M ASM assembler; a copy of its manual can
be found at http://www.autometer.de/gaby/DRI/ASM.pdf.
20081
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specialized register called the "accumulator," 387 A register that is of
particular interest to us is, of course, a "shift register," since one of
the claims that was held in Gottschalk v. Benson388 to be unpatentable
involved the use of a "reentrant shift register, '3 89 a register3 90 in which
a string of binary digits could be shifted to the left or to the right.
Shifting the string one place to the left amounts to multiplying the
number represented by the string by two; shifting it one place to the
right amounts to dividing it by two. Thus, for example, if a register
contains the number five in binary notation, its contents would look
like this:
00000101
after shifting the contents one place to the left, they would
look like this:
00001010
which equals the number ten.
The claim in Benson, which did not relate to the design or
construction of any type of physical register, thus amounted to little
more than a series of multiplications by two and divisions by two of a
number that originally represented a Binary Coded Decimal version
of another number. It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court held
that such a series of arithmetical operations is not the sort of process
that can be patented.
When one gets right down to the hardware, all the code-all of the
instructions-and all the data that are fed into a computer take the
form of strings of binary digits-bits-that are processed in some
way in the registers of a computer's central processing unit and then
output as another string of bits.
7. Peripherals
Registers are at the very heart of the computer; on the other hand
there are peripherals like video screens and keyboards and printers
that, though often connected to a computer, are not parts of it. These
peripherals are of critical importance to the use that we make of
387 So called because it could store and accumulate intermediate results.
38 8 See supra Part HI.
389 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
39In the case of the Intel 8080 that register was the accumulator. The instruction to shift
the contents of the accumulator to the left was "RAL" and to the right was RAR, standing for
"Rotate Accumulator Left" and "Rotate Accumulator Right," respectively.
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computers, because they let us feed information into the computer
and, once it has been processed, get it out again, but, once again, they
are not themselves parts of the computer.
391
There is a real danger, however, that a person who has only dealt
with a computer using a pointing device like a mouse and a video
screen with a Graphical User Interface-a "GUI" 392 -will confuse the
peripheral devices with the computer itself.
The relation between the computer and its peripherals is perhaps
best illustrated by the examples of the keyboard and an early printer
such as the one that I had connected to my first computer, back in the
days before the introduction of the IBM PC. 393 When one depressed a
key on the keyboard, say the key marked A, that device sent a code-
a number in the form of a string of binary digits-to the computer
and, if the computer was running a program that edits text, like the
WordStar program that I used as a word processor, that program
would insert the ASCII code for the letter 394 in the file that it was
391 Although, of course, they may like modem washing machines and toasters contain a
computer themselves.
392 Also known as a "WIMP" environment. WIMP environment n. [acronym: 'Window,
Icon, Menu, Pointing device (or Pull-down menu)'] A graphical-user-interface environment
such as X or the Macintosh interface, esp. as described by a hacker who prefers command-line
interfaces for their superior flexibility and extensibility. However, it is also used without
negative connotations; one must pay attention to voice tone and other signals to interpret
correctly.393 See supra note 389.
394 Or, if the shift key were depressed, the ASCII code for the letter A. ASCII : /askee/, n.
[originally an acronym (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) but now merely
conventional] The predominant character set encoding of present-day computers. The standard
version uses 7 bits for each character, whereas most earlier codes (including early drafts of
ASCII prior to June 1961) used fewer. This change allowed the inclusion of lowercase
letters.., but it did not provide for accented letters or any other letterforms not used in English
(such as the German sharp-S BI or the ae-ligature x which is a letter in, for example,
Norwegian). It could be worse, though. It could be much worse. For a listing of the various
ASCII codes, see ASCII Table and Description, http://www.lookuptables.com/. This table
begins with the following comment:
ASCII stands for American Standard Code for Information Interchange. Computers
can only understand numbers, so an ASCII code is the numerical representation of a
character such as 'a' or '@' or an action of some sort. ASCII was developed a long
time ago and now the non-printing characters are rarely used for their original
purpose. Below is the ASCII character table and this includes descriptions of the first
32 non-printing characters. ASCII was actually designed for use with teletypes and
so the descriptions are somewhat obscure. If someone says they want your CV
however in ASCII format, all this means is they want 'plain' text with no formatting
such as tabs, bold or underscoring--abe raw format that any computer can
understand. This is usually so they can easily import the file into their own
applications without issues....
For a history of ASCII and its predecessors, including Morse Code, see Tom Jennings, ASCII:
American Standard Code for Information Infiltration, http://www.wps.com/
projects/codes/.
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editing. And then, later, when the file was sent to the printer and the
printer got to that segment of the code it would print the letter a.
Thus the keyboard sent a code to the computer, the computer
processed that code, and the computer then sent another code to the
printer and the printer printed the appropriate character. We need
peripheral devices to get information into the computer and to get
information out of the computer in a form where we can understand
it, but it is important to realize that the peripheral devices are not
actually parts of the computer.
395
8. Near the Beginning Was the Plugboard
Before computers could be instructed to reprogram themselves and
before they had central processing units or registers, they could be
rewired, as were tabulating machines, using "plugboards."
The very first punched-card tabulating machines were
custom-built to do just one job, such as tally the US 1890 or
1900 census data.396 Starting in 1906, tabulators were made
more flexible by addition of a wiring panel to let users control
their actions to some degree, thus allowing the same machine
to be sold into different markets (government, railroad, etc)
and used for different purposes. But this also meant that if
one machine were to be used for different jobs, it would have
to be rewired between each job, often a lengthy process that
kept the machine offline for extended periods. In 1928, IBM
began to manufacture machines with removeable wiring
panels, or "plugboards", so programs could be prewired and
swapped in and out instantly to change jobs....
By the 1930s, most IBM punched-card equipment-
tabulators, accounting machines, multiplying and summary
punches, calculators-operated under the control of a
plugboard, now formally referred to as a control panel. Users
wired plugboards to specify exactly which card columns were
to be read or punched, which card fields were to be fed to
which accumulators, and so forth, depending on the machine.
395 Although nowadays they may contain a computer to assist them in performing their
functions. It should also be noted that the Federal Circuit has suggested that information in
digital form stored on a "physical structure" like a CD-ROM or player piano role is patentable,
not as software but simply as a novel physical structure. See supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
396 These tabulating machines were designed by Herman Hollerith, see
http://www.maxmon.com/1890ad.htm, and were used, as we have seen, by the human
computers who worked on the Manhattan project; see supra text accompanying note 265.
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The instructions were given by connecting holes (*hubs")
with wvires. For example, a simple task on an accounting
machine might be to print columns of numbers from a deck of
cards, in which case a series of wires would connect card
columns to printer columns. A slightly more ambitious
version of this task would also accumulate totals by
connecting the same card columns to accumulators, and then
print the totals at the end.
7
The first electronic computer in the United States is usually
considered to have been the ENIAC, which could bc reprogrammed
by changing the wiring in a plug board. This apparently is what led to
the perverse conclusion that the first computer programs were
hardware, rather than that they were implemented in hardware (as all
computer programs arc) .
Here is a picture of the ENIAC being programmed by two
women: 39
Hardwired machines like the ENIAC were soon replaced by stored
program computers:
400
,' IBM Control Panels, httpiiww cofi hiae di i ac, is-oiph oard. ii i htl
" See irufia note 415 and accompanying text,
H1'1 istoric Computer Images, littp:, ftp.ar. nil fp, h.isto ic- cintpiiters
""Also known as Von Ncumann machines in honor of John 01 \i NCiinlann \ho first
publicized the concept. See Arthur W. Burks, I Herman if (ioldstine. & John on Neumann,
Preliminarv discussion of the logical ck'si 4n qi' m non ecir ni owuitpulfllo ootr0ialeut.
http://.ww ,.cecs.haaird.edu, ionaian titi nann'neumann.htltI Ilere arc excerpts fiom that
publication:
PART I
I. Principal components f the machie
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1.1. Inasmuch as the completed device will be a general-purpose computing machine
it should contain certain main organs relating to arithmetic, memory storage, control
and connection with the human operator. It is intended that the machine be fully
automatic in character, i.e. independent of the human operator after the computation
starts....
1.2. It is evident that the machine must be capable of storing in some manner not
only the digital information needed in a given computation such as boundary values,
tables of functions (such as the equation of state of a fluid) and also the intermediate
results of the computation (which may be wanted for varying lengths of time), but
also the instructions which govern the actual routine to be performed on the
numerical data. In a special-purpose machine these instructions are an integral part of
the device and constitute a part of its design structure. For an all-purpose machine it
must be possible to instruct the device to carry out any computation that can be
formulated in numerical terms. Hence there must be some organ capable of storing
these program orders. There must, moreover, be a unit which can understand these
instructions and order their execution.
1.3. Conceptually we have discussed above two different forms of memory: storage
of numbers and storage of orders. If, however, the orders to the machine are reduced
to a numerical code and if the machine can in some fashion distinguish a number
from an order, the memory organ can be used to store both numbers and orders....
1.5. Inasmuch as the device is to be a computing machine there must be an arithmetic
organ in it which can perform certain of the elementary arithmetic operations. There
will be, therefore, a unit capable of adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing. It
will be seen . . . that it can also perform additional operations that occur quite
frequently. The operations that the machine will view as elementary are clearly those
which are wired into the machine. To illustrate, the operation of multiplication could
be eliminated from the device as an elementary process if one were willing to view it
as a properly ordered series of additions. Similar remarks apply to division. In
general, the inner economy of the arithmetic unit is determined by a compromise
between the desire for speed of operation-a non-elementary operation will
generally take a long time to perform since it is constituted of a series of orders given
by the control-and the desire for simplicity, or cheapness, of the machine.
1.6. Lastly there must exist devices, the input and output organ, whereby the human
operator and the machine can communicate with each other.... 2. First remarks on
the memory
3. First remarks on the control and code
3.3. It must be possible to transfer data from the memory to the arithmetic organ and
back again. In transferring information from the arithmetic organ back into the
memory there are two types we must distinguish: Transfers of numbers as such and
transfers of numbers which are parts of orders....
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Almost all modem computers are stored program computers that
can be reprogrammed simply by feeding the new program-as a
string of binary digits-into the machine's memory. It is this feature
that allows one to feed a higher level program-like one written in
Fortran-into the computer's memory and then using a compiler
4. The memory organ
5. The arithmetic organ
5.1. In this Part we discuss the features we now consider desirable for the arithmetic
part of our machine. We give our tentative conclusions as to which of the arithmetic
operations should be built into the machine and which should be programmed....
5.2. In a discussion of the arithmetical organs of a computing machine one is
naturally led to a consideration of the number system to be adopted. In spite of the
longstanding tradition of building digital machines in the decimal system, we feel
strongly in favor of the binary system for our device. Our fundamental unit of
memory is naturally adapted to the binary system since we do not attempt to measure
gradations of charge at a particular point.., but are content to distinguish two states.
... The main virtue of the binary system as against the decimal is, however, the
greater simplicity and speed with which the elementary operations can be performed.
To illustrate, consider multiplication by repeated addition. In binary multiplication
the product of a particular digit of the multiplier by the multiplicand is either the
multiplicand or null according as the multiplier digit is 1 or 0. In the decimal system,
however, this product has ten possible values between null and nine times the
multiplicand, inclusive. Of course, a decimal umber has only log102 0.3 times as
many digits as a binary number of the same accuracy, but even so multiplication in
the decimal system is considerably longer than in the binary system. One can
accelerate decimal multiplication by complicating the circuits, but this fact is
irrelevant to the point just made since binary multiplication can likewise be
accelerated by adding to the equipment. Similar remarks may be made about the
other operations. In additional point that deserves emphasis is this: An important part
of the machine is not arithmetical, but logical in nature. Now logic, being a yes-no
system, is fundamentally binary. Therefore a binary arrangement of the arithmetical
organs contributes very significantly towards producing a more homogeneous
machine, which can be better integrated and is more efficient. The one disadvantage
of the binary system from the human point of view is the conversion problem. Since,
however, it is completely known how to convert numbers from one base to another
and since this conversion can be effected solely by the use of the usual arithmetic
processes there is no reason why the computer itself cannot carry out this conversion.
... Indeed a general-purpose computer, used as a scientific research tool, is called
upon to do a very great number of multiplications upon a relatively small amount of
input data, and hence the time consumed in the decimal to binary conversion is only
a trivial percentage of the total computing time. A similar remark is applicable to the
output data.
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program (or interpreter) generate machine code that can be executed
by the machine.4°'
a. Of Front Panels and Blinkenlights
Once computers became programmable and included registers in a
central processing unit there still had to be some way to load a
program into those registers. Initially this was done by the
programmer flipping switches on the front panel of the computer to
insert machine code instructions into the computer's registers and
reading the contents of those registers by noting the status of the
"blinkenlights" 40 2 on that front panel.
This type of front panel was found both on mainframes like the
IBM/System 360 and the MIPS Altair computer, which was the first
personal computer.
The switches on the front panel were typically used to "boot" the
machine.
401 Although it is usually a good idea for programmers to keep other data separate from the
instructions in the program there is nothing in the stored program computer itself that requires
that this be done.
402Here is an excerpt from the entry on "blinkenlights" from the Jargon File,
http://www.catb.org/_esr/jargon/html/B/blinkenlights.html: blinkenlights: /blink'@nli:tz/, n.
[common] Front-panel diagnostic lights on a computer, esp. a dinosaur. Now that dinosaurs are
rare, this term usually refers to status lights on a modem, network hub, or the like. This term
derives from the last word of the famous blackletter-Gothic sign in mangled pseudo-German
that once graced about half the computer rooms in the English-speaking world. One version ran
in its entirety as follows:
ACHTUNG! ALLES LOOKENSPEEPERS!
Alles touristen und non-technischen looken peepers! Das computermachine ist nicht
fuer gefmgerpoken und mittengrabben. Ist easy schnappen der springenwerk,
blowenfusen und poppencorken mit spitzensparken. 1st nicht fler gewerken bei das
dumpkopfen. Das rubbernecken sichtseeren keepen das cotten-pickenen hans in das
pockets muss; relaxen und watchen das blinkenlichten.
This silliness dates back at least as far as 1955 at IBM and had already gone international
by the early 1960s, when it was reported at London University's ATLAS computing site. There
are several variants of it in circulation, some of which actually do end with the word
'blinkenlights'. In an amusing example of turnabout-is-fair-play, German hackers have
developed their own versions of the blinkenlights poster in fractured English, one of which is
reproduced here:
This room is fullfilled mit special electronische equipment . Fingergrabbing and
pressing the cnoeppkes from the computers is allowed for die experts only! So all the
'lefthanders' stay away and do not disturben the brainstorming von here working
intelligencies. Otherwise you will be out thrown and kicked anderswhere! Also:
please keep still and only watchen astaunished the blinkenlights. The Jargon File is a
dictionary of computer jargon that was originally maintained at MIT and that can
now be found at http://www.catb.org/jargon/. It is great resource for those of us who
are not computer programmers, but who wish to understand how those strange
beings think about things.
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[The term "boot"] derives from bootstrap loader, a short program
that was read in from cards or paper tape, or toggled in from the front
panel switches. This program was always very short (great efforts
were expended on making it short in order to minimize the labor and
chance of error involved in toggling it in), but was just smart enough
to read in a slightly more complex program (usually from a card or
paper tape reader), to which it handed control; this program in turn
was smart enough to read the application or operating system from a
magnetic tape drive or disk drive. Thus, in successive steps, the
computer 'pulled itself up by its bootstraps' to a useful operating
state. Nowadays the bootstrap is usually found in ROM or EPROM,
and reads the first stage in from a fixed location on the disk, called the
'boot block'. When this program gains control, it is powerful enough
to load the actual OS and hand control over to it.4" 3
9. Computers That Can Reprogram Themselves
When we think of computers today, we tend to think not of the
dedicated single-purpose computer chips that are hard-wired into
devices like toasters and automobiles nor do we think of early
machines like the ENIAC 404 that had to be rewired, perhaps using a
plug board, each time before they could carry out a new program.
Rather we think of general purpose, "programmable" computers,4 °5
that can, if we just feed them the right instructions in the form of a
stream of binary digits-i.e., feed them the right program-perform
any computation whatsoever.40 6
It might seem reasonable to restrict our attention only to
programmable computers, for we are not concerned with computers
without programs. The fact of the matter is, however, that all
computers407 have programs, even if they are embedded in dedicated
single-purpose devices. All computers are programmable; the
computers that we call "programmable" are more properly referred to
as "stored program" computers, for they can store programs as data
and can be instructed to reprogram themselves-rewire themselves as
it were-in accordance with the instructions contained in the stored
403 Id., http://www.catb.org/-esr/jargon/html/B/boot.html.
404 See supra Part VI.A.4.
405 Le. "stored program computers" or "Von Neumann machines." See supra note 400 and
accompanying text.
406 Provided, of course, that the computation in question is in fact computable. For a
discussion of the idea of a computer that can perform any computation whatsoever, see supra
Part VI.A.3(a)(ii).
407 That function as computers and not as doorstops or paperweights.
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programs.4 °8 The distinction between the various types of computers
would hardly merit mentioning, were it not for the fact that the
peculiar claim that software is hardware can be used to justify the
Federal Circuit's holding in Alappat that a computer program is
patentable because a computer program is a machine or a part of a
machine40 9 can be traced in part to the failure of some legal scholars
to recognize that computers that could only be reprogrammed by
having someone rewire them still have programs, and that, though
those programs may be fixed in the tangible medium of the wiring,
the wiring was not the program that runs as a process on the computer
any more than a phonograph record is a musical work.
Among those who apparently subscribe to the view that computer
programs-at least some computer programs-are parts of a machine
are Pamela Samuelson, the leading authority on soi disant
"intellectual property" rights relating to computer programs, who
claimed in her seminal article on copyright and computer programs
that "[b]ecause part of the debate on the appropriateness of copyright
as a form of protection depends on the answer to the question, 'It is a
writing or is it a machine part?,' it is essential to understand programs
in their entirety.A0
Samuelson then goes on to say:
408 The distinction between stored-program computers and other types of computers was
carefully made in one of the first articles ever written on computing and the law, John Banzhaf's
note about computers and copyright: Digital computers may conveniently be divided into three
categories: fixed program, variable program, and stored program. The fixed program machine
always performs the same operation upon data of a uniform type. An example would be a cash
register which will compute the amount of the sales tax and the customer's change. Since the
calculations never change, the mechanism is fixed and it may be said to operate under a fixed
program. A variable program (often called a wired program) computer also performs repetitive
calculations but these can be altered by changing its wiring .... Stored program computers are
designed to perform a wide variety of tasks and to permit the pattern of calculations to be
changed quickly and easily. . . .Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1274, at 1274-75 n. 4 (1964). What Banzhaft calls a "variable program
computer" is a computer, like the ENIAC, that could be reprogrammed only by changing its
wiring.
409 See supra Part III.A. The most extreme case of confusing a program with wiring is
undoubtedly the opinion of the federal District Court in Junger (c'est mot) v. Daley, holding that
the source code of a computer program is "is a device, like embedded circuitry in a telephone,"
8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 713 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). The issue in
Junger v. Daley was whether "source code" was speech protected by the First Amendment; the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the trial judge's holding and held that source
code was indeed protected by the First Amendment.410 See supra Part III.A. The most extreme case of confusing a program with wiring is
undoubtedly the opinion of the federal District Court in Junger (c 'est moi) v. Daley, holding that
the source code of a computer program is "is a device, like embedded circuitry in a telephone,"
8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 713 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev'd 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). The issue in
Junger v. Daley was whether "source code" was speech protected by the First Amendment; the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the trial judge's holding and held that source
code was indeed protected by the First Amendment.
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It is important to note at the outset that the first generation of
computers did not utilize what are now referred to as
computer programs to carry out their computational tasks.
Rather, they were constructed-or "hard-wired"--in such a
way that the machine could perform only the particular
function for which it had been wired. To change the operation
the machine could accomplish, that is, to enable the machine
to perform a different task, the computer's engineers had to
rewire or reconfigure the machine. In other words, the first
operating computers were all hardware.411
And then she inserts the following footnote:
"To perform different operations, [ENIAC] had to be
manually rewired, like an old wire-and-plug telephone switch
board, a task that could take several days." Golden, Big
Dimwits and Little Geniuses, TIME MAG., Jan. 3, 1983, at
31. One could say that, in a sense, such a machine was
programmed by its hardware. That is, the order in which the
machine would execute its primitive functions was set by the
manner in which the hardware had been constructed. But this
is using the word "program" in a very different sense from
the way one uses it today to refer to the set of written
instructions which are translated to binary code, stored in a
computer, and used to cause a computer to perform a useful
function.412
Note that here Samuelson confuses the meaning of "program" as a
noun with its meaning as a verb and then uses the verb "to program"
in a most idiosyncratic fashion when she describes the computer as
having been programmed by its hardware.413 Rewiring the ENIAC
was the way that it was programmed; the wires by themselves did not
do anything, as Banzhaft had made clear414 twenty years before
Samuelson wrote her article.41 5
41 1984 DUKE L.J. 673-74 (footnote omitted).
412 1d. at 674, n33. It is strange to think that the whole confusion about whether software is
hardware may have started with a journalist's off-hand characterization of way the ENIAC was
programmed.
413 For a history of the term "program" as it came to be used in connection with computers,
and especially with its use as a verb, see David Alan Grier, The ENIAC, the Verb "to program "
and the Emergence of Digital Computers, 18 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING 51
(1996). It turns out that the first use of the word "program" as a verb in connection with a digital
computer was in paper by John Mauchly, one of the designers of the "ENIAC," the very
computer that supposedly was all hardware and therefore did not use programs.
414 See supra note 411.
415 It should be noted that Samuelson made her claims about programs as hardware as part
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Back in the days when the ENIAC was reprogrammed by rewiring
it,416 the programmers gave their written instructions-the program-
to the women417 who were rewiring the computer rather than loading
the program into the computer itself. Those early programs, addressed
to women, rather than to computers, most certainly were not
hardware. Equally clearly, they were written texts and no more
patentable than, say, a table of logarithms.
B. Software
In the old view it is regarded as the purpose of our programs
to instruct our machines; in the new one it will be the purpose
of our machines to execute our programs.-E. Dijkstra4"8
We have been exploring the nature of computers at some length419
and in the process we have had to spend a considerable amount of
time considering the nature of the computer programs that instruct a
computer to do whatever it does. As I have said before, a computer
without a program is usable only as a doorstop. The issues that we are
concerned with, however, are whether computer programs are
of an argument--one that has not been accepted by the courts-that computer programs, at least
those in the form of "machine code" should not be protected by copyright. It does not seem
likely that she would have used the same argument to reach the conclusion that computer
programs should be patentable.
416 See figure accompanying note 402.
417 Because there was a war going on, both the programmers and those who rewired the
ENIAC in accordance with the programmer's programs, were women. A great to-do in those
days was made about "Rosie the Riveter"; because, or so I suppose, both military secrecy and
the public's incomprehension of what was involved in computing, there was no corresponding
recognition of, say, "Polly the Programmer" or "Renata the Rewirer."
418 Comments at a Symposium, http://tinyurl.com/rq9p8. Edsger Wybe Dijkstra was one of
the most influential members of computing science's founding generation. Among the domains






* formal specification and verification
* design of mathematical arguments
In addition, Dijkstra was intensely interested in teaching, and in the relationships between
academic computing science and the software industry. During his forty-plus years as a
computing scientist, which included positions in both academia and industry, Dijkstra's
contributions brought him many prizes and awards, including computing science's highest
honor, the ACM Turing Award. E.W. Dijkstra Archive, The Manuscripts of Edsger W. Dilkstra,
http://www.cs.utexas.edulusers/EWD/.
419 Some might say at too much length.
YOU CAN'T PA TENT SOFTWARE
patentable, and whether they should be patentable, without regard to
the machines upon which they run. So now the time has come to
forget about the machines and concentrate on the programs.
Computer programs are often collectively called "software" and in
this article, as you undoubtedly have noticed, I use the terms
"computer programs" and "software" pretty much interchangeably.
The term "software" is, however, misleading to the extent that it
suggests that software is-that computer programs are-the same sort
of "ware" as the hardware-i.e., the computer-upon which it runs.
To dispel this confusion it is perhaps enough to note that the term
"wetware" is often used by cognitive scientists to refer to the (usually
human) brain: it is unlikely that anyone could actually believe that
computers and brains and computer programs are all the same sort of
"thing", although many a cognitive scientist at least tries to believe
that the wetware, the brain, is just a sort of complicated computer on
which the programs that we call the "mind" are running.420
This distinction between hardware and software involves the
distinction between physical objects, on the one hand, and
information processing and texts, on the other. If you want to give an
old-fashioned cognitive scientist a hard time, just ask him where the
programs of the brain are stored when they are not running-and then
ask him what the programs are stored as.
That is-or, at least, would be were we doing cognitive science or
philosophy-a good question: What are our thoughts stored as when
we are not thinking them, when they are not being thought? A text?
The OED 2d defines "ware" as: "A collective term for: Articles of
merchandise or manufacture; the things which a merchant, tradesman,
or peddler, has to sell; goods, commodities." And in this context the
distinction, or lack thereof, between hardware and software takes on
considerable legal significance: for example, are computer programs
goods that are covered by the Sales Article of the UCC and subject to
sales tax? Or are they services? Or are they copyrightable texts or
uncopyrightable processes? And-and this is our question-if they
are processes, are they patentable processes?
But, whether the usage is felicitous or not, as used here, the term
"software" refers to computer programs that are running, or can be
run, on a properly programmed computer421 as well as algorithms
420 See, e.g., J.Z. YOUNG, PROGRAMS OF THE BRAIN (1978).
421 There is something seemingly circular here that is of critical importance to an
understanding of how computers function: programs, with very few exceptions, do not simply
run on computers, they are run by-executed by, carried out by-other programs that are
already running on the computer. For the insatiably curious though, I should, I suppose, mention
that there are little programs--so-called "bootstrap loaders"--that load themselves-like lifting
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instructing one-whether one is a programmer or a program-how to
create other programs.
By now we should all understand that whatever computer
programs may be, they are not devices like the wiring in a telephone
or a block and tackle. Computers, at least when they are not human,422
are indeed devices, but programs are not; programs are either writings
or processes, while devices like the innards of a telephone are neither.
Let me repeat that: Computer programs are not devices. Computer
programs are either writings or processes. A program is a process
when it is being executed by a computer; it is a text when it is just
being stored in memory or on a hard disk.
If you have read, or even glanced at, Section 6.1, you should be
aware that although computers take many different forms, there is no
real dispute as to what computers are: they are devices 423 that we use
to assist us in doing computations. On the other hand, there appears
for some unknown reason to be lots of confusion about the nature of
computer programs.
For our purposes, however, once we distinguish between a
computer and the program that runs on the computer424 it should be
clear that it is the computer and the process running on the computer
that together assist us in doing computations. The computer by itself
themselves by their own bootstraps-into the machine with little or no assistance from other
programs except those that are already hard-wired into the computer. The Jargon File includes
the following "Historical note" after its discussion of the verb "boot":
Historical note: this term derives from 'bootstrap loader', a short program that was
read in from cards or paper tape, or toggled in from the front panel switches. This
program was always very short (great efforts were expended on making it short in
order to minimize the labor and chance of error involved in toggling it in), but was
just smart enough to read in a slightly more complex program (usually from a card or
paper tape reader), to which it handed control; this program in turn was smart enough
to read the application or operating system from a magnetic tape drive or disk drive.
Thus, in successive steps, the computer 'pulled itself up by its bootstraps' to a useful
operating state. Nowadays the bootstrap is usually found in ROM or EPROM, and
reads the first stage in from a fixed location on the disk, called the 'boot block'.
When this program gains control, it is powerful enough to load the actual OS and
hand control over to it. "OS", by the way, stands for "operating system", the program
or collection of programs that give the computer its identity as, for example, a Unix
box or a MSWindows machine. It is the operating system that runs the various
application programs on the computer.
4221 see no reason, however, to distinguish for present purposes between a computer
instantiated as a box containing wires and valves and storage devices, on the one hand, and a
computer instantiated as a human being--or a Turing machine, see supra Part VI.A.3(a)(ii), for
that matter-on the other.
423 Or people.
424 We are not concerned here with the computer program as texts, for texts as such are not
patentable, although they may, of course, in some cases be copyrighted.
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is just a box with some complicated wiring that just sits there if no
program is running on it; the program when it is not running on the
computer is simply an abstract idea, an algorithm describing the way
425to carry out a computation.
The computer itself is-if it is not a human being-a machine.426
The program-i.e., the process-that runs on the machine is,
however, a most unusual process, for it can also, at least in theory, be
run on a human brain. When the program is run, whether on a
machine or in a human brain4 27 the result is nothing material, but is
rather simply the outcome of a computation: a number or some
equally intangible bits of information.428
Programs are to computers as thoughts are to brains. It is easy
enough these days to think of brains as devices or a collection of
devices-but it is not so easy to understand what a thought is, or what
the output of a thought process is, or how the brain works.
Fortunately we do not have to understand such matters; all we need to
know is that, whatever else they do, brains can process information
just as computers process information 429 executing exactly the same
programs.
430
Here is a more technical definition of a "computer program" taken
from the entry for "Program" in the first edition of the Encyclopedia
of Computer Science:
In order to solve a computation problem, its solution must be
specified in terms of a sequence of computational steps, each
of which may be effectively performed by a human agent or
by a digital computer. Systematic notations for the
specification of such sequences of computational steps are
referred as programming languages.431 A specification of the
sequence of computational steps in a particular programming
432language is referred to as a program.
425 That abstract idea or algorithm is most likely stored as a text in some tangible medium
like a punch card or a hard disk, but, once again, that does not make the abstract idea patentable.426 And is patentable as such.
427 Assisted, if needed, by pencil and paper.
428 Although, of course, that information may be stored on a piece of paper or on some
other storage device.
429 Our brains are, after all, capable of performing any operation that can be performed by
a Turing machine. See supra Part VI.A.3(a)(ii). On the other hand, computations made by brains
are slower than those made by a computer and are more likely to contain errors, note that this is
not to say that brains cannot do many things that computers cannot do and perhaps will never be
able to do.
430 See supra Part VI.A. 1.
431 Programming languages are discussed infra Part VI.B.4.
4 32 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1158 (1976).
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A sequence of computational steps, each of which may be
effectively performed by a human agent or by a digital computer, is
called an "algorithm. ',4
33
1. Algorithms
Algorithms, and especially mathematical algorithms, are a central
concept in mathematics, the philosophy of mathematics, and
computer science. On the other hand, algorithms are not often met
with in the curricula of our law schools nor in the quotidian practice
of "the lawyer in the street"-or even the patent lawyer in the street.
Yet we lawyers are never going to understand the actual issues in
cases like Gottschalk v. Benson434 unless we have some understanding
of what an algorithm is.
435
Here is the standard definition of algorithms: "Algorithms" are
"Precise rules for transforming specified inputs into specified outputs
in a finite number of steps".436 Thus mathematical algorithms are
precise rules for solving mathematical problems. But recipes, if they
are precise enough, are also algorithms by this definition. And the
specification in a patent application, which is supposed to be precise
enough that anyone "skilled in the art" can implement it, also is-or,
at least, should be-an algorithm.437
We have repeatedly made clear that all computer programs are
algorithms,438 but this does not mean that all algorithms are computer
programs. In fact, most algorithms are not computer programs.
As Donald Knuth, who wrote-and is still writing-the first and
greatest treatise on computer science puts it:
The notion of an algorithm is basic to all computer
programming
433 As it was by Justice Douglas in Gottschalk v. Benson. See supra text accompanying
note 38.
434 In case you have forgotten, Benson is the leading case in which the Supreme Court held
that algorithms that can be executed by a computer are unpatentable. See supra Part II.A.435 And what information is.
436 Donald Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, SEMINUMERICAL ALGORITHMS
181-82 (2d ed., 1981).437 The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same .... 35 U.S.C. § 112.
438 See, e.g., supra note 21.
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.... The modem meaning for algorithm is quite similar to
that of recipe, process, method, technique, procedure, routine,
except that the word "algorithm" connotes something just a
little different. Besides merely being a finite set of rules
which gives a sequence of operations for solving a specific
type of problem, an algorithm has five important features:
(1) Finiteness. An algorithm must always terminate
after a finite number of steps .... Note, however, that
the number of steps can become arbitrarily large ....
(A procedure which has all of the characteristics of
an algorithm except that it possibly lacks finiteness
may be called a "computational method."....)
(2) Definiteness. Each step of an algorithm must be
precisely defined; the actions to be carried out must
be rigorously and unambiguously specified for each
case. . . . (3) Input. An algorithm has zero or more
inputs, i.e., quantities which are given to it initially
before the algorithm begins. These inputs are taken
from specified sets of objects....
(4) Output. An algorithm has one or more outputs,
i.e., quantities which have a specified relation to the
inputs....
(5) Effectiveness. An algorithm is also generally
expected to be effective. This means that all of the
operations to be performed in the algorithm must be
sufficiently basic that they can in principle be done
exactly and in a finite length of time by a man using
pencil and paper ....
Now it turns out that algorithms can be perceived not only as
computer programs but also as the underlying processes that are
responsible for Darwinian evolution.
The theoretical power of Darwin's abstract scheme was due
to several features that Darwin quite firmly identified ... but
439 Donald E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, FUNDAMENTAL ALGORITHMS 1-
9 (2d ed., 1973) [hereinafter "Fundamental Algorithms"]. Nota bene the requirement that the
operations of carrying out an algorithm can be performed in principal by a man using paper and
pencil corresponds to Justice Douglas's explanation that algorithms can be carried out by "head
and hand." See supra text accompanying note 76. A man solving a problem by head and hand is
a classic example of a "mental process" and his solution to the problem is an idea.
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lacked the terminology to describe explicitly.... Darwin had
discovered the power of an algorithm. An algorithm is a
certain sort of formal process that can be counted on-
logically-to yield a certain sort of result when it is "run" or
instantiated. Algorithms are not new, and were not new in
Darwin's day. Many familiar arithmetic processes, such as
long division or balancing you checkbook, are algorithms,
and so are the decision procedures for playing perfect tic-tac-
toe, and for putting a list of words into alphabetical order.
What is relatively new-permitting us valuable hindsight on
Darwin's discovery-is the theoretical reflection by
mathematicians and logicians on the nature and power of
algorithms in general, a twentieth century development which
led to the birth of the computer, which has led in turn, of
course, to a much deeper and more lively understanding of
the power of algorithms in general.
The term algorithm descends ... from the name of a Persian
mathematician, Mfiusd al-Khowdrizm, whose book on
arithmetical procedures, written about 835 A.D. was
translated into Latin in the twelfth century .... The idea that
an algorithm is a foolproof and somehow "mechanical"
procedure has been present for centuries, but it was the
pioneering work of Alan Turing, Kurt Gdel, and Alonzo
Church in the 1930s that more or less fixed our current
understanding of the term. Three key features of algorithms
will be important to us, and each is somewhat difficult to
define....
(1)substrate neutrality: The procedure for long
division works equally well with pencil or pen, paper
or parchment, neon lights or skywriting, using any
symbol system you like. The power of the procedure
is due to its logical structure, not the causal properties
of the materials used in the insubstantiation, just so
long as those causal powers permit the prescribed
steps to be followed exactly.
(2) underlying mindlessness: Although the overall
design of the procedure may be brilliant, or yield
brilliant results, each constituent step, as well as the
transition between steps, is utterly simple. How
[Vol. 58:2
YOU CAN'T PATENT SOFTWARE
simple? Simple enough for a dutiful idiot to perform.
(3) guaranteed results: Whatever it is that an
algorithm does, it always does it, if it is executed
without misstep. An algorithm is a foolproof recipe.
It is easy to see how these features made the
computer possible. Every computer program is an
algorithm, ultimately composed of simple steps that
can be executed with stupendous reliability by one
simple mechanism or another. Electronic circuits are
the usual choice, but the power of computers owes
nothing (save speed) to the causal peculiarities of
electrons darting about on silicon chips. The very
same algorithms can be performed (even faster) by
devices shunting photons in glass fibers, or (much,
much slower) by teams of people using paper and
pencil .... 440
Now it is, I think, fortunate that we do not have to explore
Darwinian algorithms or more outr'e ideas such as the one that the
universe-or, rather, the "multiverse"--is "simply" a quantum
computer making every possible computation. 441 The only algorithms
that concern us are those that we-or our programs-can write and
that can be run on a digital computer or computed by "head and
hand."
2. Legal Algorithms
Those reading this who are trained in the law may, upon first
hearing the term, conclude that algorithms have nothing to do with
legal practice. But every time we draft a contract, or a will, or some
proposed legislation, if the instructions that instrument contains are
precise enough, then we have just written an algorithm.
Programmers write computer programs; lawyers write forms of
legal instruments;442 both write algorithms. Though lawyers for the
most part may not understand-or even care-what computer
programs are and though programmers may not know or care what a
440Id.
441 LLOYD, supra note 178.
442 As lawyers know, but most others perhaps do not, very few lawyers spend their time
trying cases in court, but almost all lawyers spend at least some of their time in drafting-and
interpreting-legal instruments. As to what a legal instrument is, see infra notes 448 and 449
and accompanying text
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legal instrument is, there is little to distinguish one of their activities
from the other, even though the texts that they produce are ultimately
used to accomplish what at first 443 at least appears to be very different
ends.
As you by now should be aware a working definition of a
"computer program" is "a set of instructions-that is, an algorithm-
that can be fed into a computer in order to cause it to perform certain
specified actions." Here are some more definitions that I have
liberated from the Jargon File, that collection of often humorous
examples of the way that computer programmers think of things;
1. A magic spell cast over a computer allowing it to turn
one's input into error messages.
2. An exercise in experimental epistemology.
3. A form of art, ostensibly intended for the instruction of
computers, which is nevertheless almost inevitably a failure if
other programmers can't understand it.44
It is a bit more difficult to give a definition of a "legal
instrument,"" 5 but the following definition taken from the
Online version of the Oxford English Dictionary should serve
well enough for our purposes:
5. a. Law. A formal legal document whereby a right is created
or confirmed, or a fact recorded; a formal writing of any kind,
as an agreement, deed, charter, or record, drawn up and
executed in technical form, so as to be of legal validity.
I would add that legal instruments are, as their name suggests,
instrumental in accomplishing some goal, in much the same way that
443 As we shall see, legal instruments can be instantiated as computer programs and
computer programs can produce forms of legal instruments.
4" The Jargon File Program.
44 5 When I was an undergraduate one of my friends was stabbed, accidentally as it turned
out, by a roommate of his who was playing percussion on a radiator with a screwdriver, and
who got my friend on the back swing as my friend tried to tap him on the shoulder and tell him
to shut up. That had been a busy night for the university police, for a couple of freshmen had
earlier gotten into an argument about the temperature at which some home-brewed rocket fuel
would explode and had blown up their room when they put their theories to the test. But, in any
case, in due time my friend was carted off to the infirmary. The next morning the student
newspaper reported that the university police had reported that my friend had been stabbed with
a sharp instrument but that the only instrument that they could find in the room was a violin. So
perhaps the term "instrument" is inherently ambiguous, although I hope it is clear that a legal
instrument is something that is written and that it therefore can't be something like a
screwdriver or a violin any more than a computer program is like the wiring in a telephone.
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computer programs are; they create legal rights and liabilities and
privileges and licenses and instruct the parties to do, or refrain from
doing, certain acts.
Perhaps the best example of a legal instrument is a deed that
conveys land from one person to another.4 6
Now for a deed to come into existence someone first has to write
it-or, in the language of lawyers, draft it-or, perhaps, copy it, with
suitable modifications 447 from some pre-existing form. A key point
about a draft of a deed is that it is a document, a text, that, by itself
does not do anything.448 It is only when it is executed-that is, signed
and dated and delivered by the grantor to the grantee-that it actually
becomes an effective legal instrument that conveys the land in
question from the grantor to the grantee.
Another example of a legal instrument is the GNU General Public
License that applies to this work---or, at least those versions of this
work that are computer programs. 449 Perhaps the simplest example of
a legal instrument is a promissory note:
Promissory Note.
FOR VALUE RECEIVED I, Insert Name of Maker , promise to pay to
the order of Insert Name of Payee the sum of Insert Amount in Words
Dollars ($j lawful money of the United States, on demand.
Signature
Date:
As has already been mentioned,450 patent applications are also a
form of legal instrument, and one that is supposed to be as precise as
any other algorithm.45'
From this description it should be clear that, when "executed,"
both legal instruments and computer programs cause something to
happen, although the type of things that happen may appear to be
446 A type of legal instrument that I drafted--or just had my secretary copy from an earlier
example, filling in the new names of the parties and the description of the land to be
conveyed-innumerable times during the nine years that I was a practicing lawyer before I went
off to Cleveland and fell among legal academics.
447 For example, changing the names of the parties and the description of the land
48 Except perhaps serve as a model-a form-that can be copied and modified to create
another draft of a deed.
449 The GNU General Public License, available at http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/
gpl.html.450 See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
451 Recall that in Gottschalk v. Benson the claimed invention was called an "algorithm."
See supra note 38.
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radically different. Computer programs produce numbers--or, more
precisely, representations of numbers-as their outputs, while legal
instruments produce changes in legal relations. The important point is
that neither of these outcomes involves any particular change in any
material object. In this respect the processes of writing drafts of legal
forms and of writing computer programs are so similar that they
should be treated by patent law in the same fashion. If legal forms are
not patentable, then computer programs should not be patentable. And
if computer programs are patentable, then legal forms should be
patentable, a conclusion that should horrify any lawyer who has ever
made use of a legal form book.452
The near identity of programs and legal instruments was neatly
illustrated for me many years ago just after I finished taking the IBM
Executive Computer Concepts course.453 I happened to look into a
colleague's office, and there pinned on the wall behind his desk was
the largest flow chart I had ever seen.454 When I asked him what it
was for, he reminded me that we represented a settlement agreement
involving extensive multiparty litigation and millions of dollars in
payments that were to be made by some of the parties to others only if
certain conditions were met. It was our job to see that the payments
were made when due and to make sure that they were not made when
they were not due. He then explained that the flow chart covered all
of the possible contingencies that could arise under the agreement, so
that he could tell upon the happening of any relevant event exactly
who was entitled to what. I was duly impressed and, with my new
found interest in computers, asked him if he had thought of
implementing the flow chart as a computer program. And then he
kindly explained that that would be a complete waste of time since
whatever happened would only happen once; that there would never
be another agreement like the one whose application we were
supervising. And yet, by translating the agreement into that flow chart
my colleague had clearly demonstrated the agreement actually was an
algorithm and that, when he followed the instructions contained in the
flow chart, he was implementing a program that could have been run
on a computer were that not a waste of time.
452 It is, in fact, difficult not to conclude that the Federal Circuit has already held in State
Street that legal forms are patentable, since the "Hub and Spoke Financial Services
Configuration" held to be patentable in that case consists of little more than a bunch of legal
forms. See supra Part 1lI.B.453 See supra note 385 and accompanying text.45 And I have never seen a larger one since.
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3. Computational Processes
The simple truth-at least simple to state if not simple to
explain-is that the computational processes that are covered by
software patents and the legal processes that are created by legal
instruments, are radically different from processes like curing rubber
or building machines or cooking a seagull that are traditional
patentable subject matter.
Consider the following passage from the so-called "Wizard
Book": 455 the text used in MIT's entry-level computer science course.
We are about to study the idea of a computational process.
Computational processes are abstract beings that inhabit
computers. As they evolve, processes manipulate other
abstract things called data. The evolution of a process is
directed by a pattern of rules called a program. People create
programs. In effect, we conjure the spirits of the computer
with our spells.
A computation process is indeed much like a sorcerer's idea
of a spirit. It cannot be seen or touched. It is not composed of
matter at all. However, it is very real. It can perform
intellectual work. It can answer questions. It can affect the
world by disbursing money at a bank or by controlling a robot
arm in a factory. The programs we use to control processes
are like a sorcerer's spells. They are carefully composed from
symbolic expressions in arcane and esoteric programming
languages that prescribe the tasks we want our processes to
perform.
A computational process, in a correctly working computer,
executes programs precisely and accurately. Thus, like the
sorcerer's apprentice, novice programmers must learn to
understand and to anticipate the consequences of their
conjuring. Even small errors (usually called bugs or glitches)
in programs can have complex and unanticipated
consequences.456
455 HAL ABELSON, JERRY SUSSMAN & JULE SUSSMAN, STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETATION
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS (MIT Press 1996), is an excellent computer science text used in
introductory courses at MIT. So called because of the wizard on the jacket. One of the bibles of
the LISP/Scheme world. Also, less commonly, known as the "Purple Book." Jargon File,
Wizard Book.456 H. Abelson & G. Sussman, Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs,
http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book-Z-H-6.html.
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Thinking of the computer programs that execute computational
processes as the spells of a sorcerer may well be the simplest way for
most lawyers to think of them, especially when we realize that we too
also cast spells that have very real consequences. When A signs and
delivers to B a copy of a deed prepared by a lawyer,457 suddenly that
plot, piece, or parcel of land known as Blackacre belongs to B rather
than to A.458
As I have pointed out before, few lawyers would think that it is a
good idea that the spells in their form books could be patented.459
4. Programming Languages
Let me repeat a key part of that quotation from the Wizard Book
The programs we use to control processes are like a
sorcerer's spells. They are carefully composed from symbolic
expressions in arcane and esoteric programming languages
that prescribe the tasks we want our processes to perform.46 °
We should realize that a patent on a computer program is not
limited to any particular programming language,461 but rather covers
all possible implementations written in all possible programming
languages. Here, for example, is a program-a very small one-that
is written in the BASIC4 62 programming language:
10 PRINT "Hello World!"
BYE
457 Or a lawyer's secretary.
458As I recall it, Robert Heinlein, in his short novel Magic, Inc., describes a world like
ours in which the laws of magic have replaced the laws of physics; every profession is radically
affected by this change except the law, for it turns out that lawyers had been practicing magic all
the time.459 See supra text accompanying note 455.
46°See supra note 459.
461 Programming languages normally are designed as an abstract set of specifications and
then are instantiated as particular programs called "compilers" or "interpreters" running on
particular computers. There are lots of versions of the BASIC programming language, many of
which run on the same hardware. On the other hand, some compilers, such as the GNU project
C and C++ compiler, can compile programs written in more than one programming language.
462 "BASIC" is an acronym for "Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code." It
was developed at Dartmouth for use by non-science students and copying it was encouraged by
Dartmouth. In 1975 Microsoft started marketing a version of BASIC as its first product and that
version was to become pretty much the standard on personal computers. Wikipedia, BASIC. If
BASIC had been patented by Dartmouth, we might have been spared "Microsoft Basic," which
I at least found to be a totally worthless back in the days before the IBM PC was dreamed of and
I was running the CP/M operating system on a NorthStar Horizon computer with 56K of
memory. (That is why I had to learn to program using the ASM assembly language. See supra
note 389).
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If one puts that program into a file"'  in this example, a file




will appear on the computer s video scrccn.
A similar "I llo World" program has been kxvritten fbr almost
every programming language that exists today4
'5 although
some of those progranis arc much more complicated than,
and bear little resemblance to, the BASIC version. Thus, for
example, the G Code version 4"() carves an image on a metal
surface, rather than just printing out the characters "Hello
World."
Yet each of these multitudinous programs would be covered by a
patent on a program that causes ' l1elo World" to appear on the
computer's screen or some other output device. And think of how
many programs would be co\,cred by a more general patent covering
any program that prints out any string of text on any output device.
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I think that we all should be very happy that, back in the days
when the first "Hello World" program was written, nobody dreamed
that software could be patented.
Another set of computer programs written in many different
programming languages that all produce the same output is the
wonderful collection-known as the "Gallery of CSS
Descramblers'A67 --of computer programs, assembled and maintained
by Dave Touretzky
468
Here is Touretzky's explanation of why he created the gallery-
were it not much too long, I would be delighted to include the entire
gallery as an appendix here:
On January 20, 2000, United States District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York issued a
preliminary injunction in Universal City Studios et al. v.
Reimerdes et al., prohibiting the defendants from distributing
computer code for reading encrypted DVDs. The defendants
had been sued under 17 USC 1201(a)(2), also known as
section 1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Judge Kaplan subsequently issued a memorandum order in
which he indicated that executable source code was not
subject to First Amendment protection against prior restraint
of speech. This finding is contrary to that of the 9th Circuit
US Court of Appeals, who ruled in the Bernstein
cryptography case that source code is indeed protected
speech. In their decision, The 9th Circuit even quoted some
Scheme code from the declaration of MIT Professor Harold
Abelson, explaining why source code is an effective and
sometimes preferred means of human communication.
Professor Andrew Appel of Princeton University also filed a
declaration explaining the importance for computer science of
being able to publish source code. More recently, the 6th
Circuit US Court of Appeals ruled in the Junger cryptography
case469 that, independent of its functional significance, the
expressive nature of source code affords it First Amendment
protection.
If code that can be directly compiled and executed may be
suppressed under the DMCA, as Judge Kaplan asserts in his
467 http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/ dst/DeCSS/Gallery/.
4"s Research Professor in the Computer Science Department and the Center for the Neural
Basis of Cognition at Carnegie Mellon University, http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/dst/.
4 9 See supra note 412.
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preliminary ruling, but a textual description of the same
algorithm may not be suppressed, then where exactly should
the line be drawn? This web site was created to explore this
issue, and point out the absurdity of Judge Kaplan's position
that source code can be legally differentiated from other
forms of written expression.
Although Touretzky was concerned with the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, his collection nicely illustrates the point that if a
software patent470 is infringed by someone writing, using, or selling a
computer program471 then such infringements would include the
writing, executing-either on a machine or by head and hand-, or
selling of any algorithm implementing the patented software, even if
the algorithm were simply written in English or in the form of a
mathematical formula. Or even wearing a tie with the algorithm
printed on it.
472
Touretzky's collection also raises the question of whether it would
violate the provisions of the First Amendment protecting the
freedoms of speech and of the press to treat the writing or distribution
of a computer program as a patent infringement.
5. Software as Text
Having written a few-quite trivial---computer programs, I tend to
think of software as a text, in the sense of the first definition of that
word given in the online edition of the OED: "The wording of
anything written or printed; the structure formed by the words in their
order; the very words, phrases, and sentences as written." And
thinking of software as a text, I naturally think that it is not patentable
and in fact that its publication is protected by the freedoms of speech
and of the press that the First Amendment of the constitution assures
us shall not be abridged. The fact that software as written is a text--
that computer programs as stored in a tangible medium of expression
are a text-is so fundamental to an understanding of computing and
the law, that there is really not very much that I can say about it.
470 or any other patent.
47135 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.
4721 still have a tie with a "CSS Descrambler" program printed on it. A picture of s tie like
that is included in Touretzky's collection.
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Programs are written and therefore programs are writings. And
writings are texts.
What more is there to say?
There is, of course, the danger that some readers, thinking of
programs as processes that run when one "clicks" on an "icon" or a
"button," may not be able to accept the reality that software is a
written text rather than a machine; the fact remains, however, that
every program that can be induced to run by judicious "clicking" is
actually stored somewhere within the computer as a text. The use of a
Graphical User Interface 473 may make life easier for computer users
who have trouble reading and writing, but it also makes it easier to
confuse the text of software with a machine. The damage that is done
to the minds of those who rely on GUIs to communicate with their
computers is explored at length in a essay by Neal Stephenson
entitled In the Beginning was the Command Line.474
If you have trouble thinking of computer programs as simply being
a text, you certainly should read Stephenson's essay. Here is a small
sampling of what he has to say:
[C]omputers do arithmetic on bits of information. Humans
construe the bits as meaningful symbols. But this distinction
is now being blurred, or at least complicated, by the advent of
modem operating systems that use, and frequently abuse, the
power of metaphor to make computers accessible to a larger
audience .....
People who have only interacted with computers through
graphical user interfaces like the MacOS or Windows-which
is to say, almost everyone who has ever used a computer-
may have been startled, or at least bemused, to hear about the
telegraph machine that I used to communicate with a
computer in 1973. But there was, and is, a good reason for
using this particular kind of technology. Human beings have
various ways of communicating to each other, such as music,
art, dance, and facial expressions, but some of these are more
amenable than others to being expressed as strings of
symbols. Written language is the easiest of all, because, of
course, it consists of strings of symbols to begin with. If the
symbols happen to belong to a phonetic alphabet (as opposed
to, say, ideograms), converting them into bits is a trivial
procedure, and one that was nailed, technologically, in the
473 See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
474 http://www.cryptonomicon.com/beginning.html.
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early nineteenth century, with the introduction of Morse code
and other forms of telegraphy.
We had a human/computer interface a hundred years before
we had computers. When computers came into being around
the time of the Second World War, humans, quite naturally,
communicated with them by simply grafting them on to the
already-existing technologies for translating letters into bits
and vice versa: teletypes and punch card machines.
[T]he first job that any coder needs to do when writing a new
piece of software is to figure out how to take the information
that is being worked with (in a graphics program, an image;
in a spreadsheet, a grid of numbers) and turn it into a linear
string of bytes. These strings of bytes are commonly called
files or (somewhat more hiply) streams. They are to
telegrams what modem humans are to Cro-Magnon man,
which is to say the same thing under a different name. All
that you see on your computer screen-your Tomb Raider,
your digitized voice mail messages, faxes, and word
processing documents written in thirty-seven different
typefaces-is still, from the computer's point of view, just like
telegrams, except much longer, and demanding of more
arithmetic.
When discussing software by itself we may find it helpful to
consider it to be patterns or data or information. But when we discuss
the legal issues relating to software the simplest way to think of it, at
least initially, is as a text-as something that is written that can be
copied and communicated-or as a process that produces such a text.
It was, perhaps not surprisingly, one of the most insistent
advocates of the peculiar idea that a text can be a machine who was
forced to confront the question of whether a patent on a machine
made of text could infringe the freedom of speech and of the press
clauses of the First Amendment, for it is the communication and
printing of texts that is protected by that amendment and, even if one
believes that a text is a patentable machine, a text still remains a text.
Back in November of 2000 Dan L. Burk published an article
entitled Patenting Speech475 in which he claimed that:
475 79 TEX. L. REv. 99 (2000).
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Far from being the instruction manual to an intricate and
complicated machine, computer code is in fact the machine
itself. Software is not a text, it is a machine built of text. Just
as physical machines are built from tangible media such as
wood, steel, and plastic, programs are built from source
code.476
Of course, having concluded that the text that is a computer
program is also a patentable machine, Burk was ultimately forced to
deal with the problem of whether the idea-the algorithm-contained
in the text of a program was patentable if it were implemented by a
human being rather than by a computer and, if the idea were
patentable, how that result could be justified under the terms of the
First Amendment.
Here is a small part of what Burk has to say on this point:
To say that software has been recently accommodated within
patent law is not to say that software now fits comfortably
within patent law. If the functional characteristics of software
that fit poorly within copyright seem to indicate it would be
better protected under patent law, the expressive
characteristics that seem to indicate software is better
protected under copyright concomitantly fit poorly within
patent law. Initially, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate in
Gottshalk v. Benson that software algorithms could not be
protected under patent law. The Court reached much the same
result in Parker v. Flook, but subsequently modified its rule
in Diamond v. Diehr to hold that software could be patentable
under rather stringent constraints. In particular, the Supreme
Court specified that the operation of the computer program
must be tied to some physical result-almost a "fixation" rule
for patent law.
This requirement of a physical result linked to the computer
process was at first applied with some rigor. However, lower
courts, particularly the Court of Appeals for the Federal
4761d. at 119. In fairness to Burk it should be pointed out that he was criticizing cases, like
Junger v. Daley (see supra note 412), where the "source code" written by a programmer was
treated as a text protected by the First Amendment, while the "machine code" that is executed
by a computer was not accorded that protection. (Although whether machine code is protected
by the First Amendment was not at issue in those cases). As Touretzky's Gallery of CSS
Descramblers demonstrates (see supra note 470 and accompanying text), it makes as little sense
to treat source code as a text while denying the same status to machine code as it does to claim
that such texts are actually machines.
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Circuit, have incrementally stretched the Diehr holding to the
point that patent now covers essentially any sort of software,
in almost any embodiment. Thus,... [it] may be that we now
have a category of patentable expression in computer
software, a juxtaposition of legal requirements that is wholly
unprecedented. Moreover, the proliferation of software-
related patents for systems that traditionally constitute forms
of speech, including systems of writing and systems for voice
command recognition, has created a unique set of problems.
Unlike copyright, which was intended to deal with expressive
subject matter, patent law has been almost entirely isolated
from First Amendment considerations. If copyright law has
proven poorly suited to distinguishing function from
expression, patent law is likely to prove even more poorly
suited to the task, and may lack altogether the doctrinal tools
to accommodate the First Amendment concerns associated
with proprietary speech.477
Of course, as Burk seems to realize,478 the difficulties with
applying First Amendment protections to patented speech would
simply disappear were the courts to return, as I think they inevitably
will, to the rule established in Benson that algorithms are not
patentable. Even if one suffers from the delusion that a computer
program is a machine made out of text that does not necessarily mean
that computer programs should be patentable. As Burke says:
If patent law is unable to separate the expressive and
functional aspects of computer code, then it may instead be
required to somehow accommodate First Amendment
interests in that code, much as copyright law has done in its
development of fair use, original authorship, and the
idea/expression dichotomy. But patent law at present is
singularly ill-equipped to make such an accommodation,
particularly now that it has been reshaped to protect computer
algorithms. It is no coincidence that the admission of
software into the canon of patentable subject matter has
resulted in the systematic eradication of a cluster of patent
doctrines, for it was precisely these doctrines restricting the
patentability of mental steps or printed matter that tended to
impede the incorporation of software into patentable subject
477 Id. at 137 (footnotes omitted).
478 In the next Part of his article Burk gives has an excellent discussion of the demise of the
doctrine that "mental steps" are not patentable at the hands of the Federal Circuit.
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matter. The introduction of expressive subject matter into
patent law may require revival or reformation of one or more
of these patent doctrines in order to re-establish the line
between function and expression in patentable subject matter.
Alternatively, some doctrine of patent fair use may be
required to accommodate expressive material that falls under
the patent umbrella.479
6. Software as a Thought Process
As I have mentioned,48 ° those who have not written a computer
program or two are likely to think of computer programs as processes
that run when one clicks on an the icon that invokes them. Thus we
click on the icon for a calculator and asks it what is 328+3 and, after
an extremely short while, it prints out 328+3 =109.333333333, doing
our thinking for us. Or we submit the word "wubmit" to a spelling
checker which informs us that we probably meant "submit," again
doing our thinking for us.
481
If when we solve those problems in our heads-perhaps with the
aid of paper and pencil or a dictionary-we think that we are
thinking, why should we deny that thought process are involved when
we ask a computer-or our secretary-to solve the problems for us?
In the preface to the first edition of the text used in the entry level
course in computer science at MIT, the authors say:
Our design of this introductory computer-science subject
reflects two major concerns. First, we want to establish the
idea that a computer language is not just a way of getting a
computer to perform operations but rather that it is a novel
formal medium for expressing ideas about methodology.
Thus, programs must be written for people to read, and only
incidentally for machines to execute....
Underlying our approach to this subject is our conviction that
''computer science" is not a science and that its significance
has little to do with computers. The computer revolution is a
revolution in the way we think and in the way we express
what we think. The essence of this change is the emergence
479Id. at 16 L-61.
490 See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
481 I was surprise to note that my spell checker produced "wabbit" as another possibility.
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of what might be called procedural epistemology-the study
of the structure of knowledge from an imperative point of
view, as opposed to the more declarative point of view taken
by classical mathematical subjects. Mathematics provides a
framework for dealing precisely with notions of "what is."
Computation provides a framework for dealing precisely with
notions of "how to."
'82
Viewed in this fashion, of course, programs have little to do with
computers. Nor are they are functional in the way that a machine is
functional. If they are tools then they are tools for thought. And in
that case it is hard to imagine how anyone could argue that tools for
thought should be patentable.483
Now such tools for thought are, at the moment, pretty much
limited to two distinct categories: programs that run on a brain and
programs that run on a computer. But the day is not far away, if it has
not already arrived, when a computer on a chip will be inserted in a
human brain.
484
If someone were to argue, as someone probably will, that if there
is a patent on a computer program it would be infringed if one, who is
not licensed to use it, executes it on a computer, but not infringed if
one executes it in one's brain, what happens when a computer is
wired into a brain?
It is hard not to agree with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gottschalk v. Benson that algorithms that describe mental processes
are not patentable, whether they are executed by a computer or by
"head and hand."
7. Interchangeability of Software and Data
It is customary to distinguish between programs and data,
programs containing the instructions as to how the data is to be
processed, data being the information that is processed by the
program running on the computer. In so far as I know, no one has
ever argued that the data processed by a computer is a machine, or
part of a machine, or so functional that it should not be treated as text.
In actuality, however, there is no absolute way to distinguish a
482H. ABELSON & G.J. SUSSMAN, STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETATION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS xvii-xviii (2d ed., 1996) [hereinafter ABELSON].
483 See also what Newell had to say in the text supra accompanying note 196.484 See Bob Calverley, USC Engineers Look to the Brain For the Next-Generation
Computer Chip, http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/stories/8213.html. Making a chip that can be
connected to human brain tissue and take over a cognitive function that has been destroyed by
ailments such as epilepsy and Alzheimer's is one researcher's ultimate goal.
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program from data. For example, the source code of a program
written in the C programming language is the data that is processed
by a C compiler that converts the source code into object code.485
8. Software as Fundamental Truths or Laws of Nature
Since the Church-Turing thesis tells us that a Turing Machine, or
any general purpose computer, can be used to calculate any calculable
485 And the object code that is produced by that compiler is the data-the source code-
that is processed by a decompiler that attempts to turn what was the object code back into
something like the original source code.
Here is a more technical discussion of this point, taken from the Part of Abelson that is
captioned: "Data as Programs:"
In thinking about a Lisp program that evaluates Lisp expressions, an analogy might be
helpful. One operational view of the meaning of a program is that a program is a description of
an abstract (perhaps infinitely large) machine. For example, consider the familiar program to
compare factorials:
(define(factorial n) (if( = n 1) 1 (* (factorial (- n 1)) n)))
We may regard this program as the description of a machine containing parts that
decrement, multiply, and test for equality, together with a two position switch and another
factorial machine. (The factorial machine is infinite because it contains another factorial
machine within it.) .... In a similar way, we can regard the evaluator as a very special machine
that takes as input a description of a machine. Given this input, the evaluator configures itself to
emulate the machine described. For example, if we feed our evaluator the definition of a
factorial . .. , the evaluator will be able to compute factorials. From this perspective, our
evaluator is seen to be a universal machine. It mimics other machines when these are described
as Lisp programs. This is striking.... Another striking aspect of the evaluator is that it acts as a
bridge between the data objects that are manipulated by our programming language and the
programming language itself. Imagine that the evaluator program (implemented in Lisp) is
running, and that a user is typing expressions to the evaluator and observing the results. From
the perspective of the user, an input expression such as (* x x) is an expression in the
programming language, which the evaluator should execute. From the perspective of the
evaluator, however, the expression is simply a list (in this case, a list of three symbols: *, x, and
x) that is to be manipulated according to a well-defined set of rules. That the user's programs
are the evaluator's data need not be a source of confusion. In fact, it is sometimes convenient to
ignore this distinction and give the user the ability to explicitly evaluate a data-object as a Lisp
expression .... ABELSON, supra note 382, at 384-87 (footnotes omitted). The authors add the
following information in a footnote: The fact that the machines are described in Lisp is
inessential. If we give our evaluator a Lisp program that behaves as an evaluator for some other
language, say C, the Lisp evaluator will emulate the C evaluator, which in turn can emulate any
machine described as a C program. Similarly, writing a Lisp evaluator in C produces a C
program that can execute any Lisp program. The deep idea here is that any evaluator can
emulate any other. Thus, the notion of "what can in principle be computed" (ignoring
practicalities of time and memory required) is independent of the language or the computer, and
instead reflects an underlying notion of computability. This was first demonstrated in a clear
way by Alan Turing (1912-1954), whose 1936 paper laid the foundations for theoretical
computer science. In the paper, Turing presented a simple computational model-now known as
a Turing machine-and argued that any "effective process" can be formulated as a program for
such a machine. (This argument is known as the Church-Turing thesis.) Turing then
implemented a universal machine, i.e., a Turing machine that behaves as an evaluator for Turing
machine programs. He used this framework to demonstrate that there are well-posed problems
that cannot be computed by Turing machines..., and so cannot be formulated as "effective
processes." Abelson, supra note 382, at 386, n 19. For more on Turing machines see supra Part
VI.A.3(a)(ii).
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function, it follows that when any such calculation is made it will
always produce the same result and that that outcome is necessarily a
fundamental 486 truth or law of mathematics. Thus when one performs
a computation, with or without the aid of a computer, the result that
one "discovers" will inevitably be a fundamental487 truth or law, not
only of mathematics, but also of nature.488
This, of course, is the basis for the conclusion of the Supreme
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson that mathematical algorithms cannot be
patented because they are "laws of nature. 489
9. Software Revisited
There is a wonderful article by Peter Suber490 entitled "What is
Software?" 491 that anyone who wants to grasp the true nature of
software should read.
The key points that Suber makes are summed up in the "Abstract"
at the beginning of the article:
In defining the concept of software, I try at first to distinguish
software from data, noise, and abstract patterns of information
with no material embodiment. But serious objections prevent
any of these distinctions from remaining stable. The strong
thesis that software is pattern per se, or syntactical form, is
initially refined to overcome obvious difficulties; but further
arguments show that the refinements are trivial and that the
strong thesis is defensible.
What is of most interest to me is the fact that Suber could not draw
a strong distinction between "software" and "abstract patterns of
information," that is, that he could not make a strong distinction
between software and the abstract information that could be processed
by a computer in accordance with the instructions contained in the
software.
486 If perhaps trivial.
487 See supra note 489.
488 The fact that most of what we call "laws of nature" can only be established inductively,
while the truths of mathematics are arrived at deductively is not a distinction that need concern
us here, any more than we need to take a position on the debates among philosophers of
mathematics about whether the realists or the formalists or the inductivists are right. (If you are
interested in such issues, you might want to look at Wikipedia, Philosophy of Mathematics,
Contemporary Schools of Thought, http://tinyurl.com/pp8u7).489 See supra text accompanying note 40.
490 One of the few people who have taught both philosophy and computer science and to
have both a JD and a PhD. http://www.earlham.edu/_peters/hometoc.htm.
491 http://www.earlham.edu/_peters/writing/software.htm.
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It turns out that software is information 492 on how to process data
and data is information493 that someone is interested in processing.
And that leads, inevitably, the question: What is information?
C. Information
The question: "What is information?" turns out to be quite difficult
to answer. People use the word "information" with a variety of
meanings and, more often than not, they assume that it must mean
something or be informative in some way. The use of the word
"information" that concerns us, however, is its use in the description
of computers as machines494 that do nothing but implement
algorithms 495 that mindlessly process information without any concern
for meaning or informativeness.496
For our purposes "information" is a pattern of bits497 that can be
stored on a tangible substrate like a CD-ROM or transmitted as a
signal conducted by a stream of electrons or photons or other forms of
energy. At a more fundamental level, where fortunately we need not
go, matter, energy, and information are the fundamental categories
that make up the universe that is studied by physicists, although
information has not been as extensively studied as matter and
498energy.
Suber was not quite right when he said that software, which as we
have seen is a form of information, is "patterns of information."
Information does take the form of patterns all right, but it would
obviously lead to an infinite regress to say that information consists of
patterns of information which are patterns of information which are
patterns of informationund so weiter. Instead information consists of
a pattern or patterns exhibited by particles of matter or by quanta of
energy.




5 See supra Part VI.B. 1.496 Information tends to drive out knowledge. Information is just signs and numbers, while
knowledge has semantic value. What we want is knowledge, but what we often get is
information. It is a sign of the times that many people cannot tell the difference between
information and knowledge, not to mention wisdom, which even knowledge tends to drive out.
HEINZ PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF REASON 49 (Simon and Schuster 1988).
497L e. binary digits.
498 General systems theorists often refer to matter, energy and information as fundamental
categories. The three concepts-matter, energy and information-are related through scientific
laws. Matter and energy relations are more thoroughly understood than relations involving
information. At the level of data or signal "difference" is suggested as a more elementary term
than "information." Stuart A. Umpleby, Physical Relationships Among Matter, Energy and
Information, http://tinyurl.com/q2vfl.
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Information in the sense that we are using it-as well as the use of
the term "bit" for binary digit-was first well defined in C.E.
Shannon's seminal article "A Mathematical Theory of
Communication. 'A
99
As Shannon explains at the outset:
The fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a
message selected at another point. Frequently the messages
have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according
to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.
These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to
the engineering problem. ....'00
Shannon was concerned with the amount of information-the
number of meaningless bits-that it would to take to convey a
message from one point to another and it is meaningless bits in this
sense that are processed by a computer, often to satisfy someone's
desire to compress the number of bits in a message.
There is thus some sort of relation between the concepts of bits
and of information, although what that relation is is not easy to
explain.50 1 But then I am not alone in having this difficulty. Seth
Lloyd writes in his book "Programming the Universe":
I began the initial meeting of my MIT graduate course on
information in the manner I begin all of my courses: "First," I
said to the twenty-odd students, "you ask questions and I'll
try to answer them. Second, if you don't ask questions, I'll
ask you questions. Third, if you don't answer my questions,
I'll tell you something I think you ought to know. Any
questions?"
I waited. No response.
Something was wrong. Normally, MIT students are more
than happy to try to stump the professor, particularly if the
alternative is that the professor will try to stump them.
499 27 BELL SYSTEM TECHNICAL JOURNAL 379-423, 623-56 (1948). You may recall that it
was also Claude Shannon who frst recognized that Boolean algebra can be used to describe the
circuits within digital electronic computers. See supra notes 358-61 and accompanying text.
5Id. atp. 1.
51 I am reminded of the unhappy days when I was a draftee in the infantry and our first
sergeant used to say every other day or so at some formation or other: "Gentlemen, I want to tell
you something I know nothing about."
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I moved on two step two: "No questions? Then here's one for
you: What is information?"
Nothing. This was even worse. After all, these students had
been stuffing themselves full of information since freshman
year. If they didn't regurgitate some of it, I was going to have
to resort to step three.
"OK. How about this one: What is the unit of information?"
At once, the class responded, "The bit!"
What do my students' answers, or lack thereof, reveal? That
it is far easier to measure a quantity of information than to
11502say what information is....
It is Lloyd's thesis that the universe is a computer-a quantum
computer-that computes itself, and this leads him to discuss many
difficult matters that we do not need to consider. But Lloyd's initial
discussions of what information is and what bits are and what
computers are are very relevant to the matters discussed in this article
and it certainly should not hurt you to read them.
The key point for our purposes is that information is not composed
of the physical particles or quanta that may embody or carry it; rather
information is the order-or pattern-that may be exhibited by
those-or other-particles and quanta. Information is not matter or
energy, it is simply a pattern, even though there could be no pattern
were there no matter or energy to be patterned. Information is what a
text contains, it is not the ink and paper-or other matter-which
compose the substrate in which the information is stored. The word
"cat" is not a cat, nor are the letters "c", "a", and "t" a cat. The word
"cat" is information that we English speakers are likely to interpret as
a name that refers to a member of the species felix cattus. A picture of
a cat is not a cat, although we may interpret it as conveying
information about a cat, or perhaps about cats in general. I have a
pretty good idea of what a cat is, but that idea is not a cat-it, too, is
information-a pattern of some sort in my brain-and not any
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And the act
Falls the Shadow
The grin on the face of a cat is not the cat. it is pure information. It
is the cat's expression. On the other hand, that expression cannot exist
without the cat, just as no other information can exist without a
material or energetic substrate. The idea of somehow separating an
expression from its substrate inevitably reminds me of the Cheshire
Cat in "Alice in Wonderland" who vanished leaving only his grin
behind.
... and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the
end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained
some time after the rest of it had gone.
The Cheshire Cat
But I suppose that I should stop this before I get busted for
practicing philosophy without a license.
The key points are that information is not any material thing, nor is
it an article of manufacture and that, on the other hand, information
cannot exist apart from a material503 substrate.
VII. CONCLUSION
When I was in law school back in the mid-fifties of the last
Icentury, the received-if somewhat oversimplified-wisdom, even
among those of us who wanted nothing to do with patent law, was
that all patent claims that have been reviewed by the Supreme Court
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are invalid and that all patent claims that have not been reviewed by
the Supreme Court are valid.
I gather that nothing has really changed since then, except that the
Court had, until recently, pretty much given up reviewing patent
claims, And the result, of course, has been that all sorts of patent
claims-including those that cover software-have been upheld by
the lower courts-in particular by the Federal Circuit that has of late
had nearly exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases, even
though the Supreme Court had earlier held in the cases known as
Benson, Flook and Diehr that software, including algorithms for the
processing of information and mathematical formulae, is, like other
abstract ideas, not patentable.
The Supreme Court, however, has of late evidenced a willingness
once again to review patent cases and has even raised sua sponte the
question of whether a patent was invalid because one cannot patent
"laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." And it is also
no longer true that the Federal Circuit can hear appeals in patent cases
where the issue of the validity of the patent was not initially raised in
the plaintiffs complaint: such appeals in federal cases are now heard
by the numbered or D.C. Circuits.
It seems improbable that we will have to wait very long before the
Court has, once again, the opportunity to consider the validity of a
patent on a computer program.
It also seems improbable that when that day of judgment comes
the Court will refuse to follow its own holdings in Benson, Flook, and
Diehr and will instead treat those cases as having been overruled by
the judges of the Federal Circuit. The Court has, after all, never taken
kindly in the past to efforts by the lower courts to openly refuse to
follow its precedents.
. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that those members of
the patent bar and legal academics, who have for years been advising
their clients and students in reliance on the opinions of the Federal
Circuit that software is patentable, will raise a mighty protest that the
Supreme Court was wrong when it decided Benson, Flook, and Diehr
and that the Federal Circuit was right in acting as if it had overruled
those cases.
The trouble with that position is that, as I argue in this article at
what most of you will consider excessive length, the Supreme Court
was right in holding that computer programs are no more patentable
than are mathematical inventions like the calculus or logical truths
like De Morgan's law that "NOT (A AND B)" equals "NOT A OR
NOT B". Computer programs are texts, not machines as some
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lawyers have confused themselves into believing, and thus they may
be copyrighted and protected by the First Amendment, but they are
not patentable as machines. Computer programs are indeed processes,
but they are not patentable processes because what they process is
information and what they produce is information, not some
modification of material goods or articles of commerce.
The simple fact is-though the reasons for it may be hard for most
lawyers to grasp-that, as the title of this article puts it: "You can't
patent software: patenting software is wrong."

